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Economic, social and territorial cohesion 
Disparities in GDP per head between regions in the EU have narrowed markedly over the 
past decade as growth in the least prosperous regions has outstripped that elsewhere. This 
has meant at the same time a lessening of the division in terms of economic potential 
between the core and the periphery and a corresponding reduction in territorial 
imbalance. However, although convergence of levels of GDP per head across regions has 
been accompanied by a narrowing of disparities in rates of employment and 
unemployment, these remain wide between both different parts of the Union and different 
areas within regions so posing a threat in some places to social cohesion.  
The concern here is to document these developments and examine economic and 
demographic developments across the EU over the recent past at national and regional 
level and assesses their implications for cohesion, not only economic and social but also 
territorial, in the sense of the balance between and within regions and between different 
territories. Its primary focus is on the extent to which regional disparities in terms of GDP 
per head, employment and demographic and territorial trends have changed since the 
mid-1990s.  
1.1. GDP trends and convergence at national and regional level 
Since the mid-1990s, the European Union (EU-27) has gone through, first, an 
economic upswing, with growth of real GDP per head1 reaching almost 4% in 2000, 
and, secondly, a slowdown with growth of less than 1% in both 2002 and 2003. In 
2004 and 2005, there was a modest recovery with growth increasing to 1.9% and 
1.3% respectively (Fig. 1.1). 
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1.1 Growth in real GDP per head in the EU-15 and the new Member 
States, 1996-2005
Source: Eurostat  
                                                 
1 Calculating economic growth based on changes in GDP per head instead of GDP has the benefit of 
taking account of changes in the total population. Given the large differences in terms of population 
growth within the EU27, GDP per head growth provides a more meaningful picture of economic 
growth. 
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In the 12 new Member States, the 10 which entered the EU in 2004 and the two 
which did so at the beginning of 2007, the story is different. These 12 countries also 
experienced high GDP per head growth in 2000 of 6%. The subsequent slowdown, 
however, was both much less severe and less widespread, mainly affecting Poland 
(where growth fell from over 5% a year to only just over 1% in 2001 and 2002). 
Growth, therefore, averaged 3.1% in 2001 and rose to 3.4% in 2002. As Poland 
recovered, growth reached 6% in 2003 and 2004 and remained high with 5% in 
2005. 
BOX - The 2007 EU enlargement 
Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union on 1 January 2007. This enlargement added 8.6% 
to the Union’s landmass and 6.3% to its population – a similar addition to when Austria, Finland 
and Sweden joined in the mid-1990s - but only 1% to its GDP measured in purchasing power 
standard terms, less than any previous enlargement. GDP per head is, therefore, only 35% of the 
EU average in Bulgaria and 38% in Romania. Accordingly, the accession of the two countries will 
lower the EU average level of GDP per head by just over 4%. 
Although GDP growth in both countries has been well above the EU average since 2001 (averaging 
5% and 6%, respectively), it would still take another 20 years or so at these rates for their GDP 
per head to reach 75% of the EU average.  
With this enlargement, the Eastern land borders of the EU have grown by 1 300 km. The EU now 
reaches the Black Sea and completely encircles the Western Balkan. The EU border with the 
Ukraine is now almost twice as long. The EU now shares a 500 km border with Moldova. 
Between 1995 and 2005, growth rates varied markedly between the new Member 
States, with some countries growing particularly fast. The three Baltic States have 
doubled their GDP per head in real terms in ten years, with growth averaging 7-8% a 
year. In contrast, Bulgaria and Romania saw their economies contract in the second 
half of the 1990s, but since 2000, they have both grown by an average 6% a year 
(see Box on the 2007 enlargement).  
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Countries with a very low GDP per head are catching up faster … 
In the 10 years from 1995 to 2005, GDP per head growth in all the new Member 
States, with the exception of Cyprus, exceeded the average rate in the EU27 (Fig. 
1.2). Since 2000, growth has been highest in the countries with the lowest level of 
GDP per head in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS). In the eight new 
Member States with the lowest levels of GDP per head (grouped on the right in Fig. 
1.3), growth between 2000 and 2005 was 5 percentage points above the EU27 
average of 1.4%. In Poland, however, growth was not as high, averaging only 3% a 
year as compared to rates of between 5% and 9% in the seven other countries.  
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In the four new Member States with the highest levels of GDP per head - Cyprus, 
Slovenia Czech Republic and Malta – growth was less strong but still, on average, 
between 0.6 and 1.8 percentage points above the EU27 average in Slovenia, Czech 
Republic and Malta, while in Cyprus growth was just below the EU average.. 
BOX - GDP performance: comparison with key competitors 
GDP per head in PPS terms in the US in 2004 was 60% higher than the EU27 average, and 43% 
above the EU15 average. Only two Member States, Ireland and Luxemburg, had levels above that 
of the US. In Japan, GDP per head in the same year exceeded the EU27 average by 19%, though in 
this case, six Member States had a level above this and in five it was only slightly below. Between 
1995 and 2005, GDP per head in the EU grew at virtually the same level as in the US (2% as 
against 2.1%) and twice as fast as in Japan.  
Regional disparities in GDP per head are far more extreme in the EU27 than in the US or Japan, 
especially after the two recent enlargements. In the EU, the GDP per head in the region where this 
is highest is 8 times greater than in the region where it is lowest. In the US, the difference is only 
2.5 times and in Japan just two times. All US states have a GDP per head that is above the EU 
average. In Japan, 40 of the 47 regions do. Clearly, the challenge of reducing regional disparities 
and ensuring economic and social cohesion across the EU is far greater than in the US or Japan. 
The variation in rates of GDP per head growth across regions in the EU is also much greater than in 
the US. Over the period 1997-2004, growth at regional level in the EU varied from below zero to 
over 8.6%, while in the US it varied from zero to 3.6%. This wider variation in growth rates, 
however, is in some degree a positive feature given the much greater need for low income regions 
to catch up. Map 1.1: Growth of GDP, 1999-2004 (EU, USA, India, China and Japan) 
In China, GDP per head, again in PPS terms, is only one-fifth of the EU average, while in India, it is 
one-eighth. In Romania and Bulgaria, which have the lowest GDP per head in the EU, the level is 
still over twice as high as in India and 50% higher than in China. These two countries, however, are 
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catching up rapidly with the EU. Growth of GDP per head in India has been double that in the EU 
over the past decade and the growth rate in China was three times the one in the EU. Nevertheless, 
even if such high growth rates can be sustained, it would take over 40 years for GDP per head in 
China to come close to the current level in the EU. 
Despite the vast difference in GDP per head, the size of regional disparities in India and China are 
similar to that in the EU. The region with the highest GDP per head in both China and India has a 
level seven times greater than in the lowest regions against eight times in the EU. Differences in 
regional GDP growth rates in India between 2000 and 2004 were very similar to those in the EU, 
varying between 1% and 13% while, in China, they varied by much less – by between 6% and 
11%.  
… The four (former) cohesion countries continue to reduce the gap 
The performance of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal was uneven between 1995 
and 2005. In all but Portugal annual economic growth consistently exceeded the EU 
average (Fig. 1.4). 
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Since 1995 Ireland has consistently grown much faster than the EU15. Between 
1995 and 2005, its annual average growth of GDP per head was 4 percentage points 
above the EU average. As a result, in 2005 Ireland had the second highest GDP per 
head in the EU in PPS terms. 
In Spain, growth of GDP per head was on average 0.7 percentage points a year 
higher than the EU average over these 10 years. As a consequence, GDP per head in 
PPS terms in 2005 was slightly above the EU27 average.  
In Greece, growth has been stronger, averaging 1.5 percentage points above the EU 
average between 1995 and 2005, increasing GDP per head to 85% of the EU average 
in 2005. 
In Portugal, growth was above the EU average up until 1999, but since then it has 
been well below the rate in the rest of the EU, with little sign of any recovery. GDP 
per head in PPS terms in 2005 was, accordingly, only 74% of the EU average, below 
the level in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. 
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At regional level the situation is improving … 
Comparing the top 20% of NUTS2 regions in the EU27 with the bottom 20% in 
terms of GDP per head between 1995 and 2004, clearly demonstrates the reduction 
in disparities which occurred over the period, the ratio of the average level in the top 
regions to that in the bottom declining from 4.1 to 3.4.  
In 1995, 78 of the 268 NUTS 2 regions which at present make up the EU27 had a 
GDP per head below 75% of the EU27 average (from here on called ‘lagging’ 
regions). Of these 78 regions, 51 were in the new Member States and 27 in the rest 
of the Union. Of the 51 regions in the new Member States, 39 had a GDP per head 
below 50% of EU average. Only four regions in the new Member States had a level 
of GDP per head above 75% of the EU average: Prague, Bratislava, Cyprus and 
Malta 
Lagging regions are catching up … 
By 2004, the situation had improved significantly, with only 70 lagging regions, 49 
in the new Member States and just 21 in the rest of the Union. The three regions in 
the new Member States in which GDP per head had risen above 75% of the EU 
average were Slovenia and two regions which include the national capital, 
Mazowieckie in Poland and Közép-Magyarország in Hungary. The fact that there 
were not more, despite relatively high growth in these countries over the period, 
emphasises the low level of GDP per head from which they were starting. At the 
same time, the number of regions with GDP per head of less than 50% of the EU 
average fell from 39 to 32. Malta's GDP per head just dipped under 75% of the EU 
average in 2004. (Map 1.2: GDP/head (PPS), 2004) 
In the rest of the EU, three regions, Campania, Puglia and Sicilia, in Italy, saw GDP 
per head fall below 75% of the EU average, while in nine it rose above this level – 
two regions in Greece, four in Spain, Cornwall in the UK, Dessau in Germany and 
Southern and Eastern Ireland which includes Dublin. All nine of these regions are 
long-term recipients of Structural Fund support with Objective 1 status. As the 
population of the three Italian regions is almost the same as the population of the 
nine regions in which GDP per head rose above 75% of the EU average, the total 
population living in lagging regions in the EU15 barely changed. (Tab. 1.1). 
     Table 1.1 
Regions Population Regions Population
EU15 213 372 million 27 32 million 386 million 21 32 million
13% 9% 10% 8%
NMS12 55 106 million 51 103 million 104 million 49 91 million
93% 97% 89% 88%
EU27 268 479 million 78 136 million 490 million 70 123 million
29% 28% 26% 25%
Total 
Number of 
regions
Total 
Population
Total 
Population
GDP per capita <75% 
EU average
1995 2004
GDP per capita <75% EU 
average
 
BOX - The lagging regions in the EU15 
The lagging regions in the EU15 (defined in relation to the EU15 average GDP per head), which 
were major recipients of support from the Structural and Cohesion Funds, showed a significant 
increase in GDP per head relative to the rest of the EU between 1995 and 2004. In 1995, 50 
regions with a total of 71 million inhabitants had a GDP per head below 75% of the EU15 average. 
In 2004, in 12 of these regions with population of almost 10 million and spread across the EU (in 
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Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Portugal, Austria and the UK), GDP per head had risen 
above the 75% threshold.  
On the other hand, in five regions, GDP per head slipped below 75% of the EU average over the 
period, three Southern Italian regions, Hainaut in Belgium and Lüneburg in Germany, which 
together had a population of around 6 million.  
… And regions with a GDP per head below 50% of the EU27 average are catching 
up faster … 
At the national level, as indicated above, Member States with a low level of GDP 
per head have tended to grow faster than other countries over recent years, implying 
a marked catching up. This was also the case at the regional level. 
Between 1995 and 2000, growth of GDP per head in the regions where this was 
below 50% of the EU average was, in aggregate, less than in the rest of the EU. 
However, this was largely due to economic contraction in Romania and Bulgaria 
affecting all 14 regions there. In the 19 remaining regions, growth averaged just over 
4% a year, well above the EU27 average of just under 3%. Between 2000 and 2004, 
average growth in regions with GDP per head below 50% (this time including the 
Bulgarian and Romanian regions) was only slightly less than in the earlier period at 
almost 4% at year, though this was much further above the EU average of 1.6% 
(Fig. 1.5).  
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In regions with a GDP per head of between 50% and 75% of the EU27 average, 
growth over the period was also higher than in other regions, if to a lesser extent 
(only 0.1% above the EU average before 2000 and 0.3% after). 
… While some of the higher income regions are facing problems 
Some of the regions with GDP per head above 75% of the EU average experienced 
very low or even negative growth rates between 1995 and 2004. In five regions – 
Guyane, Champagne-Ardenne and Poitou-Charentes in France, Berlin in Germany 
and Valle d'Aosta in Italy – GDP per head declined in real terms over these nine 
years. In twelve others, growth was under 0.5% a year. In the four years, 2000- 
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2004, moreover, GDP per head fell in 27 regions and in a further 24, growth was 
under 0.5% a year. (Fig. 1.6) 
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Convergence is therefore occurring at the EU level … 
Over the period 1995-2004, therefore, disparities in GDP per head between NUTS 2 
regions narrowed across the EU, most of the reduction occurring in the last four 
years. This is confirmed by a number of statistical measures (including the Gini 
coefficient and weighted coefficient of variation), most visibly by the narrowing of 
the gap in GDP per head between the most and the least prosperous regions. 
As part of this convergence, there was also a reduction in the gap between the core 
regions in the central part of the EU (the so-called Pentagon stretching from London 
across to Hamburg, down to Munich, across to Milan and up to Paris) and other 
parts of the EU, so contributing to territorial cohesion. The peripheral, regions, 
broadly defined, therefore, performed better in terms of growth over this period than 
the traditional economic hub of the EU. 
This stronger growth performance, however, does not extend to all the peripheral 
regions, just as the relatively weak performance does not apply to all core regions. In 
other words, things are more complicated than a simple comparison between the 
core and the periphery might suggest. Some regions seem to have overcome 
handicaps stemming from their peripherality, at least during this period, others not.  
But not in most cases at the national level… 
It is equally instructive to examine what has been happening to regional disparities 
within countries over recent years, since much of the regional convergence which 
has occurred at EU level is a consequence of convergence of low income countries 
rather than of low income regions as such. For cohesion in all three dimensions – 
economic, social and territorial – to be strengthened, it is as important that regional 
disparities narrow within countries as over the EU as a whole (Fig. 1.7).  
  10 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1.7 GDP per head (PPS) in Member State and regional extremes, 2004
Source: Eurostat
* In these regions, the GDP per head figure tends to be overestimated because of commuter flows.
Index, EU-27=100
Hainaut
Yuzhen tsentralen
Moravskosl
ezsko
Dessau
Border, 
Midland 
and 
Western Dytiki 
Ellada
Extremadura
Guyane
Calabria
Észak-
Magyarország
Flevoland
Burgenland
Lubelskie
Norte
Nord-Est
Východné 
Slovensko
Itä-Suomi
Östra 
Mellansverige
West Wales 
and The 
Valleys
Antwerpen
Bruxelles/B
russel*
Střední 
Čechy
Yugozapaden
Oberbayern
Hamburg*
Praha*
Southern and 
Eastern
Madrid
Attiki
Île de France
Lombardia
Közép-
Magyarország
Utrecht Salzburg
Mazowieckie
Lisboa
Bucureşti-
Ilfov
Západné 
Slovensko
Åland
Stockholm
Wien*
Bratislavský*
Berkshire, 
Bucks & 
Oxfordshire
Inner 
London*
 
In practice, convergence of GDP per head at regional level has occurred in some 
Member States over recent years but divergence in others. In Austria disparities in 
GDP per head between regions narrowed over the period 1995-2004. In Germany, 
France, Greece, Spain and Italy, however, there was little change, and this was also 
the case in Belgium and Finland. In the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Portugal 
disparities widened between the 1995 and 2004, most of this divergence occurred 
between 1995 and 2000, with very mild divergence between 2000 and 2004 in the 
UK and Portugal, while in Sweden and the Netherlands regions converged 
moderately over this period. 
In Poland and Hungary, there was also a widening of regional disparities between 
1995 and 2000, but on a much larger-scale than in the UK, and little change from 
then to 2004. In the Czech Republic as well as in Romania and Bulgaria, disparities 
widened markedly throughout the period, while in Slovakia, there was some 
widening but on a much smaller scale. 
BOX – The impact of Commuting on GDP per head 
Gross domestic product per head measures the economic wealth created in an area per inhabitant 
of that area. This indicator is most relevant when the people who create this wealth live in the area. 
For large countries this is usually the case, there may be some cross border commuting, but it 
usually does not significantly alter the GDP per head level. For small countries, such as Luxembourg 
for example, GDP per head will overestimate the average GDP created per inhabitant if many 
people commute into the country and few of the country's residents work outside the country. This 
effect is, of course, much stronger at the regional level. For example, in Brussels almost one in 
every two people working in the region lives outside. As a result, GDP per head is almost double 
the level it would be if those contributing to Brussels' GDP and their dependents were included in 
the Brussels population. In a few rare cases, a region may have a substantial proportion of its 
residents working outside the region, with few commuting into the region, as a result GDP per head 
underestimates the economic wealth per inhabitant. 
This effect of commuting is most pronounced in densely populated urban areas. Most capitals fall 
into this category; their GDP is overstated relative to that produced by residents by between 4% 
and 76%. In eight capital cities, GDP per head is inflated by more than 10%. However, this has not 
had a significant impact on the allocation of structural funding. (Map 1.3: GDP/head adjusted for 
effects of commuting) 
Divergence within countries reflects growth of capital cities … 
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Taking a more territorial approach reveals that in all of these countries, especially in 
the new Member States, a large part of the divergence in regional prosperity was a 
result of high concentration of economic activity and growth in and around the 
capital city. Moreover, even in the countries in which disparities remained much the 
same or where they narrowed GDP per head in the capital city region grew faster 
than in other parts of the country.  
Between 1995 and 2004, all capital city regions, with the exception of Berlin 
increased or at least maintained their share of national GDP. The increase was 
particularly marked in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest. 
The relative growth of capital city regions is strongly related to their attraction as 
locations for business as well as for individuals. This tends to lead to unbalanced 
territorial development within countries unless there are other centres of economic 
activity, in particular other large cities or conurbations – or even networks of smaller 
cities and towns to provide the same kind of attraction. 
BOX - Concentration of economic activity in capital cities  
In 2004, capital city regions2 produced on average 32% of the GDP in the country where they were 
situated, while they accounted for just 22% of population. All capital city regions with the exception 
of Berlin have a higher GDP per head than the national average and in fourteen it is between 40% 
and 100% higher. This is due to the relative concentration of economic activity in these regions and 
their higher productivity levels. On average, productivity levels in capital city regions were 25% 
higher than the national level; Berlin was the only capital with a productivity level below the 
national level. The capital city region, therefore, tends to act as a growth pole, attracting business 
investment from outside through the range of services and amenities they have to offer as well as 
the large market they represent.  
Between 1995 and 2004, capital city regions increased their economic position within the country 
on average their share of national GDP increased by 9% while the population only increased by 2%. 
Only Berlin and Dublin saw their share of national GDP decline (by 10% and 3%, respectively). 
Balanced territorial development is aided by secondary growth poles 
The concentration of economic activity in capital cities brings benefits in the form, 
for example, of economies of scale or agglomeration and a large size of market. But 
it also involves costs, in the form of congestion, poorer air quality and high property 
prices3. More balanced development tends to reduce these costs and, by spreading 
demand more evenly, to facilitate faster economic growth in the country as a whole.  
In only three countries in Europe, however, do secondary growth poles seem to be 
effective in counterbalancing the economic power of the capital city. In Spain, the 
Barcelona region (defined at NUTS 3 level) was responsible for generating 14% of 
Spanish GDP, while Madrid generated 18% with a similar population. Madrid, 
however, attracted a larger share of population growth and of economic growth than 
Barcelona. Barcelona saw its GDP per capita decline in relation to that of Madrid 
between 1995 and 2004. In Italy, Milan was responsible for 10% of national GDP, 
similar to Rome. Naples in the south, however, accounts for a much smaller share of 
                                                 
2  Capital city regions are included for all Member States with the exception of Malta, Cyprus and 
Luxembourg. They are based on a NUTS3 region or groups of NUTS3 regions and approximate a 
commuter shed area.  
3  The Urban Audit Perception Survey conducted in 75 cities in the EU27, Croatia and Turkey in 
November 2006 found that in virtually all capital cities good quality, affordable housing was perceived 
to be much less available than in other cities in the country. 
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GDP with little sign of the gap being closed despite the slightly faster growth in 
recent years in the southern regions than in the northern ones. In Germany, there are 
multiple growth poles, the four largest city regions together with Berlin each 
accounting for around 5% of national GDP and three out of four (Munich, Frankfurt 
am Main and Hamburg) grew faster than Berlin over the period.  
In other countries, the capital city region tends to dominate. In France and the UK, 
Paris and London account for around 30% of national GDP, while other cities 
account for no more than 3-4%. In France, GDP per head in the Lyon region is 
above the national average and closest to that of Paris, though this is not the case in 
Lille or Marseille. In the UK, GDP per head in Birmingham, Manchester and 
Glasgow is no higher than the national average and growth has been slower than in 
London. In Poland, despite relatively large concentrations of population in Lódz, 
Kraków and Wrocław, economic activity is heavily concentrated in the Warsaw 
region (which accounts for 16% of Polish GDP but only 7% of population) and 
growth between 1995 and 2004 was much higher than in these other cities. 
In the rest of the EU, though there are examples of GDP growing faster in large non-
capital cities than in the country as a whole, their share of national GDP fell by 1 
percentage point between 1995 and 2004. In most cases, GDP per head remains 
around or below the national average. Only in Germany and Italy are there second 
cities with GDP per head higher than in the capital. 
Continuing effort is needed to reduce disparities at EU level further. 
Irrespective of what has happened within countries, the gap in levels of prosperity 
across the EU remains wide. In 2005, in three of the new Member States (Cyprus, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic) GDP per head had risen to above 75% of the 
EU27 average. If recent trends in relative growth rates continue, projections suggest 
that by 2016 six more of the countries might reach this level – the three Baltic 
States, Hungary, Malta and Slovakia. Poland and, most especially, Bulgaria and 
Romania, could take considerably longer to do so (Fig. 1.8). 
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Even if, however, economic growth in the new Member States can be sustained at a 
rate well above that in the rest of the EU and these projections are realised, in many 
regions in these countries GDP per head will still be well below 75% of the EU 
average unless regional disparities narrow markedly. In the Czech Republic, for 
example, in three of the eight regions GDP per head was around60% of the EU 
average in 2004. Many regions will, therefore, take far longer to reach the 75% level 
than the country in which they are situated, even given the maintenance of relatively 
high rates of growth. Cohesion policy, accordingly, remains essential for supporting 
the development of regions, particularly, in the new Member States if regional 
disparities are to be reduced to a more acceptable level within a reasonable period. 
1.2. Productivity and employment growth 
The level of GDP per head in any country or region can be approximately attributed 
to two broad factors. One is the output produced by each of the people in work, or 
their level of productivity. The other is the proportion of the population in work. The 
same goes for changes over time. For GDP per head to increase, therefore, either 
productivity has to go up or the proportion of people in employment has to rise. 
Both are important. Although the emphasis tends to be on increasing productivity as 
the means of expanding income levels over time, in part because of its link to 
competitiveness – though this link is not necessarily very close because of the 
growing importance of non-price factors – raising employment can contribute at 
least as much to growth in economies where levels are low. Moreover, low levels of 
employment and, correspondingly, large numbers out of work also have implications 
for social cohesion.  
The challenge is to combine high productivity with high levels of employment – to 
avoid sacrificing one for the other – and to do so throughout a country or region so 
as to maintain territorial cohesion. This challenge is particularly acute, as shown 
below, in the new Member States, where productivity is still much lower than in 
most other parts of the EU, despite high rates of growth since the mid-1990s, but 
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where equally in many places employment is also low. But a similar challenge, if 
perhaps less acute, also confronts other parts of the EU. 
Productivity 
Productivity trends at international level – growth in the EU falling behind the US 
Between 1980 and 1995, productivity growth as measured by GDP per person 
employed was considerably higher in the EU-15, than in the US. Since then, 
however, growth in productivity in the EU-15 as lagged behind that of the US (Fig. 
1.9). Whereas, GDP per person employed was only marginally lower than in the US 
in 1995 (3% lower), by 2005, the gap had become significant (12% lower). 
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Much of this gap can be attributed to the longer hours which Americans tend to 
work, mainly because of having much shorter holidays. If differences in average 
working time are explicitly allowed for and productivity is measured in terms of 
GDP per hour worked, the gap all but disappears. In 2004, therefore, productivity in 
these terms was almost identical in the EU15 to that in the US, though the growth of 
productivity remains higher in the US than the EU15 even after allowing for 
changes in working time.  
GDP per hour worked was higher in nine Member States than in the US. By 
contrast, it was substantially lower in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal (54%, 53% and 
45% of the US level, respectively) and even lower in the 11 remaining new Member 
States, where it was between 8% and 45% of the US level. Over the period 1995-
2004, only in Ireland, Greece and Sweden among the EU15 countries (no data for 
hours worked are available for the new Member States before 2000) was 
productivity growth higher than in the US, though it was similar in Finland, Portugal 
and the UK.  
On the evidence of the growth in GDP per person employed, it was almost certainly 
higher as well in all the new Member States, apart from Cyprus and Malta. In these 
terms, productivity growth in the new Member States averaged 4.5% a year over the 
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period 1995-2005, four times higher than for the EU15 (Fig. 1.10). In Estonia, it was 
close to 8% a year and in Latvia and Lithuania, 6-7% a year, though in the Czech 
Republic, it averaged under 3% a year, less than in Greece and Ireland. At the other 
extreme, GDP per person employed increased by just 1% a year in Germany and by 
only marginally above zero in Spain and Italy. 
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Regional EU disparities in productivity … 
Productivity, measured in GDP per person employed, varies markedly across the 
EU, underlying the disparities in GDP per head noted above. It is highest in 
Northern and Western European regions in which capital cities or large conurbations 
are situated and lowest in most in the new Member States. In most regions in Spain, 
Greece and Portugal (the Cohesion countries), it is much closer to the EU average, 
though still below. (Map 1.4: GDP per person employed (EUR), 2004). Regional 
disparities in productivity are also significant within Member States, contributing to 
the differences in GDP per head (Fig. 1.11).  
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In terms of GDP per hour worked, which is a more accurate measure, regional 
disparities in productivity tend to be wider since average working time of those in 
employment is generally longer in the lagging regions than in the higher income 
parts of the EU. The highest levels of productivity are even more overwhelmingly in 
the regions which include the capital city in the Northern and Western parts of the 
EU (7 of the top 15 regions), the highest level (in Luxembourg) being some 20 times 
higher than in most regions in Bulgaria and some in Romania. Nine out of ten 
lagging regions have productivity levels below 75% of the EU average, with most of 
those in the new Member States having levels substantially below the average, in 
many cases, significantly lower than in most Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and 
southern Italian regions. 
At the same time, there is evidence of a marked catching up over recent years, 
especially in regions – in the new Member States, especially – where productivity 
levels are lowest. Between 1995 and 2004, therefore, labour productivity, measured 
in terms of GDP per person employed, grew by 6.5% a year in the three Baltic States 
and in parts of Poland, while in most of the more developed regions, it rose by less 
than 2% a year, in some cases, much less. Almost all the regions experiencing the 
highest rates of productivity growth were in the new Member States – 27 of the 31 
in which the growth rate was more than 4% a year (the only exceptions were three 
Greek regions and Madeira) – a result of the significant restructuring which is 
occurring there together with the considerable scope for catching up with levels 
elsewhere. 
On the other hand, only one lagging region (Guyane) was among the 30 regions in 
which GDP per person employed declined over this period. The other 29 regions 
were in Italy, France, Spain and Germany. In some cases, the regions concerned 
have among the highest levels of GDP per head in their respective countries 
(Lombardia, Bolzano and Valle d'Aosta in Italy, Madrid, Navarra and Cataluña in 
Spain, Köln in Germany). In a number of them – in Germany and northern Italy, in 
particular – GDP growth was relatively low during this period, which might have 
been a contributory factor (though the lack of growth of productivity was itself a 
potential cause of the low growth). In the Spanish regions, however, GDP growth 
was above the EU average, which suggests that such growth might be difficult to 
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sustain over the long-term, in the absence of the improvements in efficiency and 
development of high value-added activities which productivity growth tends to 
reflect.  
The counterpart of the lack of productivity growth in Spain is a high rate of 
employment growth, which in a sense has fuelled the growth of GDP and has 
provided much needed jobs for a substantial proportion of the population who were 
previously unemployed or economically inactive. In Italy, a similar lack of 
productivity growth has occurred in a context of low growth of GDP and sustained 
growth of employment. Conversely, the high rate of productivity growth in regions 
in the new Member States has occurred in many cases with little or no increase in 
jobs in a context where the proportion of people of working age in employment is 
relatively low – indeed, similar to the level in Spain in the mid-1990s. 
The challenge facing both sets of regions, as emphasised above, is to achieve 
simultaneously both a growth rate of productivity in line with the need to maintain 
and strengthen competitiveness and a rate of net job creation which provides 
employment for all those who want to work. 
Box: regional variations in the main components of GDP growth 
The pattern of regional growth in GDP per head and of the two proximate determinants of this, 
growth in employment and in GDP per person employed, is shown in the three maps. These 
indicate that in most of the regions in central and eastern Europe, Greece, and the Nordic 
countries, productivity growth was the main contributor to GDP growth between 1995 and 2004, in 
many cases, the only one. (Map 1.5: Growth of GDP per head, employment and productivity)  
Between 1995 and 2004, growth in GDP was accompanied by growth in employment in the ten 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe only in 2003 and then only marginally. Overall, GDP growth 
was almost entirely due to growth of productivity and employment remained broadly unchanged or 
declined.  
In Spain, growth in GDP was fuelled almost exclusively by employment growth and in Italy, Ireland 
and the Netherlands, growth of employment also contributed most to GDP growth. In the other 
countries, in Belgium, Germany, France and the UK, there was a more equal balance between 
employment and productivity growth.  
Employment growth in the EU  
At national level 
Employment growth averaged just under 1% a year in the EU27 over the period 
1995-2004. There was a marked difference, however, between the relatively high 
rate of increase up to 2001 and the absence of any growth at all in the two last years 
when GDP increased relatively little. Employment growth was particularly high 
throughout the period in Spain, as noted above (3.3% a year) and was also above the 
EU average in Italy – one of the few countries in which employment growth was 
maintained after 2001 – France and the UK. In Germany, on the other hand, growth 
was below average and employment fell significantly after 2001. In Portugal, 
employment rose by almost 2% a year up to 2001 but has hardly risen at all since 
then reflecting the low rate of GDP growth. In Greece employment increased by 
much less than the EU average up to 2001 (by only around 0.5% a year), but has 
risen at a much higher rate since 2002 (by almost 2% a year up to 2005). 
Most of the other countries, apart from the new Member States, experienced a 
relatively high rate of employment expansion between 1995 and 2001 – over 2% a 
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year in the Netherlands and Finland, 4% a year in Luxembourg and over 5% a year 
in Ireland – and little increase or a reduction in the subsequent two years. Since 
2003, employment has risen but by less than 1% a year in most cases.  
In the new Member States, employment declined significantly in most countries up 
to 2001, the main exceptions being Hungary and Cyprus, but it has begun to increase 
in many of them since, though at a relatively slow rate except in Latvia and 
Lithuania. In Poland and Hungary, employment has barely changed since 2001. 
… And at regional level 
Almost all regions (nine out of ten) with a GDP per head above 75% of the EU 
average experienced employment growth between 1995 and 2004, the average being 
1.2% a year for the group as a whole. 
Only sixteen of these regions experienced a reduction in employment of more than 
0.1% a year over these nine years. These were 13 regions in Eastern Germany and 
Mazowieckie in Poland and two regions in Northern England. The highest rates of 
increase occurred in regions in Spain, Ireland and the south east of the UK. 
In contrast, employment in regions with GDP per head below 75% of the EU 
average declined on average by 1% a year. In half of the regions employment fell, 
the largest reductions (over 3% a year) occurring in a number of Polish and 
Romanian regions.  
The sectoral structure of EU employment reflects the continued shift towards a 
service economy and the ongoing decline in employment in agriculture and industry. 
Since 2000, total employment in the EU has increased by 8.5 million, mainly driven 
by strong net employment creation of almost 11.5 million in the service sector. The 
latter has more than made up for the employment contraction in industry (down 1.6 
million) and agriculture (down 1.2 million) since 2000. 
Within industry, employment has contracted particularly strongly in manufacturing, 
where it has fallen by 2.2 million (or about 6% on 2000 levels), although this has 
been offset to a certain extent by the rise in employment of 0.8 million in the 
construction sector. Within services, where employment has expanded in all sub-
sectors apart from "financial intermediation", the main drivers of employment 
creation have been real estate, renting and business activities (up 3.5 million), health 
and social work (up 2.3 million) and education (up 1.3 million). 
1.3. Employment rates 
The low growth of employment across the EU since 2001 has slowed progress 
towards achieving the Lisbon and Stockholm employment targets. Given the limited 
prospects for increased employment growth in the immediate future, the overall aim 
of ensuring that at least 70% of people of working age (defined as those aged 15-64) 
are employed by 2010 now seems unlikely to be attained until a few years after this. 
Recent progress towards the female and people aged 55-64 targets is nevertheless 
encouraging. Since 2000, the female employment rate has risen by 2.7 percentage 
points to 56.3% (the target is 60%) and the older workers' employment rate by 5.9 
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percentage points to 42.5%, although for the latter with a target of 50%, there 
remains a long way to go. 
Much of the slow progress can be attributed to the decline in employment in 
Germany and Poland, though in 2005, there are signs of some improvement in the 
latter. At the same time, employment rates in Greece and Italy remain well below 
the targets and still exhibit marked gender differences. 
In 2005, as in 2000 when the target was first set, only four Member States 
(Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) had employment rates above the 
70% objective, though five countries (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and 
Portugal) are within 3 percentage points of it. The biggest increases in the rate since 
2000 have been in Spain (a rise of over 6 percentage points), Cyprus, the three 
Baltic States, Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the rate remains over 10 
percentage points below the target in the last three of these countries as well as in 
Hungary, Poland, Malta and Romania. In Poland as well as Portugal, Germany, 
Denmark, Sweden, Romania, Malta and the Czech Republic rates have declined 
since 2000  (Fig. 1.12).  
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Nine Member States met the employment rate target for women of 60% in 2005, 
three more than in 2000 (the three being Estonia, Austria and Slovenia), while 
another six, including France and Germany, were within 3 percentage points  (Fig. 
1.13). In Greece, Italy and Poland, however, the rate was over 10 percentage points 
below the target and in Malta, over 26 percentage points. Since 2000, large increases 
in the employment of women have occurred in the same countries in which the 
overall rate has risen (indeed they have been the primary cause of this), with 
particularly big rises in Spain, Italy, Latvia and Estonia. (Map 1.6: Female 
employment rate in 2005 compared to Lisbon target) 
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Gender pay gaps reducing at a much slower pace than the gender employment gap 
Despite reductions in the gender employment gap, the gender pay gap (in unadjusted 
form) – measuring the difference in average gross hourly earnings between men and 
women across the whole economy and all establishments – one of the structural 
indicators to monitor progress under the Lisbon Strategy has narrowed only 
marginally since 2000. In 2000, women in the EU had, on average, 16% lower 
hourly earnings than men, the gap ranging from below 10% in Portugal and Italy to 
20% or more in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. In 2005, their 
earnings were 15% lower than men and still 20% or more in Germany and the UK. 
On the other hand, there were several more countries where the gap was below 10%, 
including Belgium, Ireland and Greece. 
The employment rate for older people – those aged 55-64 – increased by some 6 
percentage points in the EU27 as a whole between 2000 and 2005 (from 36.6% to 
42.5% – Fig. 1.14). This increase contrasts markedly with the downward trend in the 
rate over many years before reflecting the tendency towards early retirement in many 
countries, encouraged initially by governments in the context of high rates of 
unemployment. Despite the increase, however, in 2005 it still remained over 7 
percentage points below the target of 50% to be achieved by 2010. (Map 1.7: 
Employment rate of people aged 55-64 in 2005 compared to Lisbon target) 
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Eight Member States had employment rates for this age group above the target in 
2005, four more than in 2000 (these being Estonia, Finland, Cyprus and Ireland), 
while in both Latvia and Lithuania, rates were only marginally below. Despite the 
large increases in employment of 55-64 olds since 2000 – which exceeded 10 
percentage points in Hungary as well as in Latvia and Finland – the proportion of 
this age group in work in 2005 was still between 10 and 23 percentage points below 
the 50% target in 12 Member States. Poland, the country with the lowest 
employment rate for older people in 2005, was the only country where this rate 
declined noticeably between 2000 and 2005. 
BOX - Regional employment rates in the US 
The variation in the total employment rate (measured as the total employed relative to population 
15-64) between the 180 US economic areas is far smaller than in the EU. In the EU, the total 
employment rate is 60% higher in the 10% of regions where this is highest than in the 10% where 
it is lowest, whereas in the US, the difference is only 22%. Confining the comparison to the EU15 
only does not dramatically alter the picture (the gap of 60% is reduced to 56%). This underlines the 
fact that the US labour market is more integrated than in the EU and population is more mobile. 
Overall, the US employment rate is 10 percentage points higher than that of the EU. Most of this 
difference is due to higher employment of the group aged 15-64 (8.5 percentage points), the 
remaining 1.5 percentage points are due to the far larger number of those aged 65 and older in 
work in the US than in the EU  (14% as compared with 3%).  
 
At regional level disparities are larger than at national level … 
The employment rates at national level conceal wide variations across regions, 
reflecting the regional and, indeed, local nature of employment problems.  
Regional disparities in employment and unemployment have long been a key focus 
of EU policies, not only because of the effect of low employment rates in parts of 
the EU on the achievement of the Lisbon targets but more importantly their 
implications for social cohesion. Between 2000 and 2005, there was some 
convergence of employment rates across regions in the EU27. Over these five years, 
the difference in the average employment rate of the 10% of regions where rates 
were highest and the 10% where they were lowest declined from 30 percentage 
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points to 27 percentage points4. Two other statistical measures (the Gini coefficient 
and coefficient of variation) also declined. (Map 1.8: Employment rate in 2005 and 
employment rate deficit compared to Lisbon target). 
In 2005, however, employment rates in the lagging regions were some 11 percentage 
points lower than those in the rest of the Union (57% against 67%), more than in 
2000 (9 percentage points). Despite some increase over this period, employment 
rates remain particularly low in the south of Italy, five regions (Campania, Puglia, 
Basilicata, Calabria and Sicilia) having rates below 50% of working-age population 
in 2005 and Sicilia a rate of just 44%. This compares with rates of 78% in the UK 
region of Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire, a difference of almost 35 percentage 
points. 
The disparity in employment rates across regions is also relatively wide in Spain, 
reflecting the still large differences in economic development between the regions. 
While regional variations in employment rates are relatively low in Poland and 
Romania, this reflects the large number of people in rural areas employed in 
agriculture, mostly in subsistence farming, which serves as a residual means of 
support for those unable to find work in other activities (Fig. 1.15). 
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… Though decreasing in several Member States 
There was a slight tendency for regional disparities in employment rates within 
Member States to narrow between 2000 and 2005. This was the case in most 
countries, most especially in Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Sweden and the UK. At the same 
time, disparities widened in Austria, Belgium, Slovakia and Hungary.  
Nevertheless, the average employment rate in lagging regions taken together was not 
only 11 percentage points lower than in the other regions in 2005, but it has also 
                                                 
4  These figures are adjusted for differences in population size between regions. They, therefore, relate to 
the top and bottom regions, in terms of employment rates, which account in each case for 10% of EU 
population. 
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decreased by half a percentage point since 2000, while in the other regions it has 
increased by 1.5 percentage points. 
There are, however, marked differences in the experience over this period across the 
EU. In all the regions of Bulgaria, Spain and Italy the employment rate increased. In 
Greece, employment rates increased in all but three regions. In contrast in all of 
Romania and all but two regions in Poland the rate declined. In Portugal and 
Hungary about half the regions saw their employment rate decline, in some cases by 
more than two percentage points.  
To achieve the Lisbon employment rate target of 70% of working-age population, 
the number employed in the EU needs to increase by well over 20 million in the 
coming years. For the sake of cohesion, these extra jobs need to be created mainly in 
regions where employment is particularly low, namely in southern Italian and Polish 
regions, in particular. 
1.4. Unemployment rates 
Unemployment is not entirely the mirror image of employment. A country or region 
with a low employment rate will not necessarily have a high rate of unemployment 
but instead perhaps a large number of people who do not participate in the labour 
market at all. This is the case of women in Southern Italy, for example. Not all of 
those concerned either here or elsewhere in the EU will have taken a deliberate 
decision not to work. Many will have decided not to look for a job because they 
consider they would be unlikely to find one but would enter the labour market if the 
situation changed. Indeed, when employment increases it is generally accompanied 
by a rise in labour market participation as well as a fall in unemployment. 
Accordingly, unemployment can give a misleading indication of the number of 
people who would like to work but cannot find a job and, therefore, of the size of 
the potential work force. Nevertheless, it is the most visible sign of labour market 
imbalance and of the threat this poses to social cohesion. 
Unemployment in the EU27  
Between 2000 and 2005 the overall unemployment rate in the EU27 increased 
marginally (from 8.6% of the labour force to 8.7%) (Map 1.9: Unemployment rate, 
2005). There were, however, considerable variations between countries. In 8 
Member States, unemployment increased by around 1½ percentage points or more 
(by almost 4 percentage points in Portugal), in 10, it changed by less than 1 
percentage point and in 9, it fell by more than this – in the three Baltic States plus 
Bulgaria, by over 5 percentage points (Fig. 1.16). 
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While the unemployment rate of men increased slightly over the period (from 7.5% 
to 7.9%), unemployment among women fell slightly (from 10.0% to 9.7%). As a 
result the gap between the two narrowed. The gap between the male and female 
unemployment rate in 2000 was the highest in Greece (6.6 percentage points), Spain 
(4.6), Italy (3.6) and Poland (3.1). In Greece this gap had barely narrowed by 2005 a 
reduction of 0.3 of a percentage point, while the other three reduced the gap by 
between 1 percentage point and 2.6 percentage points. 
At 18.6%, the youth unemployment rate still remains around twice as high as the 
overall unemployment rate, pointing to an over-supply of relatively low-skilled, 
inexperienced young workers. Furthermore, large disparities are still evident across 
the Member States, with rates above 20% in eight countries, and especially high in 
Slovakia and Poland at around 30% and 37% respectively, but as low as around 
8.5% in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
Still, the youth unemployment rate (of those aged under 25) in the EU27 increased 
by 0.7 of a percentage points between 2000 and 2005, but again this average hides 
much variation. In Bulgaria, the Baltic States, and Slovakia, youth unemployment 
rate fell by more than 6 percentage points, while in five Member States, including 
Portugal and Hungary, it increased by more than 5 percentage points.  
The long-term rate of unemployment5 in the EU was 4% in 2005, the same as in 
2000. While a number of Member States recorded a substantial reduction over this 
period, especially Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, the rate in creased by almost 3 
percentage points in Poland and by 2 percentage points in Slovakia, in both of which 
rates were already high (10% and 12% respectively). (Map 1.10: Unemployment rate 
(female, youth and long-term), 2005) 
                                                 
5  Those unemployed and actively looking for work for 12 months or more as a percentage of the labour 
force 
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Across the EU, long-term unemployment continues to be significantly higher for 
women (4.5% in 2005) than for men (3.6%), with the widest differences, as for the 
overall unemployment rate, occurring in Spain and Italy as well as in Poland (in 
each case the gap being 2 percentage points or more), but above all in Greece (8.9% 
for women, 2.6% for men). 
Unemployment at the regional level  
As in the case of employment, regional disparities in unemployment rates narrowed 
between 2000 and 2005, the difference in the average rate between the top and the 
bottom 10% of regions (again defined in terms of population) declining from 19 
percentage points to 16 (Fig. 1.17). (Other measures of regional dispersion, such as 
the Gini coefficient, also declined.)  
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In the lagging regions, unemployment fell from an average of 13.4% to 12.4% over 
the period, the largest falls being in the Bulgarian and Southern Italian regions as 
well as in the Baltic States. In 17 of these regions, however, – mostly concentrated 
in Poland, Portugal, Greece and Hungary – unemployment increased by over 2 
percentage points. 
In the more developed regions (those with GDP per head above 75% of the EU 
average), by contrast, unemployment remained stable between 2000 and 2005 at just 
below 8%, though with Spanish, Italian, French and UK regions generally 
experiencing a reduction and German, Austrian, Dutch and Belgian regions, some 
increase. The increase was especially marked in Germany. In this group of regions, 
44 experienced an increase in unemployment of more than 4 percentage points, 33 
of them in Germany. 
1.5. The risk of poverty 
Although there is no measure of the number of people across the EU-27 living in 
poverty in an absolute sense, there are indicators of those whose income is low 
enough to put them at risk of being socially excluded in a relative sense. These were 
defined by the Member States through the Open Method of Coordination on Social 
Inclusion in June 2006 as those with disposable income below 60% of the national 
  26 
average level of income, as measured by the median, on the assumption that 
household income is distributed evenly between all members6. Such people, it is 
argued, might well be unable to afford the standard of living which most people in 
the country concerned take for granted and, accordingly, may be deprived in a 
relative sense, even if in some cases they may still be better off in absolute terms 
than many in parts of the EU where average income levels are much lower. 
According to the latest data (collected in 2005 for income in 2004), the proportion 
of the population at risk of poverty, defined in relative terms, ranges from 21% in 
Lithuania and Poland and 20% in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal to 11% in the 
Netherlands, 10% in the Czech Republic and 9% in Sweden. On average, on this 
measure, 16% of the EU population, or around 75 million people, were at risk of 
poverty in 2004 (Fig. 1.18). 
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A slightly larger proportion of women than men have income below the poverty 
line, 17% on average as opposed to 15%. In Bulgaria and Italy the difference 
reached 4 percentage points. In all Member States, apart from Hungary and Poland, 
the relative number of women with income this low is either larger than that of men 
or much the same, partly reflecting the larger numbers of women than men aged 65 
and over and the relatively large proportion of these living alone and dependent on a 
retirement pension. However, when looking at the gender dimension, it is important 
to interpret figures with caution since they assume equal distribution of resources 
within the household, which might not necessarily be the case7. 
                                                 
6  Those at risk of poverty are defined as having an “equivalised income” (which takes into account the 
household size and composition) below 60% of the national median level. 
7  The newly implemented reference source of statistics on income and social exclusion is the European 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) framework regulation (No.1177/2003). In 2007, 
for the first time, EU-SILC data is available for 25 EU Countries. During the transition to EU-SILC, 
income based indicators were calculated on the basis of available national sources (household budget 
survey, micro-censuses, etc.) that were not fully compatible with the SILC methodology based on 
detailed income. Following the implementation of EU-SILC, the values of income based indicators 
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The risk of poverty is even higher for children, young people and the elderly. 
The young have the highest at-risk-of-poverty rate, at 19% for children under 18 and 
18% for the 18-24 age group. The rate then declines with age as individuals progress 
in the labour market, before it rises again after people retire and no longer have 
income from work. The risk of poverty for children is particularly high in Poland 
(29%), Lithuania (27%) and Romania (25%). One person households, especially 
those with dependent children tend to have the highest poverty risk, some 33% of 
lone parents with a dependent child in the EU having income below the poverty line. 
Poverty among children, it is widely recognised, can potentially affect their 
development and future opportunities and so the life chances of future generations. 
The risk of poverty for people aged 65 and more is particularly high in Ireland 
(33%) and Cyprus (51%), while it is also significantly higher than for the population 
as a whole in a number of Member States. Older women, without exception, are at 
greater risk of poverty than older men, who are on the whole no more exposed to the 
risk of poverty than their younger counterparts. The most elderly, those aged 75 and 
over, in which women are in the majority, tend to be most at risk of poverty for a 
number of reasons, not least the lower incomes on which their pensions are based 
and the fact that in some countries the rules on indexation mean that pensions fail to 
keep pace with the growth of average earnings. 
At the same time, the risk-of-poverty rates take account only of monetary income 
and leave out of account the wealth which those in retirement might possess, 
particularly their house (which means that they tend to have relatively low housing 
costs) and accumulated savings. Accordingly, the risk of deprivation among 
pensioners might well be somewhat less than implied by the poverty measure. 
As indicated above, the at-risk-of-poverty rates presented here are specific to each 
country and are measured in relation to very different levels of income. People with 
a given level of income in absolute terms might therefore be classified as being at 
risk of poverty in one Member State but not be in another. 
The income threshold against which the risk of poverty is assessed is much lower, 
measured in purchasing power parity terms (i.e. taking account of the difference in 
price levels) in the new Member States and Cohesion countries than in the rest of 
the EU. This threshold, therefore, is over 7 times higher in Luxembourg and four 
time higher in Austria than in Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria and higher still (12 and 
8 times) than in Romania. This means that the at-risk-of-poverty threshold for a 
single person household varies from EUR 558 a year in Romania to EUR 17087 a 
year in Luxembourg. In Romania, therefore, single people at risk of poverty have to 
live on income of less than two euros a day and in Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, 
less than four euros a day. 
In Member States where poverty affects a larger proportion of the population, it also 
tends to be more severe, though this is not always the case. Head count figures in 
themselves do not indicate how far below the threshold the income of people at risk 
of poverty is. On average in 2004, the gap between the median income of those at 
                                                                                                                                                 
cannot be compared to the estimates presented in previous years. This is why no trends in income 
based indicators are presented in this report. 
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risk of poverty and the poverty line itself in the EU was 23%. Member States with 
the smallest proportion of people at risk of poverty also tend to have the lowest 
intensity of poverty as well and vice versa for those with the largest proportion at 
risk. This is particularly the case in Poland, where the median income of those at 
risk of poverty was some 30% below the poverty threshold. 
Member States with the lowest proportion of people at risk of poverty tend also to 
have the most equal distribution of income. This, however, is only a partial indicator 
of social cohesion within Member States. It is also relevant to know how the income 
of those at the bottom end of the distribution compares with the income of those at 
the top This can be assessed by the ratio of the top quintile (the income received by 
the 20% of the population with the highest income) to the bottom quintile (the 
income received by the bottom 20%)8. On average in EU Member States, this ratio 
was 4.9, which means that the income of someone 20% from the top of the 
distribution was nearly 5 times higher than that received by someone 20% from the 
bottom. In Portugal, however, this ratio was over 8, while in Lithuania, Latvia and 
Poland, it was only slightly less. 
The risk of poverty is especially high for the unemployed 
Being unemployed entails significantly more risk of having income below the 
poverty line than being in work throughout the EU, despite the income support 
schemes which exist in all Member States. The proportion of those who spent more 
than half of the year (2004) unemployed who had a poverty-level of income, 
therefore, ranged from a low of 26% in Denmark and Sweden – still 5 times higher 
than the proportion with this level of income who spent most of the year in 
employment – to a high of around 60% in each of the three Baltic States, over 6 
times greater than for those who were mainly employed (Fig. 1.19). In 9 of the other 
24 Member States for which data are available, moreover, the relative number of 
unemployed at risk of poverty was around half or just under (44-51%). These 
include four more of the new Member States (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Malta), though they also include three of the most prosperous countries in the 
EU – Luxembourg, Ireland and Austria. 
                                                 
8  More precisely, it is the ratio of the income received by the individual who is ranked at 20% from the 
top of the income distribution to the income received by the person who is ranked at 20% from the 
bottom. 
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1.19 Proportion of unemployed and employed at risk of poverty, 2004
BG: 2003; RO, SI, UK: no data
Source: Eurostat  
They do not, however, include the three EU15 Cohesion countries – Greece, Spain 
and Portugal – where the difference in the risk of poverty between being employed 
and being unemployed is significantly lower than elsewhere. This is a reflection not 
of the level of unemployment benefits but of the large number of the unemployed 
living in households where someone is working. In addition, in each of these 
countries, especially in Greece and Portugal, being employed is less of a safeguard 
against being at risk of poverty than in other Member States, with the exception of 
Poland. In Greece and Portugal as well as in Poland some 13-14% of people who 
were employed for most of 2004 had income below the poverty line. 
1.6. Structural change and economic development 
The differences in levels of GDP per head across regions, as already indicated, 
reflect the combined effect of variations in, first, the level of productivity or the 
value-added – or output – produced by those employed (together of course with the 
capital and other factors of production they have available to work with) and, 
secondly in the number of people available to work who are actually employed. As 
seen above, both the level of productivity of labour and the proportion of working-
age population in work – the employment rate – are much lower in general in 
regions with low GDP per head than in those with higher levels. Both need to 
increase if these regions are to attain the income levels in much of the rest of the 
EU.  
The low level of productivity, however, is linked not only to much lower levels of 
value-added per person employed in all the various sectors of activity, which have 
their root in a range of causes, including the method and organisation of production, 
the technology used, the skills of the work force and so on, but also to the relative 
importance of these sectors. The structure of the regional economies concerned, in 
other words, is biased towards low-value activities which itself has a depressing 
effect on the overall level of productivity and, accordingly the income generated in 
the region. As the regional economies develop, the relative weight of these low 
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value-added sectors will tend to decline, just as they did in higher income parts of 
the EU in the past. 
Low-vale added activities dominate the economic structure of less developed 
regions … 
The pace at which this happens, however – just as the pace at which productivity 
growth occurs within sectors – is conditioned by the resources available, both 
human and physical, as well as by less tangible factors, such as the innovative 
capacity of the region, its system of governance and so on. The work force in the 
region and the enterprises located there have to possess the skills and know-how 
required by the higher value-added activities and need to be supported by suitable 
infrastructure, facilities and services for these activities to develop and expand. 
The relative concentration of low income regions on low value-added activities is 
evident from comparing their division of value-added and employment between 
sectors with that in regions with higher levels of GDP per head. This, at the same 
time, indicates – if only in broad terms given that future development may not 
precisely mirror the past – the structural changes which regions will need to 
accommodate to attain higher levels of GDP per head (Tab. 1.2). 
Error! Not a valid link. 
The generation of value-added in regions with GDP per head below 50% of the EU 
average, which are all situated in the new Member States, comes much more from 
agriculture and industry than in higher income regions and less from services, 
predominantly business and financial services and education and healthcare within 
public services. Equally significantly, to produce only a slightly larger share of 
value-added from agriculture than in higher income regions absorbs a considerably 
larger proportion of those in employment – 17% of the total in work. Shifting the 
work force from agriculture into other, more productive, activities would, 
accordingly yield a substantial gain in overall income even without any growth of 
productivity within sectors. 
In regions with a slightly higher level of GDP per head in 2003, of 50-75% of the 
EU average, which include many of the Objective 1 regions at the time (i.e. before 
the 2004 enlargement), the division of value-added between sectors is more similar 
to that in higher income regions, except for a larger share in agriculture, construction 
and public services and a much smaller share in business and financial services. 
Again a relatively large share of employment is absorbed in agriculture (10%) to 
produce a relatively small share of total value-added (5%). 
… Which are also the activities with lower productivity … 
The relative levels of labour productivity implied by the sectoral division of value-
added and employment and the scope for catching up in the low income regions can 
be seen more directly by relating value-added in the different sectors in purchasing 
power parity terms to the number employed. (Tab. 1.3) 
Error! Not a valid link. 
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Although the level of productivity varies between sectors in all regions – it is higher 
in industry and business and financial services than in others (though the latter 
largely reflects the method of measuring value-added in financial intermediation) – 
the level in the lowest income regions is considerably less than in the rest of the EU. 
In agriculture, it was under 40% of the EU average in 2003 and in industry, under 
half, the latter in part reflecting the concentration on more basic manufacturing 
(textiles and clothing, for example) than in higher income regions where there is 
much more concentration on medium and high tech sectors (engineering and 
electronics, in particular). In services, it was closer to the level elsewhere, but it was 
still only around two-thirds of the EU average or less. 
… And with a relative high concentration of employment 
In addition, to the low productivity in each sector, however, the difference in the 
distribution of employment between these as compared with the EU average further 
reduced value-added per person by almost 13%. In other words, productivity – and 
GDP – could be this much higher in these regions if the share of employment in 
each sector was the same as in other regions. 
The productivity gap between regions with GDP per head of between 50% and 75% 
of the EU average and other regions is much narrower in all sectors, especially in 
services, where in each sector, value-added per person employed was less than 10% 
below the EU average in 2003. In agriculture and industry, on the other hand, it was 
well over 20% below the level elsewhere, partly in industry reflecting the relative 
weight of low-tech manufacturing as opposed to medium and high tech. 
Although the broad sectoral structure of these regions is less concentrated on low 
value-added activities than in lower income regions, it is still the case that the 
relative concentration of employment in such activities as compared with the rest of 
the EU reduced the overall value-added generated by those in work by 6%. As a 
result, the overall level of productivity was some 15% below the EU average.  
By contrast to the position in low income regions, in the regions with GDP per head 
of 15% or more above the EU average productivity in all sectors is not only higher 
but the concentration of employment on higher value-added activities as compared 
with other regions itself added over 5% to overall value-added per person employed 
in 2003. 
This is compounded by low employment levels 
The depressing effects of low productivity in the different sectors combined with the 
unfavourable structure of the economy, however, is not the only reason for GDP per 
head in the lagging regions being below that elsewhere in the EU. Low employment 
is also a major contributory factor. In the regions with GDP per head below 50% of 
the EU average, the lower proportion of the population in employment as compared 
with other regions reduced GDP per head in 2003 by almost 22% given the level of 
productivity. In other words, had the number in work in relation to population been 
the same as in the EU as a whole and had their productivity been the same as those 
already employed, GDP would have been almost 28% higher than it actually was. 
In regions with GDP per head of 50-75% of the EU average, GDP per head was 
some 16% below the level implied by relative productivity, suggesting that it would 
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be almost 20% higher if the level of employment was the same as the EU average. 
The gap between the relative level of productivity and GDP per head is also 
significant for regions with GDP per head between 75% and 100% of the EU 
average, implying that the latter could be raised by around 13% if employment could 
be increased to the level elsewhere.  
By contrast, in regions with GDP per head of 15% or more above average, 
employment was also above average, reinforcing the effect of relatively high 
productivity on income levels. These regions, therefore, gain from having both a 
more productive economy and more people in work. 
This makes clear that increasing GDP per head in lagging regions is not simply a 
question of making their economies more productive in a narrow sense but 
increasing the number of people in work. Such an increase is potentially important 
not only for the output that those at present out of work produce and the income they 
generate but also to maintain social cohesion. This is especially so in a context 
where the high rate of growth of productivity of those employed implies high growth 
of real wages and a widening gap between people working and those not. 
Growth of value added is higher in less developed regions … 
A key question in regions where GDP per head is well below the EU average and 
productivity is also much lower concerns the pace at which this gap in productivity 
is likely to be closed in the different sectors of activity, or in other words how 
quickly the possibilities for catching up are likely to be exploited. The experience of 
the period 1995 to 2003 throws some light on this. 
This indicates that while sectors of activity contributed differentially to the overall 
increase in value-added, there was some similarity in the pattern of growth between 
regions with different levels of GDP per head. Growth, therefore, tended in some 
degree to be concentrated in the same broad sectors.  
In all the regional groups, value-added in agriculture declined over this period, by 
more in the regions with the lowest GDP per head than in the others. Value-added in 
industry, on the other hand, increased in both regional groups with GDP per head 
below 75% of the EU average but declined, if only marginally, in regions with 
higher levels. Value-added in construction and services grew in all the regional 
groups. (Tab. 1.4) 
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Table Growth of value added, employment and productivity by regional income group, 1995-2003
% per year
Gross value added Agriculture Industry Construction Basic 
market 
services
Business+ 
financial 
services
Public 
Services
Total
Under 50% -3.6 1.8 3.8 4.7 6.0 6.3 3.5
50-75% -2.0 1.8 2.1 2.8 4.4 3.5 2.7
75-100% -1.7 -0.1 3.4 2.3 3.6 3.0 2.1
100-115% -1.9 -0.2 3.1 2.7 3.7 2.8 2.2
115% and over -1.6 -0.2 1.2 1.9 3.5 2.4 1.9
All regions -2.0 0.4 2.5 2.7 4.0 3.3 2.4
Employment 
Under 50% -3.4 -2.6 -1.6 0.5 3.5 -0.2 -1.0
50-75% -2.6 0.3 1.2 1.4 4.5 1.3 0.9
75-100% -2.1 -0.5 1.9 1.5 4.1 1.5 1.2
100-115% -0.9 -0.9 1.5 1.6 3.9 1.7 1.3
115% and over -1.4 -1.1 0.4 1.4 4.0 1.4 1.3
All regions -1.8 -0.9 0.8 1.3 4.0 1.3 0.9
Labour productivity
Under 50% -0.1 4.5 5.6 4.2 2.4 6.6 4.5
50-75% 0.7 1.5 0.9 1.4 -0.1 2.2 1.9
75-100% 0.4 0.4 1.5 0.8 -0.5 1.4 0.9
100-115% -1.0 0.7 1.6 1.0 -0.2 1.1 0.9
115% and over -0.2 0.9 0.8 0.6 -0.5 0.9 0.7
All regions -0.1 1.3 1.8 1.3 0.0 2.0 1.5  
In each of the three broad service sectors, the rate of growth of value-added varied 
inversely with the level of GDP per head. In all three sectors, therefore, it was higher 
in the lower income regions than elsewhere and in each case lowest in the high 
income group.  
In all the regional groups, growth of value-added in business and financial services 
was particularly high. In each case, therefore, there was a shift in output both from 
industry and, more especially, agriculture to services and within these from basic to 
more advanced services. The latter include education and health care, which account 
for much of the value-added in public services. 
… But is it not matched by growth in employment 
The number in work fell over this period in these regions as growth of productivity 
outstripped that of output. Relatively high productivity growth occurred in all broad 
sectors except agriculture, so narrowing the gap in value-added per person 
employed. In agriculture, where the gap was equally wide, productivity remained 
almost unchanged, so moderating the reduction in employment from the fall in 
output. This partly reflects the subsistence nature of the sector in many of the 
regions concerned and its role as an employer of last resort, in the sense that many of 
those unable to find work in other parts of the economy take up – or remain in – 
subsistence farming as a means of supporting themselves. 
In industry and construction in these regions, growth of productivity exceeded the 
growth of value-added and employment fell. This was also the case in public 
services, where despite growth of value-added of almost 7% a year, the number 
employed declined slightly. Employment growth was, therefore, confined to basic 
market services and business and financial services, especially the latter, where it 
amounted to 3.5% a year. This, however, was not sufficient to offset job losses in 
the other sectors, partly reflecting the relatively small size of the service sector in 
these regions but more importantly the scale of productivity increases in a context of 
relatively high output growth. 
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Productivity increases were on a much smaller scale in other regions, where the 
productivity gap was much narrower, including those with GDP per head of between 
50% and 75% of the EU average. Here net job creation in services more than 
compensated for large job losses in agriculture. These job gains were particularly 
substantial in business services (employment growing by 4.5% a year), a feature 
common to all the regional groups.  
Such growth, combined with the growth of education and health care within public 
services has significant implications for the demand for labour. Together with the 
decline of jobs in agriculture and in industry – or at least low growth – it implies a 
rising demand for labour with high education and skill levels and a reduction in the 
demand for manual labour, both skilled and low skilled. It is coupled, moreover, as 
more detailed investigation shows, with a similar shift of jobs within sectors – 
towards managerial and professional type jobs and away from, for example, jobs on 
the production line – as a consequence of automation and changes in working 
methods. The challenge facing lagging regions is to accommodate these shifts by 
ensuring the availability of a work force with the education levels and the skills 
required as well as the provision of the infrastructure, services and amenities which 
support business development. 
Regional characteristics remain determinants of economic structure 
The structure of economic activity in regions is linked not only to the level of GDP 
per head but also to their inherent features. Although economic activity tends to shift 
from low value-added to high value-added sectors as regions develop, detailed 
analysis indicates that the sectoral composition of activity will continue to reflect in 
some degree the underlying characteristics of the regions concerned9. Such factors 
as geographical position, topology, climate, the pattern of urban settlements, cultural 
and industrial heritage and accumulated know-how which are important 
determinants of comparative advantage tend to influence the structure of the 
economy even in regions with relatively high levels of GDP per head.  
This can be seen, for example, in regions which continue to specialise in textiles and 
clothing in northern Italy or in the manufacture of machine tools in western parts of 
Germany. The proportion of the regional work force employed in these sectors may 
be very small, though significantly larger than in other regions with similar levels of 
prosperity, but they remain important parts of the regional economy in terms of the 
income they generate both directly and indirectly. These areas of specialisation, 
therefore, tend to become less evident in terms of the relative numbers they employ 
as regions develop and other activities which are common to all regions - such as 
retailing, education and health care – expand, fuelled partly by the income generated 
in the areas concerned.  
In short, while there is a tendency for regions to become more similar in terms of 
their economic structure as they grow – as they experience a common shift from 
primary and secondary sectors to services – aspects of specialisation remain. This 
has implications for their vulnerability to external events, such as the continuing 
process of globalisation, the depletion of traditional sources of energy and the 
                                                 
9  See Changing regions – Structural changes in the EU regions, study carried out for DG Regional 
Policy by Applica sprl and wiiw, 2007. 
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associated increase in price, or global warming. The differential effect of these 
prospective developments is considered below. 
1.7. The regional impact of global developments 
Globalisation and trade liberalisation affects regions differently 
The continuing process of globalisation, the entry of developing economies into 
industrial markets which is a major part of this and the associated intensification of 
competition in the markets concerned has different implications for regions in the 
EU. Although this process tends to be a gradual one, it can be accelerated by the 
sudden entry of new players into the market or changes of trade agreements. This 
may leave producers in the EU with limited time to react to the difficulty of 
competing with lower cost producers in third countries in markets for more basic 
products by either shifting their focus of competition from price to non-price factors, 
notably quality and design, or abandoning these markets completely and moving 
into new, less basic, ones.  
Since the industries which are most exposed to increased global competition are not 
evenly distributed across the EU but tend to be concentrated in particular places, 
reflecting the differing areas of regional specialisation, some regions are much more 
vulnerable to this ongoing process than others. Regions specialising in textiles, 
clothing and leather10, or steel-making (basic metals NACE 27) or electric, 
audiovisual and ICT equipment11 are particularly vulnerable since these are 
industries which developing countries have moved into on a large-scale and where 
low costs are a primary factor of competition, at least in respect of mass-market 
products.  
The regions with a relatively large share of employment in textiles, clothing and 
leather tend to have relatively low levels of income – and low labour costs – and are 
mainly located in the new Member States (Map 1.11: Employment in selected 
manufacturing sectors, 2005). Here in a number of regions – in Bulgaria, Romania, 
Estonia, Lithuania and parts of Poland – the industry has expanded over recent years 
as a result of low costs. There are, however, a number of regions in other parts of the 
EU where the industry is also responsible for a large share of employment. This is 
particularly so in Norte in Portugal, where some 13% of all those in work are 
employed in textiles, more than anywhere else in the EU. Here employment has 
declined in recent years as competition from low cost producers in China and other 
parts of East Asia has intensified, especially after the ending of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement in 2005.  
The challenge facing Portuguese producers is to shift the basis on which they 
compete away from low costs to quality, style and rapid response to changing 
patterns of demand, as producers in northern and central parts of Italy, where the 
industry also accounts for a relatively large share of employment, have successfully 
done in the past. This requires, however, a major change in methods of working and 
the organisation of production. It also requires a work force with different skills than 
                                                 
10  Sectors covered by NACE codes 17 (textile), 18 (clothing) and 19 (leather) 
11  Sectors covered by NACE codes 30 (office machinery and computers) 31 (electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c.) and 32 (radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus) 
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those which have traditionally been required. A similar challenge is likely to face 
producers in the new Member States in the years to come as their income and wage 
levels rise.  
The challenge, however, extends beyond producers in the industry as such, since 
employment in textiles and clothing is almost certain to decline whether the strategy 
adopted in the industry is successful or not – whether jobs are lost through the 
adoption of new technology combined with the outsourcing of the more basic, 
labour-intensive parts of the production process, as has happened in Italy, or simply 
by companies closing down. The parallel challenge is, therefore, for the region to 
develop new activities to replace the income and jobs lost as the industry shrinks. 
Much the same considerations apply to steel-making, which is more dispersed 
across the EU but which is still much more important for some regions than others – 
in Northern parts of Spain, in southern regions in Sweden and the north of Finland, 
as well in the industrial area in the new Member States which spans the north-
eastern part of the Czech Republic (Moravskoslezko), the southern part of Poland 
(Slaskie) and the eastern part of Slovakia (Stredné Slovensko and Východné 
Slovensko). 
Employment in the manufacture of electrical appliances and audiovisual and ICT 
equipment is also widely spread across the EU, but nevertheless with high 
concentrations in several Hungarian, Czech and Slovakian regions, where the share 
in employment is above 4%, more than three times the EU average of 1.3%. As in 
the case of textiles, this sector also includes activities that are less easily relocated in 
being closely tied to companies with local headquarters such as Nokia in Finland 
and Hewlett-Packard in Ireland, especially when new product development is of key 
importance to remain competitive.  
As do rising energy costs 
Although it might fluctuate significantly, the price of oil is almost certain to increase 
over the long-term as more accessible reserves are depleted. This together with the 
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will feed through into overall energy costs. 
The rate at which this occurs will depend largely on the progress made in energy 
saving and the extent to which consumption can be reduced relative to GDP. So far, 
despite efforts made in this direction, energy use has continued to rise as GDP has 
grown.  
Nevertheless, it is still the case that countries with the highest level of GDP per head 
tend to have the lowest consumption of energy per unit of output. The most notable 
exception is the US which, largely because of a policy of keeping prices low, 
consumes 50% more energy relative to GDP than the EU15 (Fig. 1.20). 
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Increases in energy costs could affect regions differentially because of varying levels 
of demand for energy which stem from differences in geographical location, climate 
and the structure of economic activity: 
• Increased energy prices are likely to push up transport costs, unless they are 
accompanied by greater fuel efficiency to compensate. Since increased costs 
affect different modes of transport differentially, they are also likely to encourage 
shifts between these, in particular from road to rail and, where possible, to sea 
and inland waterways. Nevertheless, the most peripheral regions, such as the 
northern parts of Finland and Sweden or the most southern parts of Portugal, 
Spain and Italy, are likely to be most affected.  
• Increases in energy prices will also tend to push up the cost of some processes 
and products more than others and encourage less energy-intensive methods of 
production and new materials to be developed, such as, for example, composite 
materials to replace steel which uses substantial amounts of energy in its 
production. Regions which rely more than others on the industries most affected 
for income and jobs – the regions specialising in steel-making, for example, as 
noted above – will tend to lose out unless they can respond in a like way. Regions 
specialising in tourism could also be affected by the increased price of air travel.  
• Regions where there is the possibility of developing or expanding renewable 
energy sources – wind power, solar, biomass or hydroelectric – could gain as 
energy use shifts in this direction. 
• The rise in energy costs could also encourage a shift in the pattern of settlements 
within regions with people tending to live closer to where they work, or vice 
versa, though it will take some time before this is reflected in spatial 
development.  
Climate change is also likely to affect some regions more than others 
The 4th Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
published in January 2007 confirms that changes in climate are due to increases in 
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atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases which far exceed pre-industrial 
levels and that this increase in brought about by human activities such as fossil fuel 
use and agriculture. This once again underlines the urgent need for global action to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The world's average temperature has already risen 
by some 0.8 degrees. Historical emissions show that considerable further warming 
and changes are in store. Global temperatures are likely to rise by up to 4 degrees or 
more this century if nothing is done. 
Within Europe, climate change is altering weather patterns and giving rise to floods, 
drought, heat waves and forest fires. While the implications of rising temperatures 
vary in different part of Europe, the overall picture is that the climate change will 
bring about a fundamental change in the basis for economic activity. This will have 
direct impacts on regional and territorial cohesion and should therefore be taken into 
account when defining the future EU cohesion policy. 
BOX Floods, droughts and heat waves 
Floods 
The number of floods in the EU27 has increased every decade since the 1960s12, while at the same 
time the costs associated with them have risen substantially, partly as a result of built-up areas 
continuing to expand in areas prone to flooding (Map 1.12: Flood risk assessment in NUTS3 
regions). If this continues, it could increase the frequency and scale of flood disasters because of its 
effect in reducing the amount of water that the soil can absorb. On top of this, climate change is 
likely to lead to more extreme weather patterns and itself increase the frequency of floods.  
At present, 7% of people in the EU27 live in areas at high risk of flood. This proportion varies from 
around 2% in Denmark to 12-13% in Austria and Slovakia13. In 45 of the 1275 NUTS3 regions for 
which data are available14, over 20% of the population is at risk. Thirty of these regions are in 
Germany, 5 in Austria, 3 in Italy and 2 in Spain, France and Romania.  
Droughts and heat waves 
Around 9% of people in the EU27 live in an area where there are over 120 days a year, on 
average, without rain or 4 months. These areas are almost exclusively in Greece, Southern Italy, 
and Portugal, though there are also a few regions in the south of France and the South-East of the 
UK, while droughts are common in Hungary and the east of Bulgaria and Romania, though of 
slightly shorter duration. The frequency and duration of droughts is likely to increase as a result of 
global warming, with these regions at particular risk.  
In addition, four countries – Cyprus, Malta, Italy and Spain – can be termed ‘water-stressed’, in the 
sense that withdrawals are more than 20% of available reserves. Global warming will reduce 
rainfall and increase temperatures in these countries, adding to problems of water scarcity. 
The impact of heat waves is at present the focus of much research with the aim of preventing a re-
occurrence of the consequences of the hot summer in 2003 when between 20 and 50 000 people 
are estimated to have died15 and loss of agricultural production amounted to around EUR 12 billion. 
Heat waves are expected to be commonplace by the middle of the century, putting people of 65 
and over at particular risk and increasing the likelihood of fires. 
                                                 
12  Nat Hazards, DOI 10.1007/s11069-006-9065-2, Major flood disasters in Europe: 1950–2005 by José 
I. Barredo. Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006. 
13  Coastal areas and areas below sea level, such as much of the Netherlands, were not included in this 
modelling exercise. 
14  Nine regions are missing: Canarias, Ceuta, Melilla, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, Guyane, 
Kypros, Açores and Madeira. 
15  2003 Heatwave in Eurosurveillance, European Communicable Disease Journal, 2005, Vol 10, No. 7-9. 
This publication puts the estimated deaths at 33,000 in August alone and up to 44,000 taking into 
account June and July as well. Setting the record straight by the Earth Policy Institute, July 28, 2006. 
Washington, D.C. In this article, the EPI revised their first estimate of deaths in Western Europe due to 
the 2003 heat wave from 35,000 to 52,000. Hot Summer in Europe: The Future has already Begun. In 
Annual Review: Natural Catastrophes 2003. Munich Re Group, München, Germany, (2004). Munich 
Re estimated the figure at 20,000. 
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1.8. Demography: Europe's changing population 
Europe's population is still growing, but is projected to start declining by around 
202316. In 2005, only 300 000 more people were born in the EU than died, giving a 
natural population growth rate of less than 0.1%, one-tenth the rate in the US. 
According to the latest projection, deaths will outnumber births in the EU from 2008 
onwards, leading to a natural decline in the population.  
From then on, population growth will depend on immigration. This is already the 
main source of population growth in the EU. Between 2000 and 2005, 86% of 
population growth was due to migration, compared to only 42% in the US. If 
migration trends remain the same, EU population will start to fall in around 15 years 
time, unless there is a pick-up in the birth rate. 
BOX - Demographic challenge in Bulgaria 
Among the EU Member States, Bulgaria is in a particularly challenging demographic situation. At 
the end of 2005, the total population was 7.7 million and is expected to decline significantly by 
2050 as a result of a low birth rate, high adult mortality and a high level of net emigration. This has 
led to population decline of 5.4% between 2000 and the end of 2005. The old-age dependency rate 
was 44.5% in 2005(. Projections of Bulgaria’s future old-age dependency rate are significantly 
higher than the EU average (61% compared to the EU average of 53% in 2050), which will have a 
major effect on the long-term sustainability of pensions.  
The rapidly increasing share of those aged 65 or older has implications for social inclusion. The at-
risk-of-poverty rate among this age group increased to 16% in 2004 from 14% in 2003. In 
addition, life expectancy at birth in 2004 was 76.2 years for women and 69 years for men) both 
significantly below the EU averages. Infant mortality was more than double the EU average in 2004 
(11.6 as against 4.5), though it has declined significantly from 27.3 in 1970. 
The economic and social impacts of demographic change.  
Demographic change will gradually limit the scope for future employment growth. 
Although the population of working age (aged 15-64) is already expected to decline 
from around 2011 onwards, total employment in the EU-25 is expected to continue 
growing up to around 2017 due to rising labour force participation. Thanks to higher 
education levels and greater labour force attachment of younger cohorts of women, 
female employment rates are projected to rise from just over 55% in 2004 to almost 
65% by 2025, assuming, of course, a counterpart growth in jobs. The employment 
rates of older workers are also projected to increase, from 40% in 2004 for the EU-
25 to 47% by 2010 and 59% in 2025. From around 2017 onwards, however, in the 
absence of an increase in net inward migration, the shrinking working-age 
population could lead to the number in employment remaining unchanged and, 
subsequently, to it declining. Productivity growth will then become the only source 
of economic growth. 
Overall, three phases can be distinguished:  
• Between 2004 and 2011, there is scope for significant employment and economic 
growth as both the population of working age and participation rates are expected 
to increase.  
• Between 2012 and 2017, rising participation rates can offset the decline in 
working-age population resulting from the baby-boom generation entering 
retirement and being replaced by much smaller numbers of young people 
                                                 
16  According to Eurostat's baseline population projection at Member State level 2004-2050. 
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becoming of working age. The overall number of people in the work force in the 
EU could continue to increase, though at a slower rate and this period could be 
characterised by tightening labour market conditions. 
• After 2018, the ageing effect will dominate. By then, the cohort trend towards 
higher female participation rates will more or less have come to an end putting 
even greater pressure on measures to increase participation of women as well as 
on measures to increase the participation of older workers to raise the effective 
retirement age. Consequently, the declining number of people of working age can 
then be expected to result in a decline in total employment and lower prospects 
for economic growth, though not necessarily of growth in GDP per head.   
Changing migration patterns in EU Member States … 
In the five years 2000-2005, the Member States experiencing the largest net inward 
migration (i.e. immigration less emigration) were the three cohesion countries in the 
south of Europe, Spain, Greece and Portugal plus Italy, countries where immigration 
had previously been relatively low. In Spain migrants added over 8% to population 
over this period, while in the other countries, they added over 3%. Inflows were also 
relatively high in Cyprus as well as in Ireland, in both of which the shares of 
foreign-born residents was already relatively large (above 10%). By contrast, net 
migration into Germany, France and the UK, in which foreign-born population 
shares were also high, amounted to less than 2% of their population (Fig. 1.21). 
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The difference between the US and the EU in terms of the share of foreign born 
residents is not that large (Fig. 1.22). In 2000, the US share of foreign born residents 
was 11%, in the EU27 it was 8% and in the EU15 it was 11%. As the EU27 has a 
larger population than the US, the total number of foreign born residents is actually 
higher in the EU. 
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Because the US is a single country and the EU consists of 27 countries, it is arguable 
that those born in other EU Member States rather than in third countries should be 
excluded from the comparison to make it meaningful. This amounts to around 2% of 
EU population. This lowers the proportion to 6% for the EU27 and 8% for the 
EU15. However, moving from New York to California is quite different from 
moving from Portugal to Finland, not only because of the difference in language but 
also because of far greater cultural differences. Within the EU, there are only a few 
Member States with more people born in other parts of the EU than in countries 
outside the EU, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland being the most prominent.  
The most striking difference between the US and the EU is how foreign-born 
residents are distributed. In the US, they are concentrated in the two main States of 
entry, California and New York, where 25% and 20% of the population, 
respectively, was foreign born in 2000. In contrast, in the EU, there are only three 
small countries with very large shares, Luxembourg (33%) and Estonia and Latvia 
(19% in each). In the EU, in four out of five Member States, those born abroad 
represented between 5% and 15% of the population in 200017, whereas this is the 
case in just two out of five US States. Foreign-born residents were, therefore, more 
dispersed in the EU than in the US.  
Overall, if migration between Member States is included, net inward migration into 
EU-25 Member States was much the same as into the US over the period 2000 to 
2005 (adding 2.1% to population over the five years as against 2.3%). Migration into 
EU-15 Member States was higher than into the US, Net inward migration, however, 
varies considerably across the US, adding over 10% to populations in Nevada, 
Arizona and Florida over the period, more than in any EU country. Only in Spain, 
Cyprus and Ireland did net migration add over 6% to population and in all other 
Member States, the figure was under 4%. 
… And at regional level 
                                                 
17 The source of these data is the Census of Population in most countries, as a result more recent data are 
not available. 
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Migration has also been the main factor responsible for differential rates of 
population growth across EU regions.  Some 39 NUTS 2 regions in all experienced 
net outward migration over the period 2000-2003, the highest rates (5% or more of 
population) being in eastern Germany, Poland and Bulgaria. Outflows were also 
significant (2% or more) in southern Italy, northern France, north and eastern 
Finland and a few parts of the north of the UK (North-Eastern Scotland and Tees 
Valley & Durham). (Map 1.13: Component of population change, 2000-2003)  
By contrast, 66 regions experienced net inward migration of over 5‰ over these 
three years and 32 regions, of over 8‰. Nine of these were in Spain, 7 in northern 
and central Italy and two in the south of France. They also include a number of 
island regions - Cyprus, Malta, Canarias, Illes Balears and Corse (see Box on Island 
regions). 
Economic factors in the form of differences in income levels and employment tend 
to be the main factors inducing people to move between regions, In Germany, all of 
the new Länder in the east have experienced a net outflow to the western Länder 
since the early 1990s, reflecting the substantial gap between the two in terms of 
income and employment levels. In Italy, migration still tends to be from the less 
prosperous south to the more prosperous north. In France, people have moved away 
from the old industrial regions in the North, such as Nord-Pas-de-Calais or Lorraine, 
to the south. 
Box – Islands 
There are 16 island regions in the Union with an overall population of around 9.5 million, 70% of 
them in Sicilia and Sardegna. On average, GDP per head in 2004 was well above that of the lowest 
income regions in the EU, but (with the exception of Illes Balears, Åland and Gotlands Ian) lower 
than the EU average. In general, there has been a slow convergence of GDP per head towards the 
EU average between 1995 and 2004, though for some of these regions (Bornholm, Sicilia, 
Sardegna, Gotlands Iän, Orkney Islands and Shetland Islands) the gap has widened. These are the 
same regions (together with the island of Eilean Siar), which have experienced population decline 
over this period. 
Though accessibility often constitutes a particular problem for islands, insularity does not seem to 
constitute in itself a major obstacle to development. What seems to determine their long-term 
development prospects is rather their size of population, which in many cases is too small to 
support a reasonable level of infrastructure and basic services.  
Capital cities, as centres of economic activity have also seen significant inward 
migration. Indeed, this is true in virtually all countries, the migrants in question 
coming both from other regions in the country concerned (as in the case, 
particularly, of Helsinki, Stockholm and the capital cities in all the new Member 
States) and from third countries (as in the case of Madrid and Rome), as well as 
from other parts of the EU (as in the case of Brussels and Vienna).  
Non-economic factors, however, in particular, the quality of life and the 
attractiveness of the environment, seem to have an increasing effect. The regions 
concerned include a number with relatively low levels of GDP per head, such as 
Cornwall in the UK, Ionia Nisia and Peloponisos in Greece, Canarias in Spain and 
Algarve in Portugal. 
Natural growth is slowing down throughout the Union 
The significant reduction in fertility rates (the average number of children per 
woman declined from an average of 2.5 in the EU in 1965 to 1.5 in 1995), which 
underlies the slow-down in population growth, began in the 1960s in northern 
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Europe and spread some 10 years later to the southern countries and some 20 years 
later to central and eastern countries. The same trends are, therefore, evident in all 
parts of the EU18. Nevertheless, there are substantial differences between regions in 
both the direction and scale of population change. 
Over the period 2000-2003, just under half (118) of the NUTS 2 regions in the EU 
experienced natural growth of population. In 30 of these regions, growth was over 
4‰ per year – 11 in France, four in Spain, five in the Netherlands, three in the UK 
(inner, outer London and North Ireland), both regions in Ireland and one each in 
Sweden (Stockholm) and Austria as well as in Cyprus.   
By contrast, the natural population decline was 2% a year or more in 72 regions 
spread across the EU, as result primarily of very low fertility rates. In 16 regions, the 
natural decline was over 4% a year - in four regions in eastern Germany, three in 
Hungary, almost all the regions in Bulgaria and in Liguria in Italy, Asturias in Spain, 
Alentejio in Portugal and Latvia 
Overall population change and the underlying factors 
More than 60% of all regions (covering 72% of EU population) experienced an 
increase in population over the period 2000-2003. In around half of these, the 
increase was due to both natural population growth and net inward migration. These 
regions (Group 1 in the table) include most of the regions which include the capital 
city and other higher income regions in Member States – in, for example, southern 
Germany the North-East of Italy and in the South and East of Spain. They also 
include, however, most regions in France and a few less prosperous parts of the UK 
(Greater Manchester and Yorkshire and the Humber). (Tab. 1.5)  
Error! Not a valid link. 
In one in four regions (covering 26% of the EU population), natural population 
decline was more than outweighed by net inward migration. These regions (Group 2 
in the table) include most regions in western Germany and the UK, northern and 
central Italy and Spain, Slovenia, central and southern Portugal and several regions 
in Greece. In a further 8% of regions, the reverse was the case, natural growth of 
population outweighing net outward migration (Group 3). These are mainly in 
southern Italy, north and west of France and northern Finland,  
Box – Northern, sparsely populated regions 
Four regions in the EU have less than 8 inhabitants per square kilometre: the two Swedish regions 
of Mellersta Norrland and Övre Norrland and the two Finnish regions of Itä-Suomi and Pohjois-
Suomi.  
The main problem they face – other than remoteness and cold climate – is depopulation, caused by 
a low birth rate and outward migration, partly reflecting economic growth in the rest of the country, 
which encouraged people – particularly the young – to move elsewhere. Over the period 1995-
2004, population decline was particularly marked in the Swedish regions and Itä-Suomi in the East 
of Finland. Population projections for the period 2002-2020 suggest that these trends will continue, 
with Northern and central parts of Finland forecast to lose at least 15% of their population over this 
period.  
With the exception of Itä-Suomi, these regions had a higher GDP per head than the EU average in 
2004, though it was declining in the Swedish regions. All regions have unemployment rates above 
                                                 
18  See, Communication from the Commission, Green Paper " Confronting demographic changes: a new 
solidarity between generations" COM (2005) 94, 16 March 2005. 
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the national average. The regional economy is strongly dependent on the public sector and the rate 
of business creation is especially low. 
One in three regions experienced population decline; in the majority this was due to 
natural population reduction and net outward migration (Group 6). These regions are 
mainly in the new Member States – in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and several parts of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, but also in eastern 
Germany and the North of Sweden.  
Continuing shifts in the age structure of the population 
This variation in population growth across regions has implications for the age 
structure and, in particular, the relative number of people of working age who 
effectively have to support young people, on the one hand, and older people, on the 
other. 
The number of young people under 15 has declined continuously over the past 
decade in relation to the number of people of working age (15-64), reflecting the fall 
in fertility rates. This decline has been particularly marked in the three EU15 
cohesion countries and the new Member States. Whereas in all the new Member 
States in 1995, there were more young people in relation to population of working 
age than in the EU15, in 2005, this was the case only in Cyprus, Malta and 
Lithuania. While this means that there are fewer young people for those of working 
age to support, it also means that there are fewer coming along to support the older 
generation in future years. 
The number of older people of 65 and over amounted, on average, to some 28% of 
the number of people of working age in Germany and Italy in 2004, implying that 
there were less than 4 people aged 15-64 for every one person of 65 and over (Fig. 
1.23). In many regions (78 of the 268), the proportion – the so-called dependency 
rate – was higher than this, exceeding 40% in Mellersta Norrland in Sweden, Åland 
in Finland and Liguria in Italy. At the other end of the scale, the dependency rate 
was only just over 16% in Ireland and Slovakia and under 13% in Flevoland in the 
Netherlands as well as in the two French DOMs of Guyane and La Reunion (see 
Box on ultra-peripheral regions). 
  45 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
IT BG E
L
BE D
E
H
U FR ES SE F
I
LV PL LT M
T AT EE LU U
K SI R
O C
Z
D
K PT SK N
L
C
Y IE
0
10
20
30
40
50
Effective old-age dependency rate 
Old-age dependency rate 
Population 65+ as % 
of population 15-64
1.23 Old-age dependency rates, 2005
Source: Eurostat
Population 65+ as % 
of employed
 
Although the dependency rate is intended to give an indication of the burden of 
support for those in retirement falling on the population of working age, it leaves out 
of account the significant number among the latter who are not actually working. As 
such, it tends to understate the extent of dependency, in the sense that support – in 
terms of income at least – effectively falls on those in employment rather than on 
everyone aged 15-64. The dependency rate as usually measured also fails to draw 
attention to the importance of raising the proportion of working-age population in 
employment as a means of reducing the average burden of support. (Map 1.14: 
Effective old-age dependency rate, 2005)  
Box - Ultra peripheral regions 
Ultra-peripheral regions are characterised by remoteness from the main EU market, narrow 
domestic markets, often fragmented across a number of islands, which limits economies of scale, 
undeveloped labour markets with few skilled workers, and fragile ecosystems. Despite this, 
economic growth in some ultra-peripheral regions has been significant l in the recent years, while in 
others, significant problems remain in overcoming structural weaknesses. 
The Canarias have recorded growth comparable to that in mainland regions, while the Açores and 
Madeira have experienced large-scale emigration, low unemployment and the continuing 
importance of agriculture and fishing. The French ultra-peripheral regions, in turn, have had high 
population growth, very high rates of unemployment, and a large and undiversified service sector. 
As a consequence, with the notable exception of Madeira and the Canarias, the ultra-peripheral 
regions have among the lowest levels of GDP per head in the EU as well as in the respective 
countries to which they belong.  
Differences across regions in the number of people of 65 and over in relation to the 
number of people in work are much wider, reflecting the substantial variation in 
employment rates as much as in the relative number above retirement age. In Italy 
and Bulgaria, therefore, this effective dependency rate averages over 45% (large 
numbers not working combining with large numbers of older people), while in the 
Netherlands, it averages only 25% and in Ireland, just 22%.  
At the regional level, the variation is even more marked. Large parts of Spain, Italy 
and Greece have an effective old age dependency rate of close to 50%, meaning that 
for every person above retirement age there are only around two people in 
employment. In five regions – Liguria and Molise in Italy, Voreio Aigaio in Greece, 
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Corse in France and Severozapaden in Bulgaria – the rate is over 60%. On the other 
hand, in Stockholm, largely because of the high level of employment, it is under 
20% (this is also the case in Guyane because of the age structure of the population). 
High effective dependency rates are, therefore, primarily associated with low 
employment rates as well as a large proportion of the population beyond retirement 
age. As this proportion continues to increase, as it will in future years, it will 
become ever more important to increase the number of people in work. This implies 
not just encouraging those at present not working to do so but making it more 
possible for them – women in particular – to combine employment with other 
responsibilities, especially caring for children. It also implies ensuring that there are 
sufficient jobs for them to do.  
1.9. Territorial trends at more local level 
Cohesion is not confined to avoiding excessive disparities across the EU as a whole 
or between regions within countries but extends to minimising those which exist 
within regions, especially between urban and rural areas or between towns and cities 
of different sizes. Although the areas concerned may seem simple to identify, they 
are hard to define. Cities, for example, can be viewed as physical, administrative or 
economic entities but the boundaries implied by each of these may differ 
significantly. 
  
BOX - Methods used to define cities, small and medium-sized towns and rural areas 
Cities of more than 100,000 - Cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants are taken from the 
Urban Audit which defines both a political boundary the "core city" and an economic boundary the 
"larger urban zone": 
• the core city, in most cases, corresponds closely to both the administrative and the physical or 
morphological boundary. In a few cases, the political boundary may be smaller than this;  
• the larger urban zone approximates to the commuter area or to a single labour market. The aim 
is to include all local areas (at the LAU2 level) in which at least 20% of people commute into the 
core city or surrounding local areas. Local areas where commuting is less than this but which are 
surrounded by areas where it is more are also included. In conurbations such as the Ruhrgebiet, 
one larger urban zone might cover more than one core city. 
The advantage of this approach is that because it corresponds with administrative units there is 
usually a substantially amount of data available. The drawback is that in some cases, the cities so 
defined do not correspond with physical or economic boundaries.  
Small and medium-sized towns of 5,000-100,000 - Urban morphological zones (UMZ) as 
created by the European Joint Research Council are defined as CORINE land cover cells of 100 
squares meters which are built up areas less than 200 metres apart.  
Port areas, airports, and sport and leisure facilities are also included if they are contiguous with 
these areas. Road and rail networks, and water courses, if they within 300 m of the UMZ, are also 
included 
The advantage of this concept is that it is based on a uniform definition throughout the EU. The 
drawback is the almost complete lack of data for the areas defined.  
Rural Areas - The OECD definition distinguishes two hierarchical levels of territorial unit: local and 
regional. 
• At local community level (LAU2), the OECD defines rural areas as communities with a population 
density below 150 people per square kilometre. 
• At regional level (mainly NUTS 3), the OECD distinguishes larger functional or administrative 
units by their degree of rurality, defined in terms of the share of population living in rural 
communities. Regions are then grouped into three types: 
o predominantly rural regions: over 50% of the population living in rural communities; 
o significantly rural regions: 15 to 50% of the population living in rural communities; 
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o predominantly urban regions: less than 15% of the population living in rural communities. 
The advantage of this approach is that it enables all areas to be defined in a simple way and is used 
internationally. It also means that data available at the NUTS 3 level can be used.  
The drawback is that the LAU2 and NUTS 3 regions vary widely in terms of land area which can bias 
the results. For a country, like Sweden, with very large LAU2s, this method will tend to overstate 
the number of rural areas. For countries, like Germany, with small NUTS 3 regions, the number of 
rural areas will also tend to be overstated and some might even be directly adjacent to, or 
surround, an urban area. 
The analysis here concentrates on cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. It is 
based on the Urban Audit, which has identified 501 such cities in the EU27 which 
are home to around 36% of the population19. Smaller towns or cities with between 
5,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (here termed ‘towns’) have been defined on the basis 
of urban morphological zones as distinguished by the CORINE land cover survey. 
Around 23% of the population in the EU live in such towns. According to the 
OECD definition, 21% of the population in the EU live in predominantly rural areas 
and another 37% in intermediate rural areas (both defined at the NUTS 3 level). As 
each of these three entities is defined on a different basis and scale, they will 
overlap, and thus they cannot be directly compared.  
To overcome this problem and to give an insight into their prospects for economic 
development, areas can be classified on a NUTS 3 basis in terms of their 
accessibility to a city with more than 100, 000 people, where a range of essential 
services can be expected to be found20. This indicates that more than 90% of 
intermediate rural regions are accessible in this sense and some two-thirds of 
predominantly rural regions.  
Large European cities: growth, decline and suburbanisation, 1996-2001 
Two-thirds of cities in the EU experienced growth of population over the 5 years 
1996-2001, while the remaining third experienced a decline21.  
There was a major trend towards suburbanisation. In 90% of urban agglomerations, 
population in the suburbs grew by more than in the core city. In only a few cases – 
such as Lefkosia, Copenhagen, Brussels, London and Ljubljana – did population in 
the core expand by more than in the suburbs and in a significant number, population 
in the core declined despite growing overall. Moreover, even where population 
declined overall, there were only a small minority of cities where there was also 
suburban decline. This, however, was the case in many second-tier cities where 
heavy industry is, or used to be, located (such as Glasgow, Newcastle, Manchester, 
Liverpool, Sheffield, Birmingham in the UK, Bremen in Germany, Łódź, Katowice, 
Bydgoszcz in Poland, Ostrava in the Czech Republic, Miskolc in Hungary, Liepaja 
in Latvia, Maribor in Slovenia, and Brăila, Sibiu, Călăraşi, Giurgiu and Alba Iulia in 
                                                 
19  The Urban Morphological Zones (UMZ) with more than 100,000 inhabitants gives an almost identical 
share of EU population living in these. The number of UMZs, however, is considerably smaller, only 
381, because the methodology used tends to cluster neighbouring cities into one large UMZ and it also 
misses some of the cities identified in the Urban Audit. On the other hand, it seems to overestimate the 
population in a number of cases. 
20  A region is classified as accessible if more than 50% of the population can reach a city with more than 
100,000 people in less than an hour. This cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary, and in the Nordic 
regions, for example, cities with considerably fewer people provide a wide range of services. 
Nevertheless, in practice, reducing the size of city does not alter the results of the analysis dramatically. 
21  Based on Urban Audit data (core cities and suburbs).  
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Romania). Relative decline of population in the core coupled with growth in the 
suburbs was particularly marked in Dublin, Lisbon, Berlin, Munich, Vienna, Rome, 
Athens, Prague, Bratislava, Budapest and Warsaw. 22 
There is evidence that population growth in the suburbs is being accompanied by the 
suburbanisation of economic activity. In 16 of the 20 cities in which GDP can be 
measured at NUTS 3 level in the core and suburban areas, the share generated in the 
latter increased between 1995 and 2003, in some cases, substantially, especially in 
the new Member States (in Budapest, Prague, Sofia and Warsaw), though also in 
Munich.  
Population growth around second tier cities with population loss in the centres is 
evident in most cases in Austria, Poland, Slovakia and Italy. This was also case in 
cities in eastern Germany, while in the western part, suburban population growth 
was associated with either little change in the centre or some increase. 
Suburbanisation and the growth in economic activity means increasing pressure on 
the environment often accompanied by decline in the centre, with shops and other 
businesses closing down. This calls for effective management of land-use and public 
transport as well inner-city renewal to slow down or even reverse the trend. 
Concentration of deprivation in urban neighbourhoods 
In 75% of the Urban Audit cities, employment rates are lower than in the country as 
a whole, reflecting the fact that many of those working there commute from outside 
while many residents especially those with low levels of education do not have jobs. 
A significant proportion of the people concerned are foreign-born, migrants and 
ethnic minorities in general tending to concentrate in inner city areas in many parts 
of the EU. In addition, the evidence indicates that even those migrants with higher 
levels of education have more difficulty in finding employment than the rest of the 
population. 
Low employment rates in inner city areas are reflected in high rates of 
unemployment. In many cities across the EU, not only are unemployment rates high 
but there are huge disparities in rates (Map 1.15: Unemployment disparities in inner 
city areas). Disparities are particularly large in France, Belgium and Southern Italy, 
in cities like Marseille or Catania, as well as elsewhere, such as in Pecs, in Hungary, 
where the highest unemployment rate (55.6%) in 2005 was nearly 10 times the 
lowest (6.2%), Košice in Slovakia, Derry in the UK or Malmö in Sweden. 
In some cities, the highest concentrations of unemployment are in central areas, such 
as East London, while in others, they are in the outskirts, for example in large 
housing estates built 20 or 30 years ago or more. In these areas, there is not only 
high unemployment but other aspects of deprivation, such as low quality housing 
and inadequate public transport and other services as well as low income levels and 
high crime rates. 
                                                 
22  In Bratislava suburbanisation extended across the Austrian border.  
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High concentrations of unemployment in particular areas, however, are not limited 
to large cities but can also be found in smaller cities of under 250,000 people. (Maps 
1.16 and 1.17: Unemployment rate, 2001 (selected Urban Audit cities))  
Rural areas 
Significant outward migration from rural areas is still the prevailing trend in large 
parts of the EU, with damaging effects on their prospects for economic 
development. This is the case in rural areas in the South of Italy, the North of 
Finland, Sweden and Scotland, Eastern Germany and in the eastern parts of Poland 
and others new Member States). The lack of suitable jobs and lower living standards 
drive people, especially the young and better-educated to move elsewhere This has 
cumulative effects on the areas concerned, leaving them with an ageing population, 
shrinking basic services and even fewer employment possibilities. Predominantly 
rural areas in the EU, therefore, have relatively high youth unemployment rates 
(17.6% on average), natural population decline and a large proportion of elderly 
people (17% being 65 or over).  
Despite these general trends, as noted above, people are leaving cities in many 
countries and there is net inward migration into a significant number of rural areas. 
Among the three OECD categories of region, the highest population growth is in 
intermediate rural areas (0.34%) as a result of the extent of migration flows (adding 
1.4% a year to population). While young people are moving to urban areas to work 
or to university, people who are slightly older are moving to more rural areas to live 
and sometimes to work. In several parts of France and the UK, this has led to the 
revival of more remote rural areas as well as those closer to cities. 
This general picture conceals a more complex pattern of development. Many 
intermediate rural areas are characterised by industrial restructuring (or the need for 
it), high unemployment and population and economic decline, while there are 
examples of predominantly rural area with growth in almost every respect – 
population, employment and GDP – including some of the more remote areas. 
Although only 23% of predominantly rural areas have GDP per head above the EU 
average, growth of GDP over the period 1995- 2004 exceeded the average in 43% of 
them as against 36% of urban and 39% of intermediate regions. Rural areas, 
therefore, cannot automatically be associated with decline or intermediate areas with 
expansion. Nevertheless, in the lower income Member States, urban-rural 
differences in income levels and deprivation tend to be greater and unemployment 
higher in rural areas than elsewhere23. (Tab. 1.6) 
Error! Not a valid link. 
While employment in agriculture is still higher in rural areas than in other parts, 
agriculture is no longer the main driver in the economy. Between 2000 and 2005, 
employment in agriculture in the EU25 declined from 5.7% to 4.9%, though it 
remains high in a number of Member States (Romania, 32%, Poland over 17%; 
Lithuania 14% and Latvia; Greece and Portugal, around 12%). 
                                                 
23  European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EFILWC, 2006).  
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Employment in agriculture is almost certain to decline in future years, especially in 
the new Member States. Outward migration could well accelerate the process, 
especially in peripheral areas in the East. This could lead to the rationalisations of 
holdings, giving rise to further job losses, adding to the incentive to migrate and 
resulting in possible abandonment of land.  
The major challenge is to diversify the rural economy to replace the income and jobs 
in agriculture as the sector continues to decline and to make the most of the inherent 
comparative advantages of rural areas which are linked to a large extent to the 
natural environment.  
This applies, in particular, to remote and disadvantaged areas. Case studies show 
that nature conservation in such places is not only beneficial in itself but is a means 
of creating and supporting employment in areas where job employment 
opportunities and the scope for diversification are limited. It is also a means of 
encouraging tourism which is likely to create even more jobs.24 Effective 
management of the natural heritage is, therefore, an important requirement for 
economic as well as environmental reasons.  
Employment creation can also come from increasing renewable energy sources, 
from the production of biomass and the processing of bio-fuels, which regions with 
fertile agricultural areas and large forest areas are well suited for.  
Cultural identity, local traditions and historical heritage can also contribute to rural 
development, though the key is to recognise the commercial potential of these 
aspects and be able to realise this. Newcomers moving into rural areas may be able 
to do this by bringing new ideas and business know-how In more remote areas, 
however, more people tend to be leaving than entering, which might put this 
potential at risk.  
                                                 
24  Case studies in Scotland show that activities linked to the environment and the natural heritage 
(environmental preservation, nature tourism, and so on) not only contribute to income and employment 
in the local economy but they underpin related recreational activities, tourism and the production and 
marketing of local produce. (Courtney, P., Hill, G., Roberts, D., (2006) The role of natural heritage in 
rural development: An analysis of economic linkages in Scotland. Journal of Rural Studies, 22 (4), p. 
469-484.) 
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Box – Mountain areas 
Although most mountain areas share common features such as sensitive ecosystems, pressure 
from human settlement and problems of accessibility, they are in fact extremely diverse in terms of 
socio economic trends and economic performance. 
For example, population remained relatively stable in northern and central Europe, while it 
decreased in Eastern Europe. In the south, some areas experienced growth, others decline. 
Similarly, traditional activities have tended to decline in some areas, while tourism has expanded, 
promoting economic development and providing job opportunities to the younger generation which 
was no longer obliged to leave in search of employment. In other mountain areas, however, 
productivity and employment have remained low and have shown little tendency in recent years to 
catch up  
With economic development, however, pressure on the ecosystem of these regions has increased 
posing new threats to the environment. Mountain areas are also threatened by international road 
traffic, calling for solutions linking rail crossings to the road network. New opportunities may also 
be provided by modern telecommunications infrastructure, which – though slow to be installed 
largely because of the geographical features – can help to overcome many problems of accessibility 
which these regions face.  
Public service provision is crucial for both individuals living in rural areas and 
businesses operating there. Fixed service points providing access to basic public, 
financial and other services are an innovative way of ensuring provision. Such 
points may take various forms, such as rural transaction centres, one-stop shops, 
multi-service centres or mobile service points. Scottish experience shows that these 
can offer a solution to problems not adequately addressed by existing arrangements, 
such as tackling social deprivation as well as providing services to remote and 
scattered communities.25 Other innovations include the creative sharing of 
resources, such as the University of Helsinki making ICT equipment in a biological 
research station in remote Lapland available for language tuition in a region where 
there is a shortage of teachers.26 
Pooling resources, sharing facilities and cooperating in development strategies are a 
potential way for small rural local authorities to overcome problems of their small 
size. At the same time, good communications to the closest city and the more 
extensive range of services it offers are equally important. 
Links between urban and rural areas  
Migration trends are increasing the importance of "intermediary" areas and leading 
to more complex urban-rural linkages than the simple one-way exchange between 
market towns and their surrounding rural areas. Population growth in urban areas is 
increasing congestion and land prices, while the demand for quality food, local 
produce and a rural way of life, on the one hand, and space for housing, public 
amenities and increased environmental protection, on the other, is giving rise to 
development opportunities and pressure on land at the same time. (Map 1.18: 
Urban-rural typology of NUTS3 regions)  
                                                 
25  Bryden, J., Rennie, F., Bryan, A., and Hay, K., with Lucy Young-Smith (2005), Critical Factors in the 
Success of One-Stop Shops as a Model of Service Delivery within Rural Locations. Report to The 
Scottish Executive, Edinburgh. 
26  Aho, S., Saarelainen, T. and Suopajärvi, L. (2004), “Creating the North by Innovations”, in N. 
Aarsæther ed. Innovations in the Nordic Periphery, Nordregio R2004:3, Stockholm, p. 169-218. 
A similar sharing of facilities also occurs in other remote areas, such as the Isle of Skye in Scotland 
Dargan, L. (2006) UK National Report – CORASON Project, Global Urban Research Unit, University 
of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
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Improvements in infrastructure and communication technology is tending to 
encourage growth of urban areas in most parts of Europe Improved accessibility is 
creating new job opportunities for rural as well as urban populations, so long as they 
can commute and have the necessary education and skill levels. 
The arrival of increasing numbers of people from towns and cities can alter the rural 
character of areas. While it might push up income and tax receipts and so help to 
maintain public services and expand the local market, it can lead to widening social 
disparities and new tensions by increasing house prices to levels that locals cannot 
afford. In some of the more remote rural areas, especially in the UK, the growing 
number of non-permanent residents in second homes and the declining number of 
locals is causing local service providers to close down, so encouraging more locals 
to leave and initiating a downward spiral. 
Offices and factories tend to locate along transport routes, in out-of-town business 
parks and in towns easily accessible by car inducing even more commuting and 
pressure on accessible rural areas. Public transport has usually not kept pace with the 
building of new roads, which has led to more use of private cars and a further 
deterioration in public transport services, hitting low income groups without access 
to a car and excluding them from new employment opportunities.  
These trends increase the importance of spatial development policies and the 
coherent management of land use. Small and medium sized towns can have an 
important role to play in this regard. Around 21% of the population in the EU lives 
in towns of between 5,000 and 100,000. Such towns provide important services and 
facilities for both their inhabitants and surrounding areas. 
Towns can benefit rural areas through the services they provide, while people living 
in towns can equally benefit from being close to rural areas. Towns can, therefore, 
serve as centres of development for rural areas, as markets for the products produced 
there and a focus for employment services of all kinds and cultural and recreational 
activities. There is a mutual dependence between rural towns and the surrounding 
areas since the viability of the services they provide is partly dependent on the 
custom from those surrounding areas. Consequently, cooperation between rural and 
urban authorities is important for spatial planning and development.  
Towns are important in strengthening territorial cohesion either by supporting 
polycentric development or by offering key services to surrounding rural areas. 
There are a number of examples of towns in reasonable reach of each other 
cooperating by sharing the functions they perform and between them providing a 
range of services and amenities. Such cooperation contributes to less spatial 
concentration and to more a balanced pattern of regional development. 
2. FACTORS DETERMINING REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, GROWTH AND 
EMPLOYMENT 
There are a range of factors which determine the competitiveness of regions and, 
accordingly, their potential for economic growth and employment creation. Sound 
macroeconomic policies combined with structural policies are fundamental in 
improving competitiveness. An economic context characterised by price stability 
and sound budget balances will tend to benefit from lower interest rates. This, in 
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turn, stimulates investment and capital accumulation, increasing both productivity 
and employment. It also helps to increase the rate and diffusion of innovation and 
reduces the cost of capital and, therefore, consumption and wages can increase in 
relation to production real wages. 
Another critical factor is the efficiency and effectiveness of public administrations at 
national, regional and local level, which has a large impact on economic 
development and job creation. For example, high levels of corruption, red tape, low 
quality of the judiciary system and a large shadow economy (all symptoms of poor 
administrative performance) directly affect overall competitiveness. Public sector 
activities may also affect productivity and growth by changing the productivity level 
of the public sector itself and by triggering productivity increases in the private 
sector.  
More fundamentally, growth and jobs are determined by framework conditions such 
as the endowment of infrastructure of various kinds – physical, in the form of 
transport and telecommunication networks, human, in the form of the skills and 
know-how of the work force, and social, in the form of care and other support 
services. They also include the capacity for innovation, which is an increasingly 
important determinant of competitiveness and which is linked to human resource 
endowment but which encompasses as well the resources devoted to R&D and the 
effectiveness with which they are used.  
Cohesion policy can make an important contribution to create these conditions. They 
are examined in turn below, focusing on the way they differ between regions and 
how they have tended to change over recent years. 
2.1. Making Europe and its regions more attractive places to invest and 
work 
2.1.1. Access to services of general economic interest  
As recognised in the EU Treaty (Article 16), access to services of general economic 
interest is of major importance in achieving economic, social and territorial 
cohesion. The existence of an efficient transport system, a high speed 
telecommunications network and continuous energy supply is a key determinant of 
the capacity of regions to attract business investment. 
Transport 
Transport infrastructure is an important aspect of regional competitiveness and a 
source of comparative advantage for businesses located in areas which are well 
endowed27. This is confirmed by the significance attached to it by businesses when 
deciding where to invest. The annual European Cities Monitor28, in its survey of 
business decision-makers, identifies international links and connections to other 
major economic centres as the third most important criteria for determining the 
location of investment. The same survey, moreover, reports this as the main way in 
which decision-makers consider that locations can be improved.  
                                                 
27  Camagni, 2002 
28  Cabinet Cushman & Wakefiled, 
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Investment in infrastructure has significant direct effects on GDP at both national 
and regional level as indicated by macroeconomic analysis.29. More detailed analysis 
of investment in Spain, however, shows that the returns can vary markedly across 
regions depending on the initial transport system in place, which affects the potential 
gains from new investment. Investment in cross-border links has directly helped to 
increase exports of goods and services to the rest of the Union.  
At the same time, by bringing regions closer together, investment in transport 
increases competition between them, with implications for both the work force and 
businesses. The realisation of the potential advantages from improving accessibility, 
therefore, depends on the competitiveness of the regions concerned and some are 
liable to lose out as they become more open to competition from elsewhere.  
General situation of transport in the EU 
The situation as regards the endowment of transport infrastructure and consequent 
accessibility differs markedly across the EU. So far as roads are concerned, there are 
continuing differences between the EU-15 countries and the new Member States in 
the density of motorways30. With the exception of Slovenia and Lithuania, they all 
score under 50% of the EU average. Despite a tripling of motorways length in 
Greece and a six-fold increase in Ireland between 1990 and 2004, both countries still 
score under 50% on this indicator. 
In 2004, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, all had a motorway density index below 
30% of the EU average. Romania's motorways did not increase between 1990 and 
2002. In Bulgaria, motorway length increased by 21% between 2000 and 2004, 
while in Poland, it more than doubled between 1990 and 2004, almost half of the 
new motorways being completed in 2004. (Map 1.19: Density of motorways, 2004) 
Because of significant investment in recent years, the density of motorway network 
in Spain and Portugal is now above the EU average. Half the additional length of 
motorways constructed between 1990 and 2004 in the EU, was built in these two 
countries. For railways, the situation is very different from that of roads. In all the 
new Member States, the density of the network is significantly higher than in the 
rest of the EU. A substantial part of the network, however, consists of single-track 
lines or is not electrified (only 11% of lines in Latvia and 7% in Lithuania as against 
an EU average of 50%). Severe speed restrictions are also in place in a number of 
countries because of the poor state of repair of the network.  
In consequence, at the same time as competition from roads has intensified, the rate 
of use by passengers has fallen (Fig. 1.24). By contrast, freight usage has expanded, 
especially in the Baltic States, where there is significant transit transport. In Estonia 
and Latvia, the freight carried by rail exceeds that carried out by road (accounting, 
respectively, for 69% and 55% of the total). 
                                                 
29  The socio-economic impact of projects financed by the Cohesion Fund. 1999. London School of 
Economics and Political Science, under direction of Dr. Robert Leonardi. Published by the Office for 
the Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. 
30  Density as defined by the length of motorways in relation to population and surface area. 
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In the rest of the EU, the TGV network is the only part of the railway system 
network to have expanded in recent years, the overall length of line, which 
amounted to 2,800 kms in 2003, increasing by 10% over the preceding two years, 
with another 2,500 kms under construction. 
As regards air travel, the number of passengers continues to grow following the fall 
after the  September 11 2001. The main features of the situation are as follows: 
• The volume of air traffic is largest in the UK, reflecting the predominant position 
of Heathrow. It is next largest in Spain because of the scale of tourism, with over 
30 million passengers a year flying into Palma de Mallorca and Malaga.  
• The largest growth of traffic has occurred in secondary airports, reflecting their 
use by low-cost airlines, and in the capital cities of the new Member States, 
stimulated by enlargement. 
In terms of accessibility to flights in 2005 (Map 1.20: Access to passenger flights, 
2005), 5% of the EU population lives more the 90 minutes away from an airport. 
51% of the population can access between 10 and 500 daily flights within 90 
minutes. London clearly dominates by providing access to more than 3000 flights a 
day, while Paris and Frankfurt offer access to more than 2000 flights a day.  
Access to flights in the new Member States is considerably lower than in most of the 
EU-15 countries. In the future, their situation will improve as the road infrastructure 
is upgraded and more flights arrive and depart from their airports. 
The growth of sea transport has also continued, principally as a result of the growth 
of container traffic and encouraged by investment in expanding capacity and in 
establishing inter-modal links. Growth has been especially significant in ports in the 
new Member States (in Gdansk, Riga, Tallin and Constanta), goods traffic 
increasing by between 30% and 60% over the period 2000 to 2003. If it is to be 
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sustained, however, it needs to be accompanied by investment in transport links with 
the surrounding area. 
The use of river transport remains small except in Germany and the Netherlands and 
shows little sign of increasing. The Danube, which has considerable potential in this 
regard, is an exception, the volume of freight transported expanding since 2000, 
while still remaining small in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. This potential, 
however, requires substantial investment in port capacity and links with surrounding 
areas if it is to be realised, necessitating in turn close cross-border coordination and 
cooperation between the regional and national authorities concerned.  
The change in the use of different modes of transport highlights the continuing 
predominance of road transport for freight, which now accounts for over 44% of the 
total, while the share carried by rail has remained unchanged at around 10%. Rail is 
significantly more important in the new Member States, its share exceeding 30% in 
the Baltic States and Slovakia, though it has declined rapidly since the early 1990s. 
As a consequence of the growth of traffic, the major transit routes across Europe 
have become increasingly congested, most notably in the Benelux countries and 
Germany, but also in Austria and the Czech Republic as well as in France along the 
Rhone valley and the Mediterranean coast.  
Roads, along with sea transport, have, therefore, accounted for almost all the growth 
of freight over the past 10 years. This growth is closely correlated with growth of 
GDP, averaging some 2.8% a year over the period 1995 and 2004, somewhat more 
than the latter. Road haulage increased by 3.4% a year as against only 0.6% for 
freight by rail.  
Growth of freight by road was especially high in the Baltic States and Slovenia, 
where it reached 300% in Latvia between 2000 and 2004 as a result, in addition to 
their economic growth, of the transit routes which go through them (international 
freight accounts for around 75% of the total in these countries, or even more in the 
case of Lithuania). It was also high in Poland (101%), Spain (117%) and, above all, 
Ireland (212%), as a consequence of both high growth rates and road construction 
(Fig. 1.25). 
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Moderating this upward trend in line with the objectives set out in the White Paper 
on Transport requires the increased integration of the different modes of transporting 
freight as well as the modernisation of railways. This equally entails investment in 
the ‘interfaces’ between the different modes (such as loading platforms) at the main 
terminals, especially at ports. 
Links between the main urban centres 
The development of urban centres, as well as of the neighbouring regions, requires 
that they are accessible by road, rail and air. The significant growth of air travel and 
the increasing connections to regional airports as a result of the development of low-
cost airlines has enabled links to these centres across the EU to be improved. 
Although the main conurbations are all connected by rail, there are still very few 
which are linked to the high speed network, which in 2003 was confined to just 5 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium), and which is justified only 
for the larger countries, at least as regards connecting secondary centres. As yet, 
none of the new Member States are included despite the expected developments 
under the Trans-European Network programme31. 
Many regional centres across the EU are still not connected to the motorway 
network. This is particularly the case in Poland, where apart from Warsaw, most 
cities, including Poznan, Gdansk, Lublin and Bialystok remain unconnected. 
Regional accessibility and connectivity 
                                                 
31  The Decision Nr 884/2004/EC on trans-European transport guidelines establishes new objectives and 
defines "30 Priority projects." 
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In addition to their infrastructure endowment, it is important to consider regions in 
terms of their accessibility. A composite indicator of accessibility32 highlights the 
difficulties affecting islands because of travel time by car or train being increased by 
the sea crossing. Malta and Cyprus are affected the most, but it is much the same for 
Greek, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian islands. This highlights the importance of air 
travel more than indicating the deficiencies of rail and road networks. 
Eastern regions have both low accessibility by road and few motorways, reflecting 
the fact that the motorway network has been constructed, quite rationally, to serve 
the capital cities and the most populated conurbations as a first priority. 
Despite the size of the network, problems of accessibility stem more from the state 
of the railways in the new Member States as well as in a number of peripheral 
regions in the other parts of the EU, in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. As noted 
above, this is a result of the low operating speeds caused by the lack of maintenance, 
the limited extent of electrification, the large number of single-track lines, the 
mountainous terrain in many places and the poor cross-border connections. 
Rationalisation, involving the closure of under-used lines, combined with 
modernisation of the network is, therefore, required in these regions. 
The situation, however, has improved in recent years through new infrastructure 
coming into use, notably in France, Spain and Greece, and the increased 
accessibility of a number of regions in the new Member States, especially border 
regions as a result of investment in crossing points to increase traffic flows. (Map 
1.21: Change in potential accessibility by car, 1998-2003)  
Connectivity 
Improving the accessibility of regions to the fullest extent requires not only 
investment in the main routes but also in secondary networks to ensure that local 
areas are properly connected. This is particularly important for the most remote 
areas as well as the least densely populated are which it is not cost effective to link 
directly to the main networks. The need is to ensure that there are good road 
connections to motorway access points and to railway stations as well as, in the case 
of freight, to ports, especially to container ports. 
There is an equal need to improve public transport, which has tended to expand 
slightly in recent years, partly because of an increase in provision (the metros in 
Athens and Lisbon, for example). Growth, however, has been generally less in the 
new Member States where public transport has faced competition from the rapid 
expansion of car ownership. (Fig. 1.26) 
                                                 
32  ‘Strategic evaluation of Transport investment priorities under Structural and Cohesion Funds for the 
programming period 2007-2013’, Ecorys with Speikermann & Wegener, 2006. This indicator 
incorporates the notion that while a peripheral region may never have the same level of accessibility as 
a central one, it can at least achieve the same journey speed. 
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In addition, in order to achieving more balanced regional development, there is a 
parallel need to diversify links between regions within Member States, which means 
improving railways, giving priority to the connections between the main 
conurbations and the national capitals, but also air travel, by supporting the present 
growth of regional airports, To this end, the regional authorities concerned could 
perhaps make use of public service obligation contracts and the related subsidies to 
overcome the low profitability of such links. 
Travel time to main railway stations gives an indication of the efficiency of 
secondary networks and emphasises the continuing problems of accessibility of 
regions with difficult terrain (in Spain, France, Romania, and the North East of 
Poland) as well as border regions in the Baltic States, Finland and Sweden, where 
some places are almost two hours from the nearest station.  
Energy  
Final energy consumption has continued to increase in EU27 Member States though 
at a modest rate (by 5% between 1990 and 2004), with the transport sector growing 
the most and accounting for the largest share of the total, a third of overall 
consumption. Over this period, the share of oil in energy consumption declined by 3 
percentage points, to just over 42%. While some countries have managed to reduce 
this share by more (Germany by 8% and Sweden by over 6%), the share has 
increased in many of the new Member States (in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland and Slovakia, as well as in Romania where it rose by 18 percentage 
points). 
The availability of a secure supply of energy is important for both the quality of life 
and economic development. The development of energy networks needs, therefore, 
to be associated with the establishment of truly national grids as well as with a more 
open and competitive market. There are differences, however, between gas and 
electricity networks. 
The present capacity of electricity networks seems generally insufficient to enable 
any expansion of trade in energy to occur to match the increase in demand. This 
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inadequacy combined with limited production capacity gives rise to serious 
problems of congestion on some lines, which led to a number of general power 
failures in 2003. This situation can affect regions and countries asymmetrically. 
Several Member States, such as Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Poland and the UK 
are, therefore, below the Barcelona objective of a level of interconnection of 10% of 
production. 
The internal limitations of the network which are the source of congestion are often 
localised and, even more often, concern cross-border connections. A recent study33 
has identified a number of network deficiencies necessitating investment in the 
immediate future in the south-west of Poland and along many of the borders of the 
new Member States. Projections34 made on the assumption of a continuation of 
present trends and policies point to a likely worsening of congestion up to 2010 
along particular borders.  
The long-term availability of energy reserves, which other things being equal 
determines the security of supply, also depends on the development of renewable 
energy and on improving energy efficiency. As noted above, regions are unequally 
placed in this regard, with significant variations in the potential development, in 
particular, of wind and water power, geothermal and solar energy and biomass. 
Nevertheless, the wide range of renewable energy sources accessible to most regions 
(biogas and bio-fuel, for example) should allow a wider geographical spread of this 
type of production. 
In March 2007, the European Council set the binding target of 20% of total energy 
consumption coming from renewable energy sources by 2020. While this share has 
risen over the past 9 years, the increase has been very slow. Between 1995 and 2004, 
it rose from 5.1% of the total to 6.4% in the EU (Fig. 1.27). There will, therefore, 
need to be a major acceleration in the rate of increase to meet this target. The fastest 
growing sources of renewable energy are wind power and solar power. The two 
Member States which have the largest share of wind power are Denmark and Spain, 
where it accounts, respectively, for 2.8% and 1% of total energy consumption, while 
the EU average is only 0.3%. Solar power provides only 0.04% of energy consumed 
in the EU27, almost double the share in 1995, but still very low. The share of solar 
power in total energy consumption is largest in Cyprus and Austria, where it 
accounts respectively for 3.7% and 0.3% of the total. Biomass is considered to have 
significant potential for development in many of the new Member States. 
                                                 
33  Network capacities and possible congestion within the Accession Countries, KEMA, 2005. 
34  TEN-ENERGY-Invest, CESI, ITT, ME, RAMBØLL 2005. 
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There seems to be less scope for expansion of the more “traditional” source of 
renewable energy – hydro-electricity – which in fact has declined slightly as a share 
of total energy consumption over recent years (from 1.7% to 1.5% of total energy 
consumption between 1995 and 2004).  
Telecommunications 
Digital technology makes it possible to have a single system of communication for 
video, audio and voice communication. Access to high capacity networks is 
expanding rapidly, almost 16% of population in the EU being connected in October 
2006 as against 11.4% a year earlier. This growth is primarily a consequence of 
competitive pressure and effective market regulation, new entrants accounting for 
almost 52% of the broadband market. Competition is facilitated by opening access 
to local networks, which involved 46% of new entrants in 2005. There is, however, 
a significant gap between the less well endowed cohesion countries and other 
Member States. Moreover, the evidence indicates a widening of this gap, the better 
endowed Member States increasing rates of connection most rapidly.  
Within countries, disparities remain equally large, notably between rural and urban 
areas. While on average some 93% of households and businesses can be connected 
to broadband in urban areas, in rural areas the figure is only 66%, with an even 
wider gap in the new Member States. 
The slow development of broadband in the less densely populated areas has led to 
renewed government intervention in the face of market failure and the neglect by 
operators of areas with the lowest rates of return or which are unprofitable.  
In order to accelerate the development of telecommunication services, a number of 
local authorities have taken action, supported by national policy, to encourage the 
construction of broadband networks and even assumed the management of these. In 
doing so, they have assumed the risk normally borne by the operator.  
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Initiatives have been taken in various parts of the EU. In Greece, ambitious 
broadband programmes were launched in 2006. In Spain, a plan has been 
implemented since 2005 to provide broadband to rural and remote areas under the 
same conditions as those in urban areas. In Ireland, regional broadband network are 
being extended from metropolitan areas. In France, the under-Ministerial Regional 
Planning Committee (CIADT – Comité interministériel d'aménagement du 
territoire)  approved a policy in 2004 of provided broadband access to 98% of the 
population and at least 85% of that in each department. This policy which combines 
measures to promote demand as well as supply has enabled local authorities to 
invest in the development of broadband networks either directly or through public-
private partnerships. In Italy, the aim is to provide universal access to broadband 
services by 2011. Under the Linguar Portugal (Connecting Portugal) action 
programme, the aim is to triple the number of families connected to broadband and 
to connect all schools by 2010, as well as keeping prices among the lowest in the EU 
by 2010. In Hungary, Estonia and Latvia, concrete targets have been set for the 
extension of broadband.  In Northern Ireland, all the population are covered at a 
single rate. In Sweden, the Government established a fund for financing broadband 
with the aim of constructing networks in rural areas, the great majority of which 
(270 out of 290) are sparsely populated.  
Public authorities have an important role to play in supporting the development of 
digital literacy and eSkills and in bringing SMEs on line. The latter is an area where 
progress is extremely slow: while more than 50% of large enterprises in the Union 
use automated eBusiness processes within their companies, less than 20% of SMEs 
do so and this gap shows no signs of narrowing. 
Health services 
The availability of health services represents an important element of regional 
attractiveness, since it delivers long-term economic and social benefits. The ageing 
of the population adds to the need for such services. Particular regions might 
experience inflows of population with concentrations of the elderly around the best 
equipped centres so adversely affected territorial cohesion. This is liable to impose 
strong pressure on finances in the areas concerned at the same time as there are 
likely to be constraints on public budgets.  
Examination of the accessibility of health services in the EU (or at least in the 
Member States where data are available) highlights a number of features: 
• Marked differences at national level in the provision of health centres. France, 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Italy, have a high 
level, often reflecting their high density of population, The countries in central 
Europe have an average level of provision, while Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland as well as Denmark, Finland and Sweden have the lowest level. For the 
last two countries, the level is significantly higher in southern areas  
• This picture conceals differences in the availability of beds per inhabitant. (Map 
1.22: Hospital beds, 2003) In these terms, Ireland and Finland are the best 
endowed, reflecting a policy of favouring large, well-equipped health centres 
rather than small, more widely dispersed ones. By contrast, the low level of 
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provision remains in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Denmark, which could lead to 
problems as population continues to age. 
• In some Member States, problems of accessing health services in some areas are 
more a reflection of difficulties of communication, as a result largely of their 
geographical features than of the low level of provision as such.  
2.1.2. Environmental protection and growth 
Substantial differences exist between Member States and regions as regards 
environment protection, the problems threatening the environment and the local 
capacity to address these problems. Such disparities are particularly apparent 
between the EU-15 and many of the new Member States. 
Water 
Access to a sufficient supply of water and water that is safe to drink is critical to 
both the well-being of residents and the competitiveness of regions. Some economic 
activities rely heavily on an abundant supply of water such as agriculture and 
tourism. Both require that water reserves are managed in a sustainable way as 
shortages would have severe consequences. 
Water availability and quality, however, differ significantly in the EU from north to 
south and from east to west. In most regions, total water abstraction has decreased 
but water stress or severe water stress still affects 18% of Europe’s population35. 
Over-abstraction of water remains a major concern in areas such as the coast and 
islands of the Mediterranean, where more and more areas are affected by saltwater 
intrusion. In some countries, loss of water by leakage from distribution systems can 
still be significant. Several southern EU15 countries have network problems which 
lead to high losses and bad water quality. Four countries – Cyprus, Malta, Italy and 
Spain - are considered to be water stressed (withdrawals greater than 30% of total 
available supplies). Most of the central and eastern countries are also faced with 
network problems. In almost all of the new Member States, some of the water 
resources are contaminated due to either natural causes (arsenic, fluoride, boron) or 
due to the agro-industrial heritage (such as old Soviet farms). The capacity to purify 
drinking water is also lacking. At the same time, water consumption by industry in 
some of the new Member States, such as Bulgaria and Estonia, has tended to decline 
due to falling production in traditional industries which use water intensively.  
Although demand for drinking water is forecast to increase in a number of Member 
States, partly as a result of the growth of tourism, in others it is expected to remain 
below current supply capacity (in Lithuania, only 30% of capacity is currently used) 
and in yet others, it is projected to fall due both to population decline and the 
imposition of new charging arrangements in some of the new Member States. In 
some of the Member States in which water demand is set to increase, it is planned to 
meet this by reducing leakage and through programmes for saving water and 
managing reserves better (in Malta, for example). 
                                                 
35  For more information see: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/quantity/pdf/comm_droughts/2006_11_1st_int_report.pdf 
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To comply with the EU Directive on this, waste water collection and treatment still 
requires significant investment throughout the EU. While Denmark, Germany, and 
Austria achieved full compliance between 1998 and 2002, in most other Member 
States, many conurbations lack adequate waste water collection and treatment 
facilities. In particular, 17 major cities had no waste water treatment at the beginning 
of 200336.  A number of Member States have also failed to designate sensitive areas 
(e.g. those at risk of eutrophication) or are behind schedule in establishing adequate 
sewage treatment capacity. As a result, more than 50% of the waste water 
discharged into sensitive areas in the EU-15 is not being treated adequately37. 
According to the latest data available (mostly for 2000 or 2001), just over 50% of 
the resident population of the new Member States were connected to urban waste 
water collection and treatment systems. A further 11% were connected to collection 
systems without treatment. This compares with some 80% on average in the EU-15. 
While some new Member States have experienced a reduction in the volume of 
waste water requiring treatment because of a fall in industrial use, as in Poland, or 
because of stronger environmental policy, as in Latvia, in others, the volume is 
likely to increase.  
Waste 
In 2004, 2.8 billion tonnes of waste was generated in the EU, posing major 
environmental problems especially in regions where recycling rates are low. 
Agriculture and industry account for a large proportion of this waste., while  the 
share treated by municipalities (about 15% of the total38) has, on the whole, 
remained unchanged at some 518 kilograms per head over the period since 2000. 
The overall volume of waste has continued to grow in the majority of Member 
States. In the new Member States, however, GDP growth has not been accompanied 
by increased waste as has happened in the EU-1539. 
Although the situation varies markedly across the EU-27, the main method of 
treating municipal waste remains landfill (especially in the new Member States) and 
incineration. Both these processes are environmentally the least preferred as they 
contribute to greenhouse gases and other emissions. At EU level, where landfill 
accounted for 45% of waste disposal in 2005 compared with 56% in 2000, 
incineration increased over the same period by some 15%. Major differences in the 
methods employed are evident at national and regional levels, with some countries 
opting almost exclusively for the landfill solution, while incineration (usually 
combined with energy recovery) often represents a favoured method in the more 
developed economies. Incineration with energy recovery has, therefore, expanded 
markedly in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, Italy and Sweden over 
the past few years. 
                                                 
36  See annex to Com(2007)128 final  
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/implrep2007/index_en.htm 
37  European Commission, 2004. Report on the implementation of Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 
May 1991 concerning urban waste treatment, as amended by Commission Directive 98/15/EC of 27 
February 1998, COM (2004) 248 final. 
38  Eurostat 
39  The Integrated Assessment. The European Environment. State and Outlook 2005. the European 
Environmental Agency 
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At the same time, recycling has increased in virtually all Member States, most 
especially in Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Poland and the UK. 
Nevertheless, the rate of recycling is still very low in the Cohesion countries. 
Composting is almost as important as recycling in volume terms, with Ireland, 
Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Hungary and the UK all showing a significant 
expansion. Again, however, it remains limited in the Cohesion countries, where in 
most cases a particular effort is, therefore, needed to shift from a heavy reliance on 
landfill – which accounts for over 90% of municipal waste in most countries - to 
more sustainable systems of waste management, in particular to increased 
recycling40.  
Air Pollution 
Air pollution comes at great cost to society. It is estimated that currently the average 
life expectancy of EU citizens is shortened by more than 8 months due to poor air 
quality. This can rise to well over a year in more polluted regions such as in the 
Benelux countries, northern Italy and large parts of eastern Europe41. At the same 
time, investments to improve air quality are estimated to outweigh the costs by a 
factor of six to one.  
While considerable progress has been achieved in reducing many forms of air 
pollution, the last few decades has seen a levelling of concentrations of the most 
dangerous pollutants such as particulate matter and ground-level ozone. Both exceed 
the values set by EU legislation throughout the Union. The daily limit value for 
particulate matter PM10, for example, has been exceeded in all countries except 
Ireland, in almost 40% of areas. Principal sources contributing to local poor air 
quality differ from region to region, spanning industrial sources and generating 
plants to domestic heating and agriculture. Local action is crucial, even where air 
quality conditions are difficult such as in the Po Valley.  
Transport is the major cause of the most intractable problems of air pollution, the 
dramatic improvements made by technologies such as catalytic converters in cars 
being overwhelmed by increases in demand. Further improvements are expected as 
cars with particulate and NOx filters are introduced on to the market. A growing 
problem is the increasing volume of shipping (using high sulphur-content fuel oil) in 
EU waters, emissions from this source being expected to be on a par with those from 
all land-based sources by 202042.  
2.2. Improving knowledge and innovation for growth 
2.2.1. FDI and regional development 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is of critical importance to the development of 
lagging regions. It not only directly stimulates economic activity but equally if not 
more importantly, goes into the construction of production facilities – plants and 
equipment – which tend to embody new technology as well as new methods of 
organisation. As such, it is a major means of diffusing knowledge from the more 
                                                 
40  EU 2003 Environment policy review, COM(2003)745 final 
41  Clean Air for Europe studies. 
42 European Environmental Agency (EEA), 2005. The European Environment - State and Outlook 2005 
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advanced to less advanced regions and, accordingly, tends to boost productivity not 
only in the activity in which the investment occurs but more generally within the 
region. 
Scale of FDI inflows into the new Member States 
FDI is particularly important in the new Member States, representing the primary 
way in which the productivity gap between the industries and services located there 
and those in the rest of EU can be narrowed. The scale of FDI inflows into these 
countries has in many cases been substantial since the late-1990s.  
It is most important in Estonia, where inflows are estimated to have averaged some 
11% of GDP over the 7 years 1998-2005, while in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, 
they amounted to around 9% and in Hungary and Slovakia, 6-7%. In four countries, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, inflows averaged 4-5% of GDP over this 
period and only in Slovenia were they less than this, at just over 2% of GDP. This 
last, however, still amounted to around 10% of domestic investment (gross fixed 
capital formation) over the period. In all the new Member States apart from 
Slovenia, therefore, the average scale of FDI in relation to GDP exceeded the 
maximum amount of annual support from the Structural Funds. (Tab. 1.7) 
FDI inflows relative to GDP, 2000-2005
% GDP
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000-2005
Bulgaria 5.4 5.1 3.9 10.5 13.9 10.8 8.3
Czech Republic 8.9 9.1 11.3 2.3 4.6 8.9 7.5
Estonia 7.0 8.7 4.0 9.7 8.3 21.2 9.8
Spain 6.8 4.7 5.7 2.9 2.4 2.0 4.1
Cyprus 9.2 9.8 10.1 6.7 6.9 7.2 8.3
Latvia 5.3 1.6 2.7 2.7 4.6 4.5 3.6
Lithuania 3.4 3.7 5.1 1.0 3.4 4.0 3.4
Hungary 7.1 7.4 4.5 2.5 4.5 6.3 5.4
Malta 3.7 : -0.5 : 2.1 11.0 4.1
Poland 5.5 3.0 2.1 2.2 4.9 3.1 3.5
Portugal 5.9 5.4 1.4 5.5 1.3 1.7 3.5
Romania 2.8 2.9 2.5 3.7 8.5 6.6 4.5
Slovenia 0.7 1.4 4.0 3.8 2.1 1.7 2.3
Slovakia 9.5 7.6 15.5 2.2 2.0 4.4 6.9
Source; Eurostat plus UNCTAD for Romania for 2000-2002, Slovenia for 2000 and Slovakia for 2000 and 2001.
Note: No data for Greece  
Within the new Member States, FDI is often heavily concentrated in the capital city 
and surrounding regions. While this is partly because of the way FDI inflows are 
recorded – i.e. being attributed to the head offices of companies which are very 
likely to be in capital cities even if the ultimate destination of the investment is 
another region – employment in foreign-owned firms, which is the product of FDI, 
also tends to be concentrated in the capital. This is the case in Slovakia, Bulgaria 
and Hungary and to a lesser extent in the Czech Republic and Poland. Some border 
regions also have a disproportionately high share of employment in foreign-owned 
firms. In other words, within countries, FDI inflows tend to reinforce regional 
disparities rather than to reduce them. 
There are a number of potential reasons why investors could choose to invest in the 
new Member States other than the lower costs of production which stem from lower 
wages. These include access to markets in these countries, proximity to the country 
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from which the investment originates, a common language, low corporate taxes and 
the availability of a suitable work force. 
While policy cannot affect factors such as national market size or proximity to 
national borders, it can influence other factors which determine the attractiveness of 
regions, not only in the new Member States but more generally. These factors 
include: 
• good basic infrastructure and accessibility 
• a well educated work force 
• good ICT infrastructure and extensive use of ICT (which should reflect the wide 
availability of the skills concerned) 
• a relatively high level of spending on R&D 
While such regional characteristics appear to be important determinants of the 
regional pattern of FDI in the new Member States and other parts of the EU, for 
investment in certain sectors the size of national market is a significant factor. In 
these sectors, large companies seek to have a presence in most national markets. At 
the same time, in other sectors, especially in manufacturing, there has been 
significant outsourcing of supplies to low cost regions, leading in some industries to 
increasing concentration of production in fewer locations. For most activities, 
however, production remains dispersed across the EU. (Map 1.23: FDI intensity)  
Measuring regional FDI intensity in terms of employees in foreign owned firms in 
relation to the total number shows that the regions with the largest shares are 
concentrated in the UK, Germany and France. Spain has two regions with a large 
share, Madrid and Navarra, and the regions bordering France and the Atlantic also 
tend to have larger than average shares. In the Netherlands, these employees are 
concentrated in the  Randstad regions, in Belgium, in Brussels and most of the 
Flemish regions and in Ireland, in the region in which Dublin and Cork are situated.  
In contrast, the new Member States, Finland, Greece, Portugal and southern Italy all 
have below average shares. Analysis suggests that spill-over effects from FDI seem 
to have been particularly marked in services in the new Member States, especially in 
business activities and the distributive trades, where witnessing the latest methods of 
organisation in operation has been as important as exposure to new technology in 
diffusing knowledge. Nevertheless, the relative concentration of FDI in 
manufacturing means that productivity gains have been relatively large in this 
sector. 
2.2.2. R&D and innovation 
Innovation capacity in Member States  
According to a summary indicator (the Regional Innovation Performance Index 
(RIPI) of the European Innovation Scoreboard),43 the Nordic countries have the 
                                                 
43  The summary indicator is made up of a set of 26 input and output indicators grouped into five broad 
categories: innovation drivers (mainly education levels of the population), knowledge creation (largely 
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highest capacity for innovation in the EU, surpassing the US and Japan. Many of the 
new Member States have the lowest level, although some of them (Estonia, 
Slovenia, and Hungary) score better than the three EU-15 Cohesion countries 
(Greece, Portugal and Spain).  
In terms of changes in the summary indicator over recent years, countries can be 
broadly classified into four groups. 
• Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, the four leading countries in terms of 
the summary indicator, which have shown less of an increase than Japan, and 
within the group, the increase for Sweden and Denmark has been less than the 
EU average. 
• The group of countries around the EU average in terms of the indicator – the 
other EU-15 Member States apart from Greece, Spain and Portugal – which have 
shown divergent movements, with an especially large increase in Austria and 
small increases in Ireland and the UK. 
• Countries which are below the EU average in terms of the indicator but which are 
converging towards it, which consist of Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus and Malta.  
• Countries for which the indicator is below the EU average and which are losing 
ground in this regard, which consist of Spain, Estonia, Bulgaria, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Romania.  
Major regional disparities persist … 
According to the latest data available, expenditure on R&D amounted to an average 
of 1.9% of EU-27 GDP in 2003. Regional disparities, however, are extremely wide. 
While expenditure in 27 regions exceeded the Barcelona target of 3%, in more than 
100 regions, expenditure was less than 1% of GDP. The regions in which 
expenditure was highest all, except for Dresden in Germany, have a relatively high 
level of GDP per head and many – 5 of the top 20 – are regions which include the 
capital city (in Germany, Finland, Sweden, Austria and France). The regions with 
the lowest levels of expenditure are all in the new Member States or are regions with 
relatively low levels of GDP per head elsewhere, mainly in the three EU-15 
cohesion countries but also in the eastern part of Germany and southern Italy. There 
are, however, some exceptions, such as Åland in Finland, Corse in France 
Bolzano/Bozen in Italy and Illes Balears in Spain in Spain. (Map 1.24: Research and 
development indicators, 2004)  
Nevertheless, in a number of regions with GDP per head below 75% of the EU 
average – especially in Spain, Germany and Italy, though also in Estonia and 
Lithuania – expenditure on R&D has risen more than the EU average over recent 
years.  
                                                                                                                                                 
expenditure on R&D), innovation and entrepreneurship (mainly SMEs involved in innovation), 
application (employment in high tech services and in medium-to-high tech manufacturing – ie mainly 
engineering – as well as high tech exports and sales of high-tech products and of new products), and 
intellectual property (patents applied for and trade-marks registered). 
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Much the same picture emerges for expenditure on R&D by the private sector. Only 
one region with GDP per head below 75% of the EU average, Střední Čechy, in the 
Czech Republic (the region surrounding Prague), had expenditure above 2% of 
GDP, the Barcelona target for business R&D, while the highest levels were 
generally recorded in regions which include the capital city. 
A similar variation is evident for the proportion of the work force with tertiary level 
qualifications and who work in jobs typically requiring a relatively high level of 
qualification (i.e. as managers, professional or technicians), who can be taken as a 
broad indicator of human resource endowment in science and technology, defining 
these terms widely to encompass all types of knowledge and its application. Of the 8 
regions where this proportion is the highest, according to the latest data (for 2005), 6 
are the location of capital cities (Stockholm, Inner London, North Holland, Ile de 
France, Luxembourg and Brussels). At the other end of the scale, Portuguese and 
Romanian regions and one Czech region make up those with the smallest 
proportions in this regard.  
The relative number of people actually employed in high-tech sectors, which can be 
taken as one of the indicators of R&D output rather than input, varies equally as 
much between regions, though not altogether in line with R&D expenditure or 
human resource endowment. The proportion of the total in work employed in such 
sectors is largest in German regions, which account for 11 of the 12 in which this is 
largest (Stuttgart and Karlsruhe, neighbouring regions in Baden-Württemberg, 
having the largest shares), again according to data for 2005. The proportion is also 
relatively large in other central regions in the Czech Republic (Severovýchod and 
Střední Čechy), Slovakia (Západné Slovensko) and Hungary (Közép-Dunántúl). All 
of these regions have among the lowest endowments of human resources in science 
and technology, illustrating the lack of any necessary relationship between inputs 
and output in this area.  
Nevertheless, the proportion of employment in high tech sectors is generally 
smallest in regions with relatively low levels of GDP per head, especially those in 
the EU-15, which also tend to have low levels of endowment of human resources in 
science and technology, Portuguese and Greek regions featuring prominently among 
the regions concerned. 
Comparisons between regions of changes in human resource endowment over time 
are severely limited by data problems. There are similar problems, though less 
severe, in comparing developments in employment in high-tech sectors. The data for 
the 10 years 1995-2005 indicate, however, that there were significant increases in 
the share of employment in these sectors in a number of lagging regions in the EU-
15 as well as in Hungary (no data are available for this period for most of the other 
new Member States). The regions in question include, in particular, Leipzig, 
Chemnitz and Dresden in the eastern part of Germany, Molise and Calabria in 
southern Italy, Galicia in Spain, Dytiki Ellada in Greece, Nyugat-Dunántúl and 
Észak-Alföld in Hungary and Slovenia.  
On the other hand, the increase has been far from general across lagging regions and 
in many the share of employment in high-tech sectors declined over this period, 
even in regions neighbouring those where the share rose. Regions showing a 
reduction, therefore, include Magdeburg and Dessau in eastern Germany 
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(substantially in both cases), Campania, Sicilia and Sardegna in southern Italy, 
Asturias in Spain (though only slightly), Dytiki Makedonia, Thessalia and Notio 
Aigaio in Greece and Közép-Dunántúl in Hungary as well as most regions in 
Portugal, Norte in particular experiencing a significant decline. 
Other output indicators of innovation show an equally wide, if not wider, disparity 
across regions. In particular, patent applications tend to be far smaller in lagging 
regions than elsewhere in the EU, especially in the new Member States (though the 
fact that these are measured in terms of applications to the European Patent Office 
and are several years out of date tends in itself to bias the comparison against these 
countries, which do not have a tradition of patenting).  
On average, therefore, the number of patent applications to the European Patent 
Office in countries with GDP per head below the EU average amounted to only 12 
per one million inhabitants as opposed to an EU-15 average of 158 according to the 
latest data available (which unfortunately relate to 2000-2002). No regions from any 
of the Member States with below average levels of GDP per head had above average 
patent applications and in only two of the lagging regions anywhere in the EU – 
Dresden and Lüneburg in Germany, the latter a commuting region close to Hamburg 
– were applications above average. In almost all regions in Poland, in all regions in 
Slovakia apart from the capital city, in many regions in Greece and in a number in 
Portugal, as well as in Lithuania and, on average, in Bulgaria and Romania, the 
number of applications was under 5 per one million people.  
The scale of regional disparities is confirmed by the Regional Innovation 
Performance indicator
44
… 
A composite indicator of innovation performance at regional level can be 
constructed from the indicators described above, together with one or two additional 
ones45. This synthetic indicator (RIPI – Regional Innovation Performance Indicator) 
covers 208 regions in the EU-25 (it includes only NUTS 1 level regions in Belgium 
and the UK) but as yet excludes Bulgaria and Romania, and relates to the years 
2002-200346. (Map 1.25: Regional innovation performance index, 2002-2003)  
According to the indicator, Stockholm has the best overall performance among 
regions and Sweden among countries, while Notio Agaio in Greece records the 
lowest value of the indicator and Greece is the lowest ranked country. Regions 
which include the capital city feature prominently at the top of the scale, while the 
EU-15 Cohesion countries are ranked towards the bottom, in some cases below a 
number of the new Member States. 
                                                 
44  2006 RIS by Hugo Hollanders from MERIT (Maastricht Economic and social Research and training 
centre on Innovation and Technology), November 2006. Study commissioned by DG ENTR. 
45  Human resources in S&T-core (% of population) – 2003; Participation in life-long learning (% of 
population aged 25-64) – 2003; Public R&D expenditures (% of GDP) – 2002; Business R&D 
expenditures (% of GDP) – 2002; Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of 
total workforce) – 2003; Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) – 2003; EPO patents 
applications per million population – 2002. These are the only individual indicators for which regional 
data are available. 
46  It takes account of the ranking of individual regions in relation to both the EU-25 average and the 
average of the country in which they are located. 
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Regions in the Nordic countries, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK are clustered 
in the top part of the ranking, though there are also regions which include the capital 
city in the new Member States – Prague, Bratislava, Közép-Magyarország (where 
Budapest is situated) and Mazowieckie (Warsaw) as well as Slovenia – in addition 
to Ile de France, Madrid and Wien. At the other end of the scale, Greek regions 
dominate those with the lowest ranking, though there also a number of Portuguese 
(Alentejo, Algarve and Norte), southern Italian (Calabria, Puglia, Sardegna and 
Sicilia), Czech (Severozápad and Moravskoslezsko) and Hungarian (Dél-Alföld and 
Észak-Magyarország) regions as well as some regions in Spain (Extremadura and 
Castilla-La Mancha), including some with GDP per head above the EU average 
(Illes Balears, in particular). Although the last is very much an exception, it 
demonstrates that there is by no means a perfect relationship between the synthetic 
indicator and the level of regional prosperity. 
Nevertheless, the relationship is relatively close (the correlation coefficient being 
0.59), suggesting that innovative performance and economic performance are 
closely linked. According to a recent study47, in regions with GDP per head above 
75% of the EU average, in almost half there was a positive relationship between 
innovation and economic performance. In almost a quarter, however, a relatively 
high level of innovative capacity was not translated into a similarly high level of 
GDP per head. In these regions, therefore, the data suggest that policy intervention 
should perhaps focus on the implementation of more effective mechanisms of 
technology transfer so as to link businesses more closely with universities and other 
research centres with the aim of ensuring that innovations are more effectively 
exploited. 
At the same time, in a third of the regions, GDP per head is relatively high despite 
innovative capacity – or at least the synthetic indicator of this – being relatively low. 
These regions include, in particular, many in northern Italy ((Emilia-Romagna, 
Veneto, Trento and Bolzano) and a number in Austria (Tirol and Salzburg) as well 
as Luxembourg, in all of which the relative number of people who have completed 
tertiary education, in particular, is significantly smaller than in similarly prosperous 
regions. This might be an early warning of problems to come and an indication that 
present high levels of GDP per head might not be sustainable without increased 
investment in human resources and other dimensions of the innovative base. 
2.3. More and better jobs 
Education levels critical for economic development 
The competitiveness of the EU economy and hence its capacity for achieving and 
sustaining acceptable rates of growth depends increasingly on the know-how of the 
labour force. A key part of the Lisbon strategy is, accordingly, to increase the 
education levels of people of working age and to make life-long learning a reality. 
This is as important in individual regions as in the EU as a whole, since balanced 
economic development, which is key to achieving higher growth rates over the long-
term in the EU economy, depends on the competitiveness of each region and, 
therefore, on its human resources. 
                                                 
47  "Policy guidelines for regions falling under the new RCE objective for the 2007-2013 period", 
December 2005. 
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There remains, however, substantial disparities in the educational attainment levels 
of the work force across the EU, This applies both to the proportion of people with 
at least upper secondary education – i.e. those who successfully completed education 
or training programmes of at least three years duration beyond basic schooling – and 
to those with tertiary qualifications, i.e. with university degrees or the equivalent. 
The relative number of the latter is especially important, since many of the most 
dynamic sectors of activity are dependent on the ability and know-how of university 
graduates, and their capacity to absorb new knowledge and learn new skills. This 
number, however, varies markedly both between different parts of the EU and 
between regions within countries and represents a major potential constraint on their 
capacity to initiate and sustain economic development and to attract business 
investment. Moreover, there is little sign of the extent of this variation being 
reduced. 
Education levels vary markedly across the EU  
In the EU as a whole, some 23% of people aged 25-64 have tertiary level education 
(according to the data for 2005), while a further 46% have upper secondary 
qualifications, leaving 31% with no qualifications beyond basic schooling. The 
proportion with tertiary qualifications, however, is significantly larger among the 
younger generation than among older people, reflecting the progressive rise in 
participation in university education over time. Some 28% of young people aged 25-
34, therefore, have university degrees or the equivalent in the EU, almost twice the 
proportion of those aged 55-64. 
This increase in education levels over time has been particularly marked for women, 
who in the past tended to have significantly lower education levels than men but 
who increasingly among younger age groups have overtaken men. 
The education gap between the US and the EU  
In the US, the share of people aged 25-64 with a tertiary education was 39% in 2005 compared to 
only 23% in the EU-27; in Finland, which has the largest share in the EU, it was only 35%. 
Focussing on those who have completed university education exclusively and excluding those with 
equivalent tertiary education (i.e. those with ISCED 5B qualifications), also shows the US at a 
considerably advantage with 29% of those aged 25-64 with a university degree, while in the EU, the 
figure was only 16%. The only two EU Member States that come close to matching the US figure are 
the Netherlands (28%) and Denmark (26%).  
The regional variation in the share of university educated residents is considerable. (Maps 1.26 and 
1.27: Population aged 25.64 with tertiary education in the US and in the EU, 2005)In the US, of the 
50 States and Washington DC, 18 had a share over 30%, while in the EU only three of the 264 
NUTS 2 regions (no data for the four French DOMs) reached this level -  Noord-Holland (37%), 
Inner London (36%) and Utrecht (34%). In the US, the top three States are Washington DC (49%), 
Massachusetts (40%) and Connecticut (38%). West Virginia had the smallest share with only 19%, 
while in the EU27, the smallest share was 5% in Burgenland in Austria. In the US, only one in four 
States had a share under 25%, in the EU, this was the case in nine out of ten regions. 
Among those aged 25-64, therefore, the proportion of women with tertiary education 
is slightly smaller than that of men in the EU as a whole (j 22.2% as opposed to 
22.6%), Among those aged 55-64, however, the proportion of women with tertiary 
education is over six percentage points lower than for men. By contrast, 30% of 
women aged 25-34 have tertiary qualifications as compared with under 25% of men. 
The proportion of women who have completed tertiary education is, therefore, 
increasing at a much faster rate than for men. 
  73 
The regional variation within the EU and within many MS is also high. With the 
exception of Germany, virtually all regions have more women aged 25-34 with 
tertiary qualifications then men. In many regions, the share of women in this group 
is more than 50% higher than men. This is the case in Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia 
all regions in Bulgaria and Finland and almost all regions in Portugal. Most of the 
other Member States have one or more regions where the share of women aged 25-
34 is 50% higher than the share of men with tertiary qualifications, including in 
Germany. (Map 1.28: Gender balance of population with tertiary education, 2005) 
The proportion of those aged 25-64 with tertiary qualifications ranges from almost 
35% in Finland, just under 34% in Estonia and 33% in Denmark to 13% in the 
Czech Republic and Portugal and 12% in Italy and Malta, while in Romania, it was 
only 11%. The proportion with upper secondary education varies equally widely and 
differently from the proportion with tertiary education. The relative number with 
either upper secondary or tertiary education is smallest in Portugal and Malta, at just 
26%, while in Spain and Italy, it is under 50%. In Portugal and Malta, therefore, 
almost three-quarters of people in this age group have no education beyond 
compulsory schooling and in Spain and Italy, over half. 
Comparing the education level of those aged 25-34 with those aged 55-64 shows 
that in Spain, Greece, Italy and Ireland, the proportion with no education beyond 
compulsory schooling more than halved in the 30 years between the two age groups. 
(Fig 1.28) The reduction in Malta and Portugal was less and in both, the proportion 
of those aged 25-34 with no education beyond compulsory schooling is almost three 
times the EU average. The increase in tertiary education was even more marked, 
with Spain and Ireland surpassing the EU average in one generation, with 
approximately 40% of those aged 25-34 having this level of education. 
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In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, the proportion with at least upper 
secondary education is around 90%, and only slightly less than this in the three 
Baltic States, Poland and Slovakia, larger than in any of the EU15 countries. Indeed, 
in all the new Member States, apart from Cyprus and Malta, the relative number of 
people of working age with at least upper secondary level education is above the EU 
average. In most cases, however, this is because of the large number with upper 
secondary education, and the proportion with tertiary education is below the 
average, in some cases considerably. 
Except in the three Baltic States, therefore, relatively few young people in the 
transition countries go on to university once they have completed upper secondary 
education or training. This feature is perhaps more significant in respect of labour 
market needs and as an indictor of human resources – or the ‘quality’ of the work 
force – in these countries than the proportion with upper secondary or higher levels 
of education., especially given the nature of many upper secondary programmes. 
These, therefore, tend to be relatively narrowly focused on specific occupations and 
not necessarily in line with the skills required as the economy develops and the 
structure of production alters. Nor do they typically provide a sound basis for people 
to be able to adapt to changes in the pattern of demand for labour as economic 
development takes place. 
Variations more pronounced between regions than between countries 
These differences in education levels between countries are even more marked at 
regional level since there are significant disparities within Member States as well as 
between them. (Map 1.29: Education attainment levels, 2005) The relative number 
of university graduates, in particular, varies considerably between regions. This 
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variation is correlated with GDP per head. Lagging regions tend to have a much 
smaller proportion of people who have completed tertiary education than others. In 
regions in the EU27 with GDP per head of under 75% of the EU average taken 
together, 14% of those aged 25-64 had tertiary level qualifications in 2005. By 
contrast, the proportion in regions with GDP per head above this level averaged just 
over 25%, almost 10 percentage points higher. 
This difference is repeated in all Member States, with the sole exception of 
Germany, where the eastern German Länder have a larger proportion of university 
graduates than the western ones. In Greece, the proportion of graduates in the 
population aged 25-64 was over 5 percentage points less in lagging regions than in 
the other parts of the country and in Portugal, as much as 9 percentage points less. In 
Italy, the difference was smaller – only 2 percentage points – though this means that 
only just over 10% of 25-64 year-olds had completed tertiary education in the 
southern regions. 
The difference between the more and less prosperous regions is particularly 
pronounced in the new Member States, especially between the capital cities and the 
rest of the country. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, the 
relative number of university graduates in the regions which include the capital city 
was over twice that in others (in the Czech Republic and Hungary, for example, 
some 27% as opposed to 11% and 13%, respectively). 
Educational levels in lagging regions remain low 
There is little sign of these differences narrowing. Indeed, the difference in the 
proportion of people with tertiary education in lagging regions compared to the other 
regions is slightly wider among younger age groups than among older ones. In the 
lagging regions, the proportion of those aged 25-34 with tertiary education was 8 
percentage points higher than of those aged 55-64, but in the other regions the 
difference was 13 percentage points. This illustrates the growing gap between the 
lagging regions and the rest of the EU in tertiary education. 
A similar pattern is evident in several Member States. In Poland, for example, the 
proportion of those aged 25-34 with tertiary education was 12 percentage points 
higher than those aged 55-64 in lagging regions, but in the other regions the 
difference was 18 percentage points.  In Italy, where the proportion of 25-34 year 
olds with tertiary education in lagging regions was 5 percentage points more than for 
those aged 55-64, the figure for the northern and central regions was almost 9 
percentage points more. 
This lack of convergence, it should be noted, does not necessarily reflect a lack of 
effort on the part of government at various levels, from regional to EU, to close the 
gap. Instead, it might be a result of those with high levels of education, especially 
the younger generation, migrating out of the less prosperous regions to the more 
prosperous ones where their potential earnings are higher, so adding to the number 
of university graduates in the latter regions and reducing it in the former. 
Employment rates lower for less well educated 
The importance of tertiary education for regional competitiveness and the capacity 
for growth is reflected in the uniformly high employment rates of university 
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graduates which prevail across the EU. Some 84% of those aged 25-64 were in work 
in the EU as a whole in 2005, the proportion varying from a high of 88% in the UK 
and Lithuania to a low of 81% in Italy and Bulgaria.  
The variation is slightly wider across regions. Nevertheless, there are no regions in 
the EU where the proportion of university graduates in employment fell below 70% 
and only 6 where it fell below 75%, four of these being in southern Italy, reflecting 
the generally low employment rates among women (the other two were Corse and 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in Germany).  
By contrast, the employment rate of 25-64 year-olds with no education beyond basic 
schooling averaged just 56%, 28 percentage points below the rate for graduates. It 
was over 75% in only two regions in the EU, both in the UK (Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire and Essex), while it was below 25% in four 
regions (Severozapaden in Bulgaria, Slaskie in Poland, Leipzig in Germany and 
Vychodne Slovensko in Slovakia).  
Although there are differences in employment rates among those with upper 
secondary education, these tend to be much narrower, varying from around 80% or 
just over to around 60% (there is only region, Corse, where the rate was below 55% 
in 2005). The main manifestation of the variation in employment rates across the EU 
described earlier in the chapter, therefore, is the difference in the proportion of those 
with no qualifications beyond basic schooling who are in work. 
Employment rates among such people are particularly low in the new Member 
States (averaging just over 49% in 2005), especially in countries where the 
employment rates are relatively low overall. The average rate for those aged 25-64 
with only basic schooling, therefore, was only 38% in Hungary, 37% in Poland and 
just 26% in Slovakia, though in the last two, there were only around 20% of the age 
group with this level of education. 
Lifelong learning 
Continuing participation in education and training throughout people’s working 
lives is essential for them to be able to adapt to new techniques and new methods of 
working and to extend their competencies as technological advance takes place. It is 
equally important for them to be able to move between jobs as the demand for 
labour shifts in response to changes in the structure of economic activity as 
economic development occurs.  
The extent of lifelong learning, however, varies markedly between both countries 
and regions. In 2003, the last year for which data are available for participation in 
training over a 12-month period, an average of some 21% of those aged 25-64 were 
involved in some education or training, mostly outside the formal education system. 
This proportion, however, varied from over 60% in Sweden and over 50% in 
Denmark and Finland to only just over 6% in Greece and just 2-3% in Bulgaria and 
Romania. Despite the evident importance of lifelong learning in the new Member 
States to facilitate movement between activities as restructuring occurs, in all the 
countries apart from Slovenia and Slovakia, it was less than the EU average, in 
Lithuania, Hungary and Poland, significantly so. 
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Participation in education and training was also below the EU average in each of the 
EU-15 Cohesion countries, as well as in Italy, where the proportion concerned was 
under 10%. 
2.4. Lisbon Agenda for the regions 
To obtain a regional perspective on the Lisbon Agenda, a synthetic index48 has been 
created based on six of the short-listed Lisbon indicators relevant at the regional 
level49 (Map 1.30: Lisbon economic indicator, 2004-2005). Although it is intended 
only to provide a rough indication of how regions are performing in relation to the 
Lisbon Agenda, it is nevertheless the case that, a region which scores high will be 
well on its way to achieving several of the Lisbon targets, while a region with a low 
score will be a long way off. 
Regions with a particularly high score include Denmark, most Swedish regions, 
Etelä-Suomi in Finland (where Helsinki is situated), regions in the South-East of the 
UK, Noord-Holland and Bayern in Germany. All of these regions were ranked in the 
top quintile as regards at least five of the six indicators. The regions with the lowest 
scores can be found in Romania, Poland and Slovakia, where this reflects a 
combination of low productivity, low employment and low expenditure on R&D.  
Among the new Member States, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and most of 
the Czech regions scored above the EU average. In Slovakia and Hungary, the 
regions which included the capital city had scores above the average, while in other 
regions in the two countries, scores were below average, in some cases, considerably 
so. There are also large differences between regions in the scores in Spain, Italy and 
Germany, with southern Spanish and Italian regions and eastern German regions all 
having low scores, highlighting both the pronounced economic disparities within 
these countries and the importance of the regional dimension of the Lisbon Agenda.  
Virtually all the regions which score below the EU average on this synthetic 
indicator have GDP per head below 75% of the EU average, demonstrating the 
importance of Cohesion policy and the financial support it provides for the pursuit 
of the Lisbon Agenda.  
                                                 
48  Before aggregating, these six indicators were re-scaled relative to the EU-27 average (values divided 
by the average and re-scaled between the minimum and the maximum value), and a square-root 
transformation is applied to minimise the influence of outliers. The composite indicator is the min-max 
rescaled average of the 6 transformed indicators (all six received the same weight). Hence, it varies 
between 0 and 1. This method ensures that the final indicator reflects the total variation in each 
indicator equally while limiting the influence of the outliers. This is the same method used to calculate 
the Regional Innovation Performance Index. 
49  GDP per capita in PPS was not included in this indicator as it also includes the employment rate and 
productivity (the two sources of economic wealth.  
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BOX – Turkey and Croatia 
The population of Turkey now amounts to around 15% of that of the EU-27. Because of its much 
faster population growth since 1990 (more than 8 times faster than in the EU-27), the share of 
population under 15 is almost twice that in the EU, while the share of those aged 65 and over is 
only a third of the proportion in the EU. 
In the four years 2001-2004, economic growth in Turkey was faster than in the EU and GDP per 
head in PPS terms increased from 27% of the EU-27 average to almost 30% –very close to the level 
in Bulgaria or Romania. This relatively low level is a consequence of much lower productivity than in 
the EU, partly reflecting the large numbers employed in agriculture (34% of the total) and just as 
importantly, of much lower employment (only 46% of those aged 15-64 being in work in 2005. This 
is only partially reflected in unemployment (just over 10% in 2005) because of the great many 
people who are not economically active, women especially (the employment rate of women is under 
24%). 
R&D expenditure amounts to only 0.7% of GDP and under a third of this is undertaken by 
businesses. Regional disparities across the country are extremely wide and show a clear West-East 
divide, the most prosperous region, Kocaeli, having a GDP per head of 51% of the EU-27 average in 
2001 and the least prosperous, Ağrı, one of only 9%. Nevertheless, disparities seem to have 
narrowed (on the basis of the Gini coefficient) between 1995 and 2001.  
The population of Croatia is under 1% of the EU-27 total and has tended to decline in recent years 
(by 0.6% a year over the period 1995-2003). The age structure of population is much the same as 
in the EU. 
Economic growth has been relatively high, averaging 4% a year between 1995 and 2004, and in 
2004, GDP per head was just under 49% of the EU-27 average, much the same as in Poland. Both 
productivity and employment are much lower than in the EU, the employment rate being only 55% 
in 2005 and unemployment almost 13%, while some 17% of those in work are employed in 
agriculture. 
Expenditure on R&D was just over 1% of GDP in 2003, slightly higher than the average in the new 
Member States, and 40% was carried out by business. 
Regional disparities in GDP per head are relatively wide, the level in Zagreb being some 86% of the 
EU-27 average in 2003 in PPS terms, around twice the level in the rest of the country In North-West 
Croatia, GDP per head averaged just over 61% of the EU average, while in East (Panonian) Croatia, 
it averaged just under 34%.  
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3. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the main achievements of cohesion policy in the period 2000-
2006, particularly in terms of the structure of spending under cohesion policy and of 
growth and jobs. It then presents the main elements of the reform for the period 2007-
2013 and a preliminary assessment of the content of the new programming documents. 
The chapter is based in large part on the results of the latest evaluations of programmes in 
the EU-15 countries, the first evaluations of programmes in the new Member States and 
three studies, one each on transport, innovation and the environment. 
4. EVOLUTION OF PRIORITIES DURING THE PERIOD 2000-2006 
Cohesion policy is aimed at supporting three main areas of investment: infrastructure 
(mainly transport and the environment), productive investment (largely SMEs and RTD 
and innovation) and investment in people. 
Over the period 2000-2006, investment was concentrated in these three areas in both 
Objectives 1 and 2, though with differing emphasis. Whereas in Objective 1 regions, the 
focus was on basic needs, on infrastructure (particularly transport infrastructure) and 
human resources, in Objective 2 regions, investment was centred more on ‘soft’ 
infrastructure, particularly on aid to SMEs and RTD. Objective 3 was dedicated in turn to 
human resources. 
The division of actual expenditure from the Structural Funds (the ERDF and the ESF) 
tended to closely follow the division planned at the beginning of the programming period, 
with only minor differences, demonstrating both the relevance of the initial plans and the 
fact that most programmes are on target (Table 2.1): 
• Transport in Objective 1 regions accounted for around 26% of total expenditure as 
against 20% of planned. Although large capital projects can be challenging to launch 
and keep to timetable, once going they have a certain momentum. 
• Environmental spending in Objective 1 regions was slightly lower than that planned 
expenditure (6.6% of the total as against 7%). This is perhaps attributable to the fact 
that significant investments in environmental infrastructure, such as water and waste 
water treatment facilities, have been made, with the emphasis in the EU15 shifting to 
awareness-raising and other preventative measures as well as to renewable energy.  
• Aid to SMEs in Objective 2 regions was lower than planned (32% of the total as 
against 35%), which as some of the evaluations noted, might be a consequence of the 
economic downturn. 
• Investment in people, notably in Objective 1 and 3, accounted for approximately 30% 
of total cohesion policy resources. On the whole absorption has been in line with 
expectations. 
In the new Member States, it is too early to determine trends in the pattern of actual 
expenditure, but the planned figures show a similar picture to that in Objective 1 regions 
in the EU-15, with large investment in transport and human resources, though with 
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proportionally less in SMEs and RTD. The latter might be attributable to the shortness of 
the 2004-2006 programming period in these countries and its initial nature, given the 
length of time it takes to build up expertise in these areas. 
Expenditure under the Cohesion Fund was equally distributed between environment and 
transport infrastructures. 
Table 2.1 
000 EUR %
Sewerage and purification 6.521.816.700 37,5%
Environment - not classified 4.293.015.300 24,7%
Urban and industrial waste 2.847.927.850 16,4%
Drinking water (collection, storage, treatment and distribution) 2.758.613.300 15,9%
Mixed water and waste water projects 895.518.500 5,1%
Environment protection (Flood protection, desertification, affrestation, Natura 2000, etc.)63.073.300 0,4%
Air 9.000.000 0,1%
TOTAL Environment 17.388.964.950 50,3%
Rail 7.807.987.990 46,3%
Roads 4.729.499.650 28,0%
Other not classified 2.772.811.000 16,4%
Ports 1.077.193.240 6,4%
Urban Transport 422.063.430 2,5%
Airports 70.513.600 0,4%
TOTAL Transport 16.880.068.910 48,8%
urban transport 286.852.100 90,5%
other 30.000.000 9,5%
TOTAL Mixed projects 316.852.100 0,9%
TOTAL COHESION FUND 34.585.885.960 100,0%
Source: Financial plans, calculations DG REGIO
Cohesion Fund (committed spending) 2000-2006
 
In relation to progress against targets, the mid-term updates generally found that most 
programmes were on track on most indicators, including job creation, SMEs assisted and 
kilometres of road and railway constructed. Indeed, some programmes exceeded the 
targets set by some way, which might imply a need to set more ambitious targets in 
future. The main exception is Greece, where the achievement of targets for business 
creation and rural development was offset by a failure to do so as regards infrastructure 
and some training measures. In some areas, notably investment in infrastructure and 
research, expenditure has, however, also lagged behind that planned in a number of other 
Member States. In addition, in a number of cases, the evaluations refer to the need to 
improve administrative capacity, an issue which is discussed further below. 
5. IMPACT ANALYSIS – THE VALUE OF COHESION POLICY 
5.1. Macroeconomic impact: 2000-2013 
Macro-economic models provide important insights into the consequences of 
cohesion policy since, in principle at least, they are able to take account of the 
substitution, crowding out, multiplier and dynamic effects of policy, so enabling the 
net effects over the long-term to be estimated. 
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The analysis presented below is based on actual payment profiles50 for the largest 
blocks of Cohesion programmes in the 2000-2006 period – those in Ireland, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal as well as in Eastern Germany (including Berlin) and the 
Objective 1 regions of Italy. The profiles comprise payment claims up to and 
including 2006, with the budget remaining assumed to be divided equally between 
2007 and 2008. They are taken as the best estimate of the pattern of expenditure 
over the period 2007-13. 
These profiles, which are a more realistic representation of actual spending than 
annual budget allocations, indicate that outlays tend to build up slowly as 
programmes are set up and then rise rapidly to a relatively constant level before 
increasing at the end of the period. In addition, the simulations reported here 
incorporate only the effects of the EU contribution. The pattern of national spending 
is assumed to remain unchanged, which seems plausible given that most co-
financing will come from money already earmarked for the spending in question.  
It is also worth noting that the models provide estimates of the long-term effects of 
the policy beyond the funding period 2007-2013.  
The following examines the prospective effects of spending on GDP and 
employment on the basis of three different economic models. 
The HERMIN51 model shows cohesion policy as having a significantly positive 
effect, with absolute GDP being some 5-10% higher in most of the new Member 
States than in the absence of intervention. The job content is high, with 2 million net 
additional jobs predicted by 2015 (Tables .2.2a and 2.2b and Fig. 2.1) 
Some of these gains are due to short-run demand effects, in the form, for example, 
of a temporary boost to construction. However, around half of the increase in GDP 
is attributable to supply-side effects, which are important to sustain higher growth 
rates over the long-term. These take the form of increases in physical and human 
capital and R&D, which serve to push up productivity and growth potential. 
Both short- and long-term effects can be seen in the interim results. The effect in 
2006 of Cohesion policy for the period 2000-2006 is particularly influenced by 
demand-side effects, since spending resulting from policy over this period will only 
be completed in 2008. Moreover, they do not take account (for the EU-15 Member 
States) of supply-side effects stemming from policy in previous periods. 
Nevertheless, the total employment effect across the recipient countries is around 
570,000, of which some 160,000 is in the new Member States. 
                                                 
50  This differs from the estimates in previous Cohesion Reports which were based on annual allocations 
rather than payments, or more precisely payment claims lodged with the Commission which will tend 
to lag actual spending by at least two months. 
51  <Reference of final study> 
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Table 2.2a 
Country
GDP gain 
(% above 
baseline)
Employment 
gain (% 
above 
baseline)
Employment 
gain (1000s 
above 
baseline)
Bulgaria NA NA NA
Cyprus 0,1 0,1 0,4
Czech Republic 1,6 0,8 39,4
Estonia 1,8 1,3 7,9
Greece 2,8 2,0 85,2
Hungary 0,6 0,6 22,1
Ireland 0,9 0,7 12,9
Latvia 1,6 1,2 11,7
Lithuania 1,2 0,9 12,4
Poland 0,5 0,4 50,3
Portugal 2,0 1,4 70,6
Romania NA NA NA
Slovakia 0,7 0,5 11,3
Slovenia 0,3 0,3 2,3
Spain 1,0 0,7 133,5
East Germany 0,9 0,7 53,0
Italian Mezzogiorno 1,1 0,8 55,7
Malta 0,4 0,4 0,6
Total 569,3
Source: GEFRA, EMDS (2007)
HERMIN: Impact of cohesion policy 2000-2006 on national GDP 
and employment in 2006
 
For 2015, the effect is much greater. This is partly because financial support is more 
substantial relative to the GDP of the recipient countries, but also because supply-
side improvements take time to build up. The estimated effect of policy on GDP is 
largest for the new Member States since they are the main recipients of support in 
relative terms. For these countries, GDP is projected to be 5 to 10 % higher than 
without Cohesion policy with an overall increase in employment of nearly 2 million 
Supply side improvements account for around half of the gain.  
The projected effect of European support differs between countries, partly because 
of variations in the scale of funding, partly because of differences in the structure of 
the economy. The factors in HERMIN which have the most effect on growth are the 
sectoral structure of the economy, the degree to which manufacturing is open to 
productivity growth driven by technological advance, the openness to world trade 
and the flexibility of wages. 
Table 2.2b 
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Country
GDP gain 
(% above 
baseline)
Employment 
gain (% 
above 
baseline)
Employment 
gain (1000s 
above 
baseline)
Bulgaria 5,9 3,2 90,4
Cyprus 1,1 0,9 3,1
Czech Republic 9,1 7,1 327,8
Estonia 8,6 5,4 31,0
Greece 3,5 2,3 95,0
Hungary 5,4 3,7 147,3
Ireland 0,6 0,4 8,2
Latvia 9,3 6,0 55,4
Lithuania 8,3 4,8 67,7
Poland 5,4 2,8 384,2
Portugal 3,1 2,1 104,8
Romania 7,6 3,2 267,5
Slovakia 6,1 4,0 87,9
Slovenia 2,5 1,7 15,7
Spain 1,2 0,8 156,7
East Germany 1,1 0,9 60,0
Italian Mezzogiorno 1,5 0,9 60,1
Malta 4,5 4,0 6,9
Total 1969,7
Source: GEFRA, EMDS (2007)
HERMIN: Impact of cohesion policy 2000-2013 on national GDP 
and employment in 2015
 
EcoMod52 predicts significantly positive effects of policy intervention in all 15 
Cohesion countries, especially in all the new Member States, where funding is 
relatively large. In Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Bulgaria, GDP is estimated to be 
around 15% higher by 2020 as a result of intervention than it would be without it. 
The projections show the effect of policy being slightly larger after 2015 than before 
because of higher productivity, a more educated work force and better infrastructure. 
The result of intervention is, therefore, to strengthen the supply side of the economy 
and put it on a higher sustainable growth path.  
However, there are two notes of caution. First, continued improvement in growth 
rates beyond the funding period is likely to depend on other policies being 
implemented to make the most of supply-side improvements. Secondly, the scale of 
the effects is sensitive to the assumptions made about the elasticity of productivity 
growth to increases in the capital stock, which are relatively uncertain. 
The effects differ between countries partly because of the scale of funding but also 
because of differences in the structure of economies, those with large agriculture and 
basic industry sectors gaining less than those with more services and higher-tech 
sectors.  
The main engine of growth is investment in both physical and human capital. While 
all sectors gain from higher growth, the gains are particularly large in construction, 
because of infrastructure projects, and higher-tech activities, because of a more 
educated and skilled work force. 
                                                 
52  <Reference of final study> 
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Employment increases are predicted to contribute around 40-50% of GDP growth in 
most cases, the remainder coming from higher productivity. Overall, policy is 
projected to create over 2 million net additional jobs by 2015, rising to nearly 2½ 
million by 2020, around a third of them in Poland, with consequent significant 
reductions in unemployment, 
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Since the QUEST model incorporates strong assumptions about the ‘crowding-out’ 
effect of policy interventions, the boost to demand in the Cohesion countries from 
spending from the Structural Funds is relatively modest (Fig. 2.2). Instead, there is a 
slow build-up of supply-side improvements, though these are reflected mainly in 
productivity gains, since the model assumes the job content of growth to be 
negligible. (This, it should be noted, though perhaps extreme, accords more closely 
than the other two models with the evidence of recent years in many of the new 
Member States, as indicated in Chapter 1.) The nature of the gains, however, mean 
that for the most part they will remain in the long-term after the programming 
period, and funding, comes to an end. In practice, therefore, Quest tends to predict 
supply-side gains over the long-term similar to HERMIN. 
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In the QUEST model, differences between countries in the scale of the effect of 
policy reflect both the size of Funds' support relative to GDP and monetary policy. 
In Slovenia, which has adopted the Euro, and the three Baltic States, which peg their 
currencies against the Euro, there is less crowding out of the stimulus to demand in 
the first year but more in later years, so depressing the rate of growth. In the Baltic 
States, in particular, therefore, the predicted effect of Cohesion policy is much less 
than indicated by the HERMIN model. 
According to QUEST, the effect on the countries which are net contributors to 
Cohesion policy is negative but relatively small, especially in relation to the positive 
effect on GDP in the Cohesion countries. For the EU27, the overall effects are also 
predicted to be small and negative over most of the programming period, but 
positive in later years, indicating that cohesion policy adds to the growth of the EU 
as a whole in the long term, as well as assisting convergence. 
In conclusions, there are evident differences in the estimated effect of policy in the 
different countries between the two models, which reflect their differing features. 
This applies as much to the relative as to the overall scale of the effect, with, for 
example, policy having a comparatively large effect on GDP in Slovakia and 
Bulgaria according to EcoMod but a smaller one as compared with other countries 
according to HERMIN. 
Although the detailed results differ, the three macroeconomic models used to assess 
Cohesion policy predict that it will have a significant effect in boosting GDP in 
lagging regions of the EU not only over the present programming period but 
permanently. Two of the models estimate that policy will add some 5-15% to GDP 
in most of the new Member States by 2015 and around 2 million to employment. 
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In addition, the QUEST predicts that cohesion policy will increase the long-term 
productive potential of the EU as a whole, as well as assisting convergence. 
Box: introducing the macroeconomic models used53 
HERMIN is a macro econometric model that combines both neo-classical and Keynesian elements to 
analyse in one framework both short-run (demand) effects and long run (supply-side) effects. 
Moreover, as a model specifically designed to measure the impact of Cohesion Policy, it has a 
sophisticated system for processing the different forms of spending under Cohesion Programmes. 
EcoMod is a multi-sector, "recursive-dynamic" computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. It has a 
detailed representation of the structure of the economy, notably the behaviour and interaction of 
different sectors, different types of economic agent (households, firms, etc) and different types of 
economic behaviour (consumption, production, investment, etc). The model is therefore well-
designed to capture structural shifts, trade effects and dynamic supply-side gains – a key aim of 
Cohesion Policy – but is not suitable for measuring short-term, year-on-year changes. 
QUEST is an in-house Commission model. It is a global macro-econometric model based on the New 
Keynesian-Neoclassical synthesis, with strong micro-foundations and forward-looking agents. It has 
less sectoral detail than the other two, but the broadest geographical coverage, including all of the 
EU economies54. Alone among the models, it can therefore include the effects on the net donor 
economies to the Structural Funds (and hence the effect of policy on the EU as a whole). It also has 
the most comprehensive coverage of the mechanisms by which "crowding out" occurs. 
The common central feature of the macro-economic models is that investment in physical and 
human capital drives growth. In the QUEST model public investment is assumed to be as productive 
as private investment for the economy as whole, which may not be the case in a number of 
instances. 
Although HERMIN and EcoMod have different structures and assign various "elasticities" (and 
therefore impacts) to different types of investment based on their own reading of the literature, a 
striking result is that all three models tend to produce similar supply-side effects over the period of 
assistance. All three models assume sound financial management and optimal investment choices, 
which again may well differ from reality.. 
One of the key differences between the models is the treatment of "crowding out". In QUEST 
economic agents are forward-looking and interest rates and exchange rates are endogenously 
determined. This tends to lead invariably to public investment crowding out private investment. 
Demand-side effects are therefore smaller than in the other two models (even at the peak of 
implementation) and final effects on employment equally small. In HERMIN, there is some crowding-
out (through labour market tightening and loss of international competitiveness) but also crowding-
in (the effect of the "Keynesian multiplier"). Demand effects are therefore significant and account 
for a large share of the overall impact. 
The distinctive results of Ecomod after the programming period are generated by the inclusion of 
long-term dynamic gains. The long-term positive interaction between factors such as RTD and 
human capital investment are assumed to continue to generate high growth (and not just a higher 
level of GDP) beyond the lifetime of the support provided. This contrasts, in particular, with 
HERMIN's approach to RTD and innovation which is to assume only small effects on the grounds that 
there is much uncertainty about these in the current literature. 
5.2. Measuring employment effects using bottom-up approaches 
It is not just the major Objective 1 programmes which have had an important effect 
on employment across the EU. According to estimates made by the latest 
evaluations of Objective 2 programmes (the updates to the mid-term evaluations), 
these too have led to significant job creation. 
These estimates are based on "bottom-up" survey data and, unlike macroeconomic 
model estimates, count jobs gross of any which are displaced elsewhere in the 
                                                 
53  For fuller information, see the following reports <references> 
54  Although Bulgaria and Romania are still being developed and they are currently covered in a more 
stylised form. 
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economy. Moreover, each country has a different methodology for assessing job 
creation. Nevertheless, despite the over-statement of job gains and the limited 
comparability of the results across countries, the estimates are indicative of the 
employment effect of Cohesion policy for investment in Objective 2 regions (Table 
2.3) 
Table 2.3 
Denmark 5.500 16.800
France 200.000 787.500
Netherlands 75.000 64.500
Spain 38.000 140.000
Sweden 25.500 48.900
United Kingdom 106.500 359.200
TOTAL 450.500 1.416.900
Structural Funds job creation in Objective 2 regions
Number of unemployed (2)
(1) The exact cut-off date varied from one country to another. Most were around the 
beginning of 2005. Cut-off for France was April 2006.
(2) Where only part of a NUTS3 region is covered by Objective 2, estimates were made 
by pro-rating. The results are therefore approximate.
Source: mid-term evaluation updates and EUROSTAT (2005), calculations DG REGIO
Gross job creation (1)
 
For the five countries for which evaluations have been carried out, which account 
for some 54% of the Funds allocated to Objective 2, the estimates suggest the 
overall the creation of over 400,000 jobs in gross terms.  
Some of the evaluations assessed the sustainability of the jobs created and their 
effect on the regional labour market. In the West Wales and the Valleys Objective 1 
region, for example, survey evidence suggested that most of the 40,000 new jobs 
created were likely to be sustained and that around half of them were filled by 
people who had previously been unemployed or inactive rather than already in work, 
suggesting a net job gain of at least 20,000. The types of job created were broadly 
similar in terms of the occupational pattern to those already in existence in the 
region, though pay rates were generally lower.  
In France, the mid-term evaluation suggests that, by April 2006, some 200,000 jobs 
are estimated to have been created nationally, some 75% of them permanent ones. 
Around 44% came from assistance to aid SMEs, 18% from aid to large enterprises 
and 5% each from support of R&D and tourism. Only 32% of the jobs, however, 
were taken by women.  The report also found that, as of February 2005, some 
144,500 of the jobs created since 2000 were still in existence.  
In Denmark, in Objective 2 areas, the evaluation found that the jobs created were 
mainly relatively low skilled ones, though as in Wales, this was in line with 
objectives of the programme, which was to bring the disadvantaged into the labour 
market.  
Under objective 3, the direct linkage between support and job creation is even less 
straightforward to establish. Although it is possible to identify the recipients of 
assistance and the form which support has taken, the net effect on employment 
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remains uncertain, even there have undoubtedly been gains to employability and 
business creation. 
The Funds, for example, provided support for the creation of some 40,000 micro-
enterprises in Germany over the period 2000-2005, with around 85% of these 
surviving beyond two years, well above the average rate newly created firms. In 
Spain over 377,000 people received support as part of self employment and social 
economy activities. In Scotland, the Funds supported the creation of 1575 
enterprises, with a survival rate of over 50%.  
The Funds have also helped a great many people into employment, though the 
effectiveness of different programmes in this regard has varied considerably. In 
Austria almost 143,000 people received individualised support, over half of them 
finding jobs as a result. In addition, specific measures were financed to assist 
women into work, some 56,000 receiving support of whom 68% found jobs. 
Success rates were similar in Italy and Belgium, though in Spain it was lower with 
between 35% and 5% of women being in employment two years later. In Spain, in 
addition, almost 2.5 million people received support in the form of continuous 
training, a large proportion of these reporting that this had improved their 
employment prospects – in line with research findings that the return to individuals 
from training can be considerable55.. On the other hand, measures targeting specific 
disadvantaged groups, such as the young with poor qualifications or people with 
disabilities, seem to have been less effective, with typically only 10-20% finding 
employment. 
Intervention under Objective 3 also helped to improve job quality and the 
productivity of participants in support programmes, as well as contributing to a 
better balance of supply and demand in the labour market by increasing the 
employability of the unemployed.  
5.3. Thematic focus in mainstream programmes 
Improving territorial cohesion by improving transport infrastructure 
A key area of European investment in the period 2000-2006 … 
An efficient transport system is a key factor underlying regional competitiveness and 
growth. Accordingly, it is one of the main areas of investment of Cohesion policy. 
While a large proportion went on motorways or other roads over the period 2000-
2006 (47% of total spending on transport), a significant share went on rail (31%). 
Moreover, this amount increased over the period. 
In Spain and Portugal, in particular, there was considerable road construction over 
this period (Table 2.4). In the former, the programmes co-financed over 1200 km of 
roads and motorways – 60% of the increase in construction which occurred in 
Objective 1 regions, saving an estimated 1.2 million hours of travel time a year. In 
the previous period, some 450 kms of rail track for high speed train had been co-
financed, between Madrid, Zaragoza and Lleida. The Spanish HST network was 
                                                 
55  See for example Education at a glance – OECD indicators 2006. 
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extended in the period 2000-2006 with the connections Lleida-Tarragona-Barcelona, 
Cordoba-Málaga, Madrid-Valencia-Levante and Madrid-Valladolid (some 850 kms 
in total). 
Table 2.4 
Motorway growth in Cohesion countries (km/surface area)
1995 1999 2001 2004
Greece 3,2 3,4 5,6 9,0
Spain 13,8 17,6 19,0 20,4
Portugal 21,2 44,5 51,2 61,7
Ireland 1,0 1,5 1,8 2,7
EUR 15 13,8 15,7 16,7 18,8  
As a result of this investment, a strategic evaluation of transport, carried out in 
200656 pointed to the relatively high density of the motorway network in Spain and 
Portugal, which had increased by 47.8% and almost 200% between 1995 and 2004 
respectively. Except for these two countries together with Cyprus and Slovenia, 
however, all the Cohesion countries have motorway densities lower than the EU 
average. Investment in airports has been also contributed to reducing accessibility 
constraints, in particular in the outermost regions. 
… With an increasing focus on sustainable modes of transport … 
Improvements in transport infrastructure, however, tend to stimulate additional 
demand, which can in turn exert greater pressure on the environment. This can be 
mitigated by measures such as appropriate choices between modes of transport and 
pricing policies. 
In a number of programmes, there was an increasing emphasis on sustainability over 
the period 2000-2006. In Ireland, for example, the Funds financed Dublin’s tramway 
system, in Athens, the metro, which has helped to reduce traffic congestion and 
pollution, 8 new stations being constructed and 17 new trains coming into service. In 
the Baleares, the ERDF co-financed the railway connection between Palma-Inca and 
Manacor and in Bilbao, a second subway line.  
The shift in emphasis from financing road investment to financing rail over the 
period is confirmed by the strategic evaluation on transport and was particularly 
necessary given the slow growth of rail transport as compared with road. According 
to the Spanish Objective 1 mid-term evaluation, 12% of rail network in Objective 1 
regions has been built with the support of the Structural Funds. 
In the new Member States, on the other hand, as noted in the previous chapter, the 
need is less to extend the rail network than to modernise lines in order to increase 
operating speeds.  
                                                 
56  Strategic Evaluation on Transport Investment Priorities under Structural and Cohesion Funds for the 
Programming Period 2007-2013 (October 2006). Study carried out for the European Commission by 
ECORYS  http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/strategic_trans.pdf  
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The only EU country in which rail transport has increased faster than use of roads in 
recent years is France, reflecting the relatively high standard of the network and the 
growth of high speed trains and suggesting that substantial improvements in services 
can increase the share of journeys made by rail. 
The deployment of the Cohesion Fund brings not only financial support for 
investment projects but a more strategic and coherent view of transport and 
environmental infrastructure. For example, the ex post evaluation of the Fund57 
noted that in Ireland the Fund contributed to tackling deficiencies in the national 
road network, particularly on the main routes linking Dublin to the other major cities 
and towns in Ireland and with Belfast in the North. 
In addition, it has brought a focus on Community priorities, such as more 
sustainable forms of transport. While in the early 1990s, there was little new 
government investment in rail infrastructure, in the period 2000-2006, some EUR 4 
billion of national money, supported by the Cohesion Fund, was invested in the 
expansion of the railways (the Strategic Rail Review of 2003). 
… And a potential high impact on growth and accessibility 
The strategic study assessed the needs and priorities for transport investment under 
Cohesion policy over the period 2007-2013 in the 15 Cohesion Countries58. 
Although the effects differ from country to country, the potential Cohesion 
programme investments are estimated to result in an increase in GDP per head of 
between 0.2% and 0.6% (some EUR 265 billion overall at 2006 prices) over the 
period up to 2031, the larger effects being estimated in Latvia, Lithuania and 
Romania59 (Table 2.5). 
So far as the return on investment is concerned, a total investment of some EUR 73 
billion60 yields estimated benefits of EUR 79 billion for the host countries and EUR 
124 billion for the EU as a whole, underlining the substantial cross-border effects of 
transport projects and the case for European involvement in spending. Indeed, many 
of the projects would not be economic if considered purely in terms of the returns to 
the Member State commissioning them but have a high return for the EU as a whole. 
                                                 
57  Ex-post evaluation of a sample of projects co-financed by the Cohesion Fund (1993-2002) (DG 
REGIO- Ecorys 2005) http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/cohesion_project.pdf 
58  To assess the impacts in terms of the core objectives of the Community Strategic Guidelines 
(competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability) several scenarios were generated using the SASI model, 
designed specifically for this purpose. The key scenario is the "balanced" one, which selects potential 
Structural Fund investments on the basis of their contribution to objectives and needs, but subject to 
realistic budget constraints. The model enables socio-economic developments in 1330 regions in 
Europe to be examined and so account to be taken of the implications of transport projects further 
afield, including outside the country in which they take place. 
59  The model covers a 25 year time horizon – typical when assessing the effects of transport projects. 
60  These figures represent net present values, based on a standard discount rate of 5% used for transport. 
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Table 2.5 
2006 2031 2031
36,6 39,9
3,7% 13,0%
22,7 24,6
0,4% 8,8%
GDP per capita (index, increase as % of 
2006)
100 +0,0% +3,0%
The impacts concern average speeds over the whole network, not just the roads concerned. 
The results should be seen in this context and results on the roads concerned are significantly higher.
Economic 
competitiveness
Average speed of inter-regional road trips 
(kph, increase as % of 2006)
35,3
Average speed of inter-regional rail trips 
(kph, increase as % of 2006)
22,6
Forecast impacts of 2007-13 transport investment on the 12 New Member States
Objective Indicator Scenario 2031
No Structural or 
Cohesion Funds
With 2007-13 
transport 
investment
 
The investments have also had the effect of increasing average road and rail speeds 
between regions, in many countries by 5-10% in the case of road, though less in 
countries where average speeds are already relatively high. The increase in rail speed 
is particularly marked in Portugal (35%). In general, by increasing the share of 
journeys made by rail, these investments contribute to sustainable transport.  
Since the gains in terms of GDP growth and accessibility tend to be relatively evenly 
spread across regions, the contribution to reducing regional disparities is often 
modest. The effect, however, tends to be larger in smaller countries, especially if the 
investment serves to improve connections to the economic core of Europe. 
In conclusion… 
• There is a strong case for continued support of transport networks in the interest 
of the overall territorial cohesion of the Union, since many of the gains from 
investment accrue outside the country in which it occurs.  
• While in many cases there is a need to increase the capacity of networks, there 
should be a greater emphasis on modernisation and the rationalisation of 
infrastructure. Investment which improves the use of infrastructure, such as 
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) or improved traffic management (including 
better information for travellers), have been identified as giving rise to potentially 
large gains, especially in congested urban areas, while contributing to 
sustainability in environmental terms. In this respect, baseline indicators and 
result indicators of GHG emissions should be used and preferences should be 
given to low-emitting projects. 
• A particular priority is completing "missing links", including those between 
different modes of transport and across borders. 
• There is a need to increase emphasis on more sustainable transport modes – on 
rail, improving ports ("motorways of the sea"), and cycle paths as well as urban 
public transport given the increasing car ownership and the spread of 
urbanisation.  
• The cohesion benefits of transport links cannot be taken for granted, even when 
they are to sparsely populated and remote areas. The full range of social and 
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economic effects should be assessed. Moreover, transport measures should 
normally be accompanied by investments in the socio-economic base of a region. 
Improving environmental sustainability 
Cohesion policy has made a major contribution to environmental quality, a 
fundamental precondition for sustained growth and the quality of life, the Structural 
Funds playing a significant role in assisting Member States to comply with the 
environmental acquis in Objective 1 regions. For the 2000-2006 spending period, 
over 13% of the Structural Funds went to environmental objectives, expenditure 
being concentrated in Objective 1 regions and Cohesion countries 61 (Table 2.6). 
Table 2.6 
Objective Environmental allocation Total objective %
Objective 1 8.595.463.791 116.429.868.009 7,4%
Objective 2 814.562.436 22.526.983.350 3,6%
Community Initiatives 238.726.373 10.301.679.154 2,3%
Total Structural Funds (including 
Objective 3) 9.410.026.226 166.726.393.900 5,6%
Cohesion Fund 17.388.964.950 34.585.885.960 50,3%
Total Cohesion Policy 26.798.991.176 201.312.279.860 13,3%
Source:
Environmental expenditure under current plans  
Total Cohesion Policy, 2000-2006
 
In addition, projects in other areas often have environmental benefits, perhaps the 
most important being support for enterprises investing in more environment-friendly 
technology or waste treatment.  
In the EU-15 Member States, much of the infrastructure has been completed 
Investment has tended to be concentrated on the infrastructure required to tackle 
problems such as inadequate water supply, waste water treatment and general waste 
disposal. As a result, the gap in the standard of environmental infrastructure between 
Objective 1 regions and others in the EU-15 countries has narrowed appreciably, the 
remaining deficiencies are generally confined to a few areas and regions. 
The most progress has been made in respect of water supply. For example, in Spain, 
over the period 2000-2006, 2000 km of water pipelines were renovated and 600 km 
of new pipelines constructed, serving some 2.6 million people (around 6% of the 
Spanish population), and 57 water treatment plants and 13 desalination plants were 
built, serving 1.8 million people. 
Improvements have also been made in treating waste. Structural Fund interventions 
in the Italian Objective 1 regions made differentiated waste collection accessible to 
                                                 
61  Defined as investment in water supply, water treatment, waste treatment, renewable energies and 
protecting against air and noise pollution. 
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around 6.4 million people and have helped to raise the share of this from 1.9% of 
total waste in 1999to 8.2% in 2005. 
The recent ex post evaluation62 noted that over the period 1993-2002 public 
spending on the environment was 37% higher due to the Cohesion Funds. In Spain, 
it is estimated, for instance, that the Cohesion Fund has contributed 15% of the 
finance needed for sanitation and 69% of that for erosion and afforestation. 
Renewable energy is a growing focus 
The evaluations also indicate the significant growth of Structural Funds support for 
renewable energy over recent years. Cohesion programmes have supported a wide 
range of activities, especially in Portugal since 2004, though the specific focus (on 
wind, biomass, solar energy, etc.) has differed substantially between Member 
States63. In Greece, there is significant potential for wind energy, the use of which 
has increased markedly in the past few years with ERDF support. At the same time, 
the German evaluation report emphasises that the high technological content of 
renewable energy in itself contributes to regional innovation and development.  
In the new programming period significant infrastructure investment is necessary in 
the new Member States 
According to a recent study64, which assessed the needs and priorities for 
environmental investment in the 15 Cohesion countries, total investment of some 
EUR 100 billion would be needed to improve water supply, wastewater treatment, 
municipal solid waste, renewable energy sources and natural risk management. The 
overall scale of investment typically averages between 1% and 2% of GDP a year. 
The need is particularly high in Bulgaria (4.5% of GDP) and Romania (4.7% of 
GDP) while at the other extreme, little investment is needed in Spain (0.1% of 
GDP). 
For the new Member States, particularly Slovakia and Poland, the highest priority is 
investment in waste water treatment to meet the standards of the Urban Waste Water 
Treatment Directive. A range of other factors, however, affect decisions of what 
should and could be financed by cohesion policy, including limitations in 
administrative capacity as well as the potential for user charges and other funding 
sources such as obligatory purchasing schemes for renewable energies65. These 
factors could reduce the contribution needed from the Funds over the medium-term. 
                                                 
62  Ecorys (2005) Ex-post evaluation of a selection of 200 projects, co-financed by the Cohesion Fund 
over the period 1993-2002. 
63  Supporting the Medida de Apoio ao Aproveitamento do Potencial Energético ("MAPE") national 
programme for renewable energy production, rational utilisation of energy and the conversion to 
natural gas, and, in particular, regional operational program for the Azores (PRODESA). 
64  Strategic evaluation on environment and risk prevention, GHK Ltd, ECOLAS, IEEP (2006) 
65  This is the legal obligation for energy producers to purchase electricity from renewable sources at 
attractive prices. 
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… While more targeted and more "soft" spending seems appropriate in other 
Member States… 
For the Member States which have been recipients of Structural Fund support for 
many years, the conclusion from the updates to the mid-term evaluations is that 
support for environmental infrastructure projects should continue on a selective 
basis, with more judicious use of such methods as cost benefit analysis.  
The further conclusion is that the demand for water and the production of waste 
water are likely to remain stable in most Member States. However, for waste, there 
seems to be a clear link with GDP per head. Some Member States, notably Spain, 
are likely to see waste production increase considerably, underlining the importance 
of accompanying hard investment with soft measures, such as demand management 
and awareness raising. 
Infrastructure projects need to be based on an analysis of demand that takes account 
of future demographic changes. In some cases, such as in Eastern Germany, a 
decline in population is a major factor at regional level, in others, such as Portugal 
and Spain, urban-rural migration means growing pressure in urban centres and 
declining population in rural areas. 
The substantial progress in improving infrastructure in the EU-15 Member States 
should be seen as an opportunity to shift attention to newer, "softer" environmental 
needs, including soil protection and integrated pollution control. 
… And in particular investment in renewable energy 
Renewable energies are a potentially major factor in combating climate change and 
containing EU dependency on oil and gas. The objective has therefore been set in 
the EU of increasing the share of renewable energy in overall electricity production 
to 21% by 2010. The cost of development varies substantially across technologies 
but in most cases, renewable energies cannot yet compete in terms of cost with 
traditional energy sources.  
The most important means of promoting renewable energy in Member States are 
obligatory purchase schemes, which make investment in their development 
profitable. In a number of Member States (Slovenia, Spain, Greece, Czech Republic, 
Malta and Bulgaria) the market funds between 67% and 98% of investment needed, 
though in others national measures for stimulating renewable energies need to be 
strengthened. 
In conclusion 
• For the new Member States, there is a strong need for investment in 
environmental infrastructure, particularly waste water treatment and waste 
management. For EU-15 countries, the balance needs to shift towards softer 
forms of spending, including the development of renewable energies, 
preventative approaches, soil protection, integrated pollution control and 
awareness-raising. 
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• Environmental strategies, including the implementation of the Water Framework 
Directive, need to be linked more closely to wider development strategies, and 
there should be an explicit recognition that environmental improvement can 
contribute significantly to wider economic development. This link needs to be 
better articulated in current programming documents. 
• Emphasis ought to be placed on prevention and demand management. The scope 
for managing investment needs through effective preventative measures (such as 
waste minimisation) and demand management (especially of water) should be 
more clearly recognised in national and regional strategies. This is particularly 
the case in Spain, Greece and Portugal where, as noted above, increasing income 
has led to increased generation of waste. 
• Programmes should be encouraged to provide clear data on the extent of current 
user charges, information which is necessary for assessing the scope for securing 
additional funding for the capital investment required. 
• Programmes should also be encouraged to include measures to prevent and tackle 
natural and technological risks, including the development of appropriate 
management plans. In addition, natural risks can be exacerbated by climate 
changes, necessitating appropriate adaptation and mitigation strategies. 
• Markets need to be created for a broader range of renewable energies and 
cohesion programmes need to support R&D and increase awareness of the 
potential of less commercialised technologies. 
Knowledge and innovation for growth 
Increasing evidence suggests that traditional comparative advantage based on the 
cost of factors of production are less and less relevant in a world where these factors 
can be sourced efficiently from a distance. This has led some to think that geography 
no longer matters. At the same time, theories of innovation and technological 
change attach increasing importance to geographical proximity,, stressing the 
advantages from agglomeration, such as access to specialised inputs, knowledge and 
information as well as research centres specialising in particular areas of R&D. Such 
advantages are intrinsically local since processes of innovation are uncertain and 
cumulative; knowledge and capabilities are embedded in individuals and 
organisations..  
In consequence, supporting investment which favours the consolidation of regional 
innovation systems, and in particular the economic, social and institutional 
environment in which firms and individuals operate, has a potentially important 
effect in strengthening the competitiveness of regions. This is the more important, 
since national policies which support innovation tend to focus on the supply side 
rather than on demand and needs. The evidence, however, suggests that Cohesion 
policy interventions tend to be biased – particularly in the Objective 1 regions – 
toward R&D capacity and infrastructure. 
Cohesion Policy makes an important contribution to national R&D and innovation 
efforts, notably in Objective 1 regions  
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Support from the Structural Funds accounted for between 5% (Spain) and 18% 
(Lithuania) of expenditure on R&D in Objective 1 regions over the period 2000-
2006, while co-financing, both by government and the private sector added 
significantly more. At regional level, the share of the Structural Funds allocated to 
R&D and innovation varied greatly from less than 5% in most of southern Europe 
and in the outermost regions to more than 15% in the Nordic regions. It is worth 
noting that those regions which rank relatively high on the innovative performance 
index described in Chapter I are also in general those that invest the most in R&D 
and innovation under Cohesion policy. (Fig.2.3) 
Boosting applied 
research, 29%
Knowledge transfer and 
technology diffusion, 
24%
Innovation friendly 
environment, 20%
Support to innovative 
enteprises, 17%
Improving innovation 
governance, 8%
Innovation poles and 
clusters, 2%
% of total RTDI investment
2.3 Cohesion policy: types of RTDI measures financed, 2000-2006
Source: European 
Commission
RTDI: Research, Technological Development and Innovation
 
 
It is equally worth noting that most regions have recognised the importance of such 
investment by increasing significantly the share of resources allocated to it in the 
present programming period. (Map 2.1: Expenditure for R&D, innovation and 
information society at regional level, 2000-2006 and 2007-201366)  
As regards the focus of cohesion policy in this regard, support from the Funds in 
Objective 1 regions in EU-15 Member States tended to concentrate on measures to 
develop an innovation-friendly environment (including financing and human capital) 
as well as boosting the transfer of technology67 (Fig. 2.4). 
                                                 
66  These figures needs to interpreted with caution, since in some Member States (for example, Spain and 
the Czech Republic) R&D and innovation investments are planned and managed at national level 
through sectoral programmes. 
67  Strategic Evaluation on Innovation and the knowledge based economy in relation to the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds" Technopolis et al (2006) 
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There was only limited support for the creation and development of innovative 
enterprises in Objective 1 regions in the EU-15 (perhaps due to the prevalence of 
smaller family-run businesses). Support was greater in regions in the new Member 
States, which have the problem of the continuing restructuring of sectors previously 
dominated by large firms. There was also more focus on innovation poles and 
clusters in these regions, perhaps due to the later launching of programmes, which 
only began in 2004.  
In Objective 2 areas, funds have gone predominantly in this direction, to support for 
innovative enterprises as well as for the diffusion of technology. 
In many countries, support for RTDI has remained supply-oriented and directed at 
infrastructure, with limited amounts going to ‘softer’ demand-side measures aimed 
directly at enterprises. Large-scale programme for constructing infrastructure have, 
therefore, been preferred to more complex 'innovative' measures aimed at improving 
links between businesses and research institutions. In this regard, the evaluation 
report emphasises the danger of RTDI measures being detached from the regional 
reality, of science and technology parks or incubators and research centres being 
built without the necessary services to bridge the gap between research and 
businesses, especially small firms.  
BOX - Innovation and information society spending  
Between 2000 and 2006, expenditure from the Structural Funds amounted to around EUR 4 billion 
in Spain on research, technological development and innovation (RTDI) together with  the 
information society,  covering:  
- over 13,000 RTDI-based projects  
- nearly 100,000 researchers participating in projects. 
- support for over 1,000 technology and research centres 
- the co-financing of most of the present 64 Spanish technology parks 
- support for around 250,000 SMEs on their technology-based activities 
- investment of nearly EUR 1 billion in ICT infrastructure, reducing the gap with the EU average 
significantly. 
In the Italian southern region of Basilicata, the project called "One PC in every home", combined 
training and the provision of ICT services to households in order to enhance the quality of life. This 
project was implemented in the first part of the 2000-2006 period and resulted in a substantial 
increase in households with access to the Internet (36% of households in Basilicata had access to 
the Internet in 2006 as against under 4% in 1999 and 29% in Objective 1 regions as a whole) as 
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well as in of the  ICT services provided by municipalities (92% of municipalities in Basilicata 
provided such services in 2006 as against 20% in 2002 and 65% in the Objective 1 regions as a 
whole) 
The ActNow project in Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly was aimed at increasing high-speed 
broadband use by businesses. By the end of 2004, more than 8,900 (50% penetration) businesses 
were connected and all 100 exchange areas in Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly had broadband 
access. In total, the region had a 37% rate of broadband penetration compared with the national 
average of 31%. 
The report also emphasised the importance of creating the capacity for innovation, 
and the demand for related services, in enterprises which are the target of these 
infrastructure programmes. The lack of such capacity may partly explain why 
technology transfer seems not yet to have produced the results which the amount of 
funding dedicated to it would suggest. The report cited Austria and the UK as 
examples of good practice in stimulating demand in companies for business and 
technology related services. 
Similar results emerge from the mid-term evaluation update in Finland, which 
recommends that grants for product development be geared more towards joint 
public-private sector initiatives in order to involve the private sector more in 
initiatives and to develop networking further.  
The updates to the mid-term evaluations indicated a number of cases where the 
Structural Funds contributed significantly to strengthening the innovative capacity of 
regions. For example, in Catalonia, the Objective 2 programme involved over 6,000 
(some 21%) of the region's researchers and amounted to EUR 1.4 billion (37%) of 
private sector investment in the information society. 
Innovation in the planned National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs) 
The medium-sized and larger Cohesion countries (Spain, Poland, Greece, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Portugal and Slovakia – i.e. those composed of more than one 
NUTS 2 region) are set to receive substantial transfers for innovation programmes 
under the National Strategic Reference Framework. In Poland, support for the 
national programme, "Innovative Economy" amounts to EUR 8.3 billion or more 
than 12% of the national allocation. In addition, innovation will be one of the key 
areas of intervention in each of the 16 Polish regional programmes and also in the 
Eastern Poland OP. 
In the other medium-sized and larger Member States, promotion of innovation is 
one of the main priorities in the regional programmes. In France and the 
Netherlands, for example, innovation is the main priority in all the regional 
programmes and in each case is expected to account for around half of total 
expenditure. In Finland, the emphasis on innovation in all regional programmes 
reflects the explicit aim of using these as a means of decentralising the Lisbon 
strategy and increasing "ownership" on the ground.  
In the smaller Member States, scale and administrative capacity considerations mean 
that programmes are more broadly defined and include innovation alongside other 
priorities such as infrastructure. This is typically the case for those receiving support 
under the Convergence Objective, such as the Baltic States, Malta and Slovenia, 
though it is also true of Denmark. This, however, does not imply any less emphasis 
on innovation (Lithuania, for example, plans to allocate 8% of total resources to 
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RTD infrastructure and a further 8% to the information society under the "Economic 
Growth" programme.). 
A strategic choice – hotspots versus lagging regions 
The question of whether Member States choose to focus RTDI resources on 'poles’ 
or ’hotspots' or on correcting regional differences in RTDI potential is a subject of 
debate. As noted above, many regions will remain predominantly 'users' of 
knowledge and need to construct their policy in the light of this. The 
competitiveness of such regions is dependent on the capacity of businesses to access 
knowledge, apply innovations developed elsewhere and convert these into market 
opportunities. 
The Dutch and Finnish approaches are two different models for RTDI in future 
years. In 2000-2006, the Netherlands adopted a somewhat different strategy in 
Objective 2 regions to other Member States, with RTDI policy aimed at 
strengthening the 'hotspots' of research and innovation, or 'peaks in the delta'. 
Conversely, Finland used Structural Fund support to complement existing national 
policy measures directed at regions with relatively weak innovative capacity. 
In conclusion 
• The importance of innovation for economic growth and competitiveness and the 
disparities which exist between regions in this regard suggest that the proportion 
of the Structural Funds invested in this area needs to increase.  
• It is important, however, that investment in RTDI infrastructure is complemented 
by the development of services and skills aimed at increasing the capacity of 
enterprises to absorb innovations and strengthening their links with research 
centres. 
• RTDI strategy at regional level needs to take account of the specific 
characteristics of different regions in order to build on their actual or potential 
comparative advantages. In some lagging regions the effort should be 
concentrated on turning them into regional innovation poles; in some other the 
proper strategy would be to favour technology transfer rather then building basic 
research capacity. 
• Integrating businesses in knowledge networks will increase the probability that 
they innovate and remain competitive68. Networks should bring together all the 
relevant public and private sector actors, including universities, and link them 
with the wider research community outside the region. Information and 
communication technologies are in this respect an important enabler of 
innovation processes. 
SMEs and entrepreneurship – the motor of job creation 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are a vital part of the economy. SMEs 
– especially new start-ups – however, often have difficulty in accessing capital, 
                                                 
68  Technopolis, op. cit. 
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knowledge and experience. EU Cohesion policy is aimed at tackling these 
difficulties through a combination of ‘hard’ measures, such as direct investment, and 
‘soft’ ones, notably the provision of business support services, training and 
mentoring, and the creation of networks and clusters. 
Cohesion programmes provided support to a large number of SMEs over the period 
2000-2006. The Spanish Community Support Framework alone gave financial 
assistance, advice and coaching in managerial and organisational skills to 227,000 
SMEs (some 28% of the total). In the seven Spanish Objective 2 Regions, a total of 
95.000 SMEs have been supported through cohesion policy, particular to help them 
to expand and to develop on international markets. The evaluation of the Steiermark 
programme in Austria found that 75% of all business-related projects were 
implemented by SMEs, more than had been expected and an initiative had been 
launched to mobilise the potential of SMEs in R&D and innovation. In the UK, over 
250,000 SMEs were supported in Objective 1 and 2 regions, around 16,000 of which 
received direct aid. 
BOX – East Midlands internationalisation strategy 
In the East Midlands in the UK, like all regions across Europe, the challenges of globalisation are 
increasingly felt. Manufacturing constitutes a larger than average proportion of the economy, which 
means that the potential effects of global competition on businesses are correspondingly greater..  
Businesses, however, have viewed this as an opportunity to actively engage with emerging 
economies, especially China and India.   
Flagship companies such as Rolls Royce are already leading the way in terms of joint ventures and 
investment in China, and work closely with regional authorities and agencies to ensure a wider 
strategic approach. The East Midlands Development Agency has worked with stakeholders, including 
local government, to fund a China Business Bureau and will shortly extend an India Trade Bureau to 
cover the whole region. These agencies help local SMEs to access new markets and internationalise 
their business. In addition, the East Midlands’ representation in Brussels is complementing this 
approach, by developing a new pan-European Enterprise Platform involving major blue-chip 
companies such as Motorola, Hewlett Packard and Microsoft, in order to explore how public-private 
collaboration can enhance regional competitiveness.  
Under the new ERDF operational programme, EU policy will be more in line with the objectives of 
the region’s economic strategy. A sum of EUR 268.5m from the ERDF will do to the region  which 
will be matched by public funds of an equal amount. 
In many cases, the evaluators found that direct investment could have beneficially 
been more selective and better targeted. In order to minimise ‘deadweight’ effects 
(i.e. supporting activities which would have been undertaken anyway), they 
recommend the use of ‘intelligent’ instruments, such as ‘soft support’ (e.g. building 
competence and networks) and loans. 
Where used, loans have demonstrated their potential, such as in the East of Scotland, 
where a range of financial instruments have used, including the Scottish Co-
Investment Fund (see Box). 
There is evidence that ‘soft’ investments are at least as effective as direct aid, though 
they need to be carefully designed and targeted. For example, in Denmark, 
evaluators found that projects that gave priority to building links between research 
centres and businesses created more jobs per project relative to expenditure than 
others, as well as more lasting and sustainable jobs. In Finland, evaluators found that 
it was important that projects fitted in with regional programmes, while it was 
important that there was cooperation between all the participants, a clear 
commercial orientation and clear financing streams, ‘light’ bureaucracy (to 
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encourage creativity), emphasis on people rather than organisations, a target group 
of users, and a common commitment to, and understanding of, the project. 
A number of programmes involved entrepreneurial training, aimed at making people 
more enterprising by improving their attitudes and skills. In some cases, this had a 
dramatic effect on the survival rate of business start-ups. In Asturias in Spain, for 
example, (a ‘phasing-out’ region), the evaluators found that 98% of new companies 
supported remained in business after a year, while in Sardegna, the survival rate 
after a year was around 92%. 
BOX - Innovative finance for new companies – the Scottish Co-investment Fund 
The Scottish Co-investment Fund (SCF) is a £90 million equity investment fund set up by Scottish 
Enterprise and part financed from the Structural Funds, in order to assist smaller growth 
companies. Unlike a conventional venture capital fund, the SCF does not find and negotiate 
investment deals on its own.  
Instead, it has established partnerships with venture capital fund managers and business ‘angels’, 
who find the investment opportunity, negotiate the investment deal and invest their own money. If 
the venture needs more money than the private sector partner can provide, they can call on the 
SCF to co-invest on equal terms. The SCF then becomes part of the investment syndicate. This 
novel financing model enables private sector investors to bring more money to deals, and to spend 
less time finding this money. 
On the other hand, efforts to promote business start-ups among disadvantaged 
groups have had mixed results. While in the East of Scotland Objective 2 region, 
there was evidence of some success, in Ireland; evaluators reported that expenditure 
on the entrepreneurship part of the programme had reached only 36% of its revised 
2000-2006 target by the end of 2004. 
In conclusion 
• Wide-ranging measures to support investment measures tend to be indiscriminate 
and risk having significant deadweight effects. Direct support measures should be 
carefully targeted and subject to rigorous testing of their likely effectiveness, such 
as through cost-benefit analysis. 
• “Soft” measures such as the provision of services, training and mentoring, and 
the support to networks and clusters can be effective if part of an overall strategy 
based on a clear analysis of needs and understanding of the demand. 
• Measures to support entrepreneurship have proved effective in a number of 
regions. There is a need to strengthen measures for promoting business start-ups 
among disadvantaged groups, notably ethnic minorities and some women, who 
still face barriers in this regard. 
Investing in people 
During the programming period 2000-06, Cohesion policy (through the European 
Social Fund) allocated approximately EUR 69 billion, or nearly one third of the 
budget of the Structural Funds, to developing human resources and enhancing 
employability. The contribution of the Social Fund to public spending on labour 
market policies, however, varies considerably across Member States (from only 
around 2% in Denmark to 15% or more in Italy). For the period 2000-06, the 
European Social Fund regulation identified five areas of intervention:  
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– Improving the access of women to the labour market (6%) 
– Adaptability (22%) 
– Lifelong learning (23%) 
– Equal opportunities and social inclusion (18%) 
– Active labour market policies (30%) 
Although spending patterns differ between Member States and some interventions 
can be classified differently in different programmes, the broad patterns of 
expenditure reflect the growing importance of adapting skills to new labour market 
needs, including sustained guidance for the unemployed, and adapting education and 
training systems to help achieve this. 
Cohesion policy investment in people contributes importantly to convergence ….  
The main contribution of Cohesion policy as regards employment and social policy 
lies primarily in targeting support on individuals. The investment concerned has a 
number of positive effects in relation to economic and social cohesion69:  
(1) Increased productivity: according to estimates, an extra year at intermediate 
level education or equivalent training increases aggregate productivity by 
about 5% immediately and by a further 5% in the long term70. 
(2) Reduced rates of unemployment; by increasing the skills of low skilled 
workers, who tend to have significantly higher rates of unemployment, the 
overall rate can be brought down. 
(3) Increased participation in the labour force of women and people at a 
disadvantage, such as those with disabilities. Increased numbers of women in 
work have been a key factor in raising the growth in GDP per head in the 
Cohesion countries in the EU-15.    
(4) Increasing participation in tertiary education and continuing training: the 
return to university education is substantial, with estimates suggesting that 
someone who has completed tertiary education earns, on average, around 
50% more than someone who completed only secondary education71. There 
seem to be an equally strong relationship between wages and on-the-job 
training, with some estimates indicating that a year of training increases 
wages by as much as 5%. 
                                                 
69  See for example Fitz Gerald, "Lessons from 20 years of cohesion", The Economic and Social Research 
Institute, 2004. 
70  De la Fuente and Ciccone, 2002. 
71 Based on statistics contained in OECD, Education at a Glance, 2006  
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Support for active labour market policies in respect of both individuals and the 
systems for managing programmes absorbed a significant share of funding over the 
period 2000-2006. Support for the modernisation and development of employment 
services was focussed on increasing their capacity to assist people and to implement 
new methods and programmes, including their ability to forecast future employment 
trends and skill needs, in order to reduce mismatches between the skills of the work 
force and those required by employers.  
As part of this intervention, support was provided to those out of work, both the 
unemployed and  inactive, and to young people looking for their first job, the aim 
being to increase their employability and improve their access to employment 
through tailor-made measures, including training, career advice and guidance, and 
help with  job search.  
A recent study which examined over 100 evaluations of active labour market policy 
concluded that training programmes are most effective when combined with private 
sector incentive measures or with other forms of support (such as mentoring) and 
sanctions (with 40-50% higher success rates)Moreover, evaluation studies show the 
positive effect of participation to be ongoing:  A follow-up survey of those 
completing programmes indicates that their rate of employment had increased 
significantly in the longer-term. For example, in Italy, those who had successfully 
completed a training course had 26-31% more chance of being in employment 12 
months later. In England, a survey of participants indicated that their average rate of 
employment was some  14% higher 6 months after completing the programme in 
question than 12 months before. 
Continuous changes in economic and labour market conditions, however, linked to 
globalisation, the development of a knowledge based economy and demographic 
trends are leading to new challenges. In particular, there is growing need for 
measures to encourage active ageing and longer working lives, to increase 
participation in the labour market and to facilitate geographical and occupational 
mobility to make labour markets more flexible. 
….and investing in the development of services to support people … 
In general and in Objective 1 regions in particular, the Funds have contributed to the 
modernisation and reform of employment services, in the form of  the development 
of counselling, job brokering and personalised services, especially for those who had 
been out of work for some time.      
In Spain, for example, intervention resulted in the development of new labour 
market measures and systems of training as well as individual advice and guidance 
for unemployed. In Germany, it has supported local authorities to build the capacity 
to undertake the new tasks introduced by the labour market reforms.  
Particular attention should continue to be given to women… 
Cohesion policy has played an important role in promoting gender equality for many 
years both by including it as a cross-cutting objective in all programmes 
("mainstreaming") and through specific interventions. The information from 
national evaluations indicates that specific actions have stimulated debate on gender 
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equality as well as helping to bring about institutional changes aimed at reducing 
inequality in the labour market. 
A number of the national evaluations point to the impact of EU actions on national 
policies. In a number of Member States, such as Germany, Ireland and Italy, the 
establishment of special arrangements or institutions on gender equality are regarded 
as a clear outcome of ESF actions. The Swedish evaluators considered that the 
Objective 3 programme has had a positive impact on national policies in terms of 
increased participation, motivation and mobilisation in activities linked to the 
national gender mainstreaming strategy. 
Despite the positive developments, the employment rate of women remains much 
lower than that of men, especially those with relatively low education levels. There 
are, in addition, still wide gender pay gaps and major differences in career 
progression. To reduce these, further support is needed to increase the care services 
available for children and others in need of care and to reduce gender-based 
segregation in the labour market and in education. 
…and groups at the margin of the labour market 
Support has been given to those disadvantaged in the labour market in order to help 
them find employment. The measure concerned are often the same as those included 
under active labour market policies but they tend to be combined into "integration 
pathway" packages adapted to the specific needs of the people in question (such as 
social skills, language training if they are migrants or assistance in setting up new 
businesses). The aim is to provide support to individuals all the way from 
identifying their need for training or other forms of assistance right through to 
placing them in a job and ensuring that they are properly integrated into the 
workplace. 
In addition, the social partners, individual employers and local communities have 
been involved both in actively assisting the social integration of disadvantaged 
groups and in providing appropriate support services. 
Those in the work force need continuously to update their skills and competencies…. 
There is an almost continuous need in today’s economy for workers to adapt to 
changing job requirements and to be prepared to change their career path several 
times during their working lives. Cohesion policy has supported measures to 
anticipate and stimulate economic change and to help the workers affected find new 
jobs through updating and extending their skills and qualifications as well as to set 
up in business for themselves. 
…and education must have the capacity to train tomorrow's workers. 
Cohesion policy has also helped to foster links between education and businesses. 
Social Fund support triggered the reform in a number of Member States of education 
and training systems (such as by adjusting curricula to labour market needs or 
improving the training of teachers), assisted the development of new forms of 
training and provided support for lifelong learning. It also increased the access of 
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individuals to education and training and supported counselling and career guidance 
activities. 
In Portugal, for example, the ESF co-financed training and education for adults in a 
wide range of vocational areas. There were over 10,000 participants, the great 
majority of them unemployed, and many long-term unemployed, typically aged 
between 25 to 44 with only compulsory schooling at most and three quarters of them 
women. According to a survey of those completing the programme, most of them 
obtained a formal recognition of acquired competencies and a significant number 
found jobs despite the unfavourable labour market situation, a quarter of whom 
considered that it would have been difficult or impossible to obtain the job without 
the training.  In addition, some 29% of them had re-entered the education system to 
continue their studies and another 12% stated their intention of doing so within the 
next two years, so giving them the chance to obtain qualifications which would 
improve their position on the labour market. 
Cohesion policy has also helped to develop public employment services and social 
services as well as education and training. There is a need, however, to strengthen 
ESF support further by improving the capacity of national authorities to design and 
implement policies, especially in lagging parts of the EU.   
The ESF has, in addition, supported the development of partnerships and pacts 
between the various actors concerned, helping them to work together to solve 
common problems. Such initiatives need to be encouraged further to mobilise all 
interested parties in the reform process at national, regional and local level. 
… effective education and training systems are crucial…. 
An important role of Cohesion policy is to support the adaptation of training and 
education systems to the new requirements of the labour market and to the needs of 
the knowledge-based society. For example, in Ireland Cohesion policy has provided 
support for the establishment of a single, coherent award system for all levels of 
education and training, which is easily understandable by learners, teachers, 
employers and community workers alike. In Belgium, a partnership between 
university and training institutions was established to develop new educational 
methods to promote lifelong learning and, in particular to widen access to education 
and training through distance learning.  
Estimates suggest that the returns to education even among those in middle age are 
significant. According to an OCED study, therefore, the net rate of return (i.e. after 
taking account of the costs and foregone earnings) to someone aged 40 obtaining a 
university degree ranges from 8% in Sweden to 28% in Belgium72. 
In conclusion 
• Projections of demographic trends indicate that with a declining number of 
people of working age increases in productivity will become the main source of 
                                                 
72 OECD, Education at a Glance, 2006. Available data on Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. 
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economic growth in future years. Investing more in education and training is 
therefore crucial to ensuring the sustainability of the European social model.  
• The continuing shift towards a more knowledge-based economy underlines the 
need to invest in improving the adaptability of workers and entrepreneurs alike. 
These challenges concern all Member States. The ESF has focussed on directly 
supporting workers as individuals. In the future, it should provide more support 
to encourage companies to increase their investment in human resources and to 
recognise the skills of their work force as a determining factor of their 
competitiveness. In addition, special attention should be given to the effects of 
restructuring, with a particular focus on the problems faced by low-skilled and 
older workers.  
• There is an equal need for better management of migration together with more 
emphasis on the integration of cross-border labour markets and on increasing the 
geographical mobility of workers as well as the integration of migrants. This 
should include not only the strengthening traditional measures but also the 
promotion of acceptance of diversity in the workplace and the combating of 
discrimination in the labour market. 
• The employment rate of women remains well below that of men and women are 
still today paid less on average in the same job. Policy intervention should focus 
on the root causes of gender employment and pay gaps.  
• The efficiency of social inclusion measures could be strengthened if there were 
more focus on preventive action and early recognition of needs. This includes, in 
particular, discouraging young people from leaving school prematurely and 
giving them the opportunity to acquire the qualifications required to ensure they 
can find a decent job and avoid the risk of social exclusion.  
Strengthening institutional capacity to provide public services and to develop and 
deliver policies  
Effective institutions at national, regional and local level are an important aspect of 
the competitiveness and of Member States and regions and of the attractiveness as 
places in which to invest and live.  
Cohesion policy contributes to enhancing institutional capacity. In Portugal, for 
example, the reform of public services led to a reduction in the number of days 
needed to start a business from 60 to12 and, in a second phase, to 24 hours. Support 
was also given to the establishment of "citizens’ shops", bringing together all the 
main public services available to people. These now cover 26 different kinds of 
service. 
The need to invest in institutional and administrative capacity building has become 
even more evident since the recent EU enlargements. Even beforehand, the pre-
accession instruments provided considerable support to the countries concerned in 
this area. After the 2004 enlargement, the Commission insisted on the need not only 
for further investment but for an extension in the scope of support. Examples of 
measures targeting public administration and services can be found in the Czech, 
Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish programmes, with a focus 
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mainly on increasing professional skills in authorities at national, regional and local 
level, including support for developing high quality training systems. 
In conclusion 
• Strengthening institutional and administrative capacity is a key element in 
promoting structural adjustment, growth and jobs. The ESF should, therefore, 
devote sufficient resources to strengthening the efficiency of public authorities 
and public services in convergence regions in order to improve their ability to 
design and deliver their policies.  
Rural measures 
Over the 2000-2006 programming period, almost EUR 14 billion of the Structural 
Funds (including the EAGGF-Guidance), around 7% of the total, went towards rural 
development. Co-financing by Member States added just under EUR 9 billion to 
this. The EAGGF-Guidance accounted for 86% of expenditure. 
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There were five main areas of spending: making the most of the rural heritage, the 
management of water reserves, and the development of infrastructure, the adaptation 
of rural economies and protection of the environment (Fig. 2.5). The EAGGF-
Guidance and the ERDF differed in their areas of support: 
– the EAGGF-Guidance was spread across all five areas, with a few predominant, 
such as the development of water reserves, the LEADER+ programmes and 
support for developing the rural heritage; 
– the ERDF was more concentrated on a few areas, like support for the rural 
heritage, tourism, handicrafts, protection of the environment and the general 
restructuring of the rural economies (Fig. 2.6). 
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While the EAGGF-Guidance was of major importance for the main recipient 
countries, the ERDF had a predominant role for other countries, notably the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, Portugal and the UK (over a third of funds coming 
from this).  
The effect of expenditure appears to have been especially significant in: 
• improving accessibility, the emphasis being put on communication links between 
towns and surrounding rural areas, though also on rural transport services (such 
as rural taxi buses) and on links with the major transport networks; 
• in developing networks for treating waste and waste water, such as in Ur in the 
eastern Pyrénées in France, where 18 remote rural communes have joined forces 
to put in place common systems for sorting, recycling, compacting, transferring 
and incinerating waste;  
• in developing ICT, through a number of projects expanding infrastructure 
(coverage of broadband, use of satellites) and services (access of SMEs and the 
general public to ICT, tele-services to SMEs, teleworking, tele-information, tele-
healthcare and so on). In Guadalinfo in Andalousie, 25 pilot centres were opened 
to provide public access to the Internet and assistance to SMEs. The Tras os 
Montes Digital project in Portugal enabled a regional portal to be opened for both 
public and private bodies providing services to businesses and individuals; 
• in encouraging the diversification of economic activity in regions and developing 
regional assets, such as in Burgenland in Austria where a plant for bottling water 
has been funded providing employment for 35 workers;  
• in developing rural tourism, such as through the Eco-tourism project in Alviela in 
Alentejo in Portugal which has led to the establishment of a centre combining 
green tourism, raising public awareness and scientific research, or the Alqueva 
dam aimed at the same time at improving irrigation, generating electricity and 
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developing tourism.. Projects of this kind are designed to make the most of the 
rural heritage by diversifying the local economy and creating employment. 
The mid-term evaluations73 in a number of Member States found that tourism 
projects were effective in expanding regional income. In Finland, for example, the 
share of revenue from tourism in the total turnover of firms supported was 19% in 
the east and 3% in the north; and in Corsica the investment in agro-tourism 
supported increased income by between 15% and 30%.  
Success in maintaining employment, and to a lesser extent in creating jobs, was 
reported in many cases, especially in Finland, Spain, Ireland and Greece, though this 
tended to be in farming rather than in other activities. 
Positive effects on the environment were also reported in a number of regions, 
though these tended to be relatively modest. In southern regions, measures were 
focused primarily on fundamental problems such as the management of water 
reserves and environmental awareness, whereas in the north, they tended to take the 
form of rural advice, conservation and support of local community projects.  
While some positive effects on living conditions were equally reported, particularly 
in Portugal, these were generally on a small scale. 
5.4. From experimentation to mainstreaming: Community initiatives and 
innovative actions 
Over the period 2000-2006, the Funds supported Community initiatives in a number 
of different areas. These enabled experimentation to take place, representing a kind 
of laboratory where policy innovation could be tried and tested. All of the initiatives 
provided an opportunity to develop policy in respect of territorial cohesion, 
encompassing area-based solutions, networking within and across national 
boundaries and new forms of partnership. 
INTERREG: a success story 
INTERREG, the largest of the Community Initiatives, supports co-operation 
between regions in order to promote greater economic and social cohesion in the 
European Union and has evolved in terms of design, management and delivery over 
the past 15 years. Strand A programmes for cross-border integration are the most 
numerous and have been in existence for longest. Strand B programmes for trans-
national cooperation were developed in the late-1990s from INTERREG IIC 
programmes and Article 10 pilot actions. Strand C programmes for the exchange of 
experience to improve policy design and delivery were introduced in 2000. 
Since the 2000-2006 round, these three strands have been complemented by the 
INTERACT programme for identification and dissemination of best practice in 
programme management know-how. 
                                                 
73  See for example Agra CEAS consulting (2005) "Synthesis of the rural development mid-term 
evaluation" 
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INTERREG III had an overall budget for the 2000-2006 period of almost EUR 5.8 
billion (at 2004 prices), two-thirds of which went to 6 countries, Spain, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, France and Portugal. The new Member States which entered in 2004 
accounted for 8% of the total. 
Despite the limited scale of support on average ((EUR 74 million per programme), 
the programmes tended to have a significant leverage effect (EUR 165 for every 
EUR 100 invested, EUR 5 of which came from private funds). This covered 
investment which would most certainly not have materialized without INTERREG. 
European regions have identified gaps and undertaken joint actions to promote 
effective and sustainable transport systems, access to the information society, 
protection of the environment and natural resources and co-operation between urban 
and rural areas. The effects of borders have been reduced and both people and 
business in border areas have benefited from common development strategies. 
Networking has helped regions to find common solutions to problems via large scale 
sharing of experience and good practice. 
Expenditure in the period 2000-2006 was in the main concentrated on four 
activities: transport (a significant part on financing links between different modes of 
transport), support of networks, tourism and aid to SMEs (Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7 
Domain '000 EUR %
transport infrastructure 788.074 15,4%
technical assistance (without innovative actions) 610.981 12,0%
tourism 528.111 10,3%
telecommunications and IS 518.473 10,2%
assisting SMEs adn the craft sector 500.705 9,8%
promoting the adaptation and the development of rural areas 464.183 9,1%
planning and rehabilitation 448.980 8,8%
RTDI 292.499 5,7%
environmental infrastructures 250.809 4,9%
other 701.727 13,7%
TOTAL 5.104.542 100,0%
INTERREG III (2000-2006) - Distribution of expenditure by domain
 
INTERREG helps to strengthen cross-border links … 
Although the relatively late adoption of many INTERREG programmes meant that it 
was difficult to gain an overall picture of its effect at the time of the mid-term 
evaluations, a review of these74 found early indications of the effectiveness of 
programmes. 
Systemic links have been constructed, for example, between public authorities and 
other institutions as part of the Austria-Slovenia programme, resulting in a 
significant increase in the number of contacts at national, regional and local level 
between the two countries. 
                                                 
74  "A Study of the Mid Term Evaluations of INTERREG programmes for the Programming Period 2000-
2006" EPRC published by the Interact secretariat (2005) 
  
 
113 
New institutions have been established in a number of border regions (such as 
Euroregio in Steiermark and the Working Group in Kärnten), while existing 
agencies have been strengthened and their funding increased (Regional development 
agencies in Slovenia and Regional Management Offices in Austria) and new cross-
border networks have been created (Association Steiermark–N-E Slovenia). In 
addition, new cross-border partnerships have been formed (such as Euregio Maas 
Rhein IIIA) and the decentralised programming approach has brought a wider range 
of participants into the process, helping to ensure that projects are genuinely bottom 
up (such as Danish-German IIIA). 
… Learning and exchange of experience 
The mid-term evaluations also pointed to a sustained exchange of experience, 
knowledge and know-how across borders and countries, broadening the perspectives 
of the participants concerned. They noted, in addition, the development of 
cooperative project management skills among public sector officials. 
An increase in mutual understanding and knowledge, for example, was referred to in 
Alpine Space IIIB, Germany-Luxembourg-Germanophone Belgium IIIA, France-
Wallonie-Flandre IIIA., while exchange of good practice in administrative and 
financial management in Alpine Space IIIB. 
BOX - REGINS - Regions join together to improve regional cluster management 
Cluster management makes a real difference in helping small businesses survive and preserve jobs 
and growth. It means dynamic SMEs can work with research and marketing support in a way that 
allows them to compete with bigger enterprises with more established supplies of capital and 
services. This is why four regions in Austria, Germany, Hungary and Italy decided to join forces to 
share knowledge on cluster management in automobile and biotechnology sectors. 
The aim of the REGINS project was to stimulate the exchange of know-how on cluster management, 
and regional innovation and SME support policies, so supporting innovation through cooperation. 
REGINS researched and evaluated what makes a cluster work well. An interregional assessment of 
the regional cluster management initiatives was carried out, resulting in a Good Practice 
Recommendations guide. Training and mentoring schemes were set up to convert successful cluster 
management into practical results. The project also supported joint research and economic 
development activities in smaller sub-projects in the two sectors concerned. 
The mid-term evaluations also found most of the programmes would not have 
happened without INTERREG funding or would have been smaller in scale or less 
timely.  
For example, in the Sweden-Norway IIIA programme, it is estimated that 71% of 
projects would not have happened without INTERREG, while in the Nord IIIA 
programme between Norway, Finland, Sweden and Russia, 60-80% of those 
responsible for projects considered this was also true in their case. Equally, in the 
Flanders/Netherlands IIIA area, projects would generally have been smaller without 
the programme. 
… But also a unique management challenge 
INTERREG programmes, however, are challenging because of their international 
nature, including those relating to their geographical spread, the diverse political, 
legal and administrative contexts they need to accommodate and their need to 
remain accessible to partners. In particular, the number (7 on average in IIIB 
programmes) and composition of participating countries has important implications 
for programme performance. For example, in the case of the outermost regions, their 
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particular geographic situation, including the characteristics of the neighbouring 
countries, has imposed particular constraints in the management of the trans-
national INTERREG programmes. Yet, according to the mid-term evaluations, 
programmes had overcome the large majority of these difficulties. 
URBAN: an important experiment in local partnership 
The URBAN Community Initiative was set up to assist urban neighbourhoods in 
crisis. The second round, URBAN II, covered 70 cities and 2.2 million inhabitants. 
Those included face a number of severe social and economic challenges, such as 
high unemployment, crime rates around twice the EU average and limited amounts 
of green space. Support was concentrated in particular on planning and regeneration, 
which accounted for around a third of spending over the period 2000-2006, while a 
further 10% went to measures to combat social inclusion (Table 2.8). 
Table 2.8 
Domain '000 EUR %
Productive environment 267.291 15,2%
assisting large business organisations 1.549 0,1%
assisting SMEs adn the craft sector 226.186 12,9%
tourism 34.083 1,9%
RTDI 5.473 0,3%
Human resources 337.870 19,2%
labour market policy 37.808 2,2%
social inclusion 178.494 10,2%
developping educational and vocational training 70.093 4,0%
workforce flexibility, entrepreneurial activity 26.517 1,5%
positive labour market actions for woman 24.957 1,4%
Basic Infrastructure 897.017 51,1%
transport 120.212 6,8%
telecommunications and IS 57.759 3,3%
energy 3.528 0,2%
environmental 28.059 1,6%
planning and rehabilitation 579.215 33,0%
social and public health 114.245 6,5%
Miscellaneous 130.750 7,4%
technical assistance 123.791 7,0%
TOTAL 1.756.719 100,0%
URBAN II (2000-2006) - Distribution of expenditure by domain
 
Targeting action on small areas of severe deprivation enabled an integrated approach 
to the various problems to be followed. Programmes were highly concentrated in 
financial as well as territorial terms, support per inhabitant being 30% higher than 
on average in Objective 2 regions on average (at around EUR 3350). 
URBAN programmes put a strong emphasis on local partnership. In around a third 
of cases local authorities formally managed the project in a further third, they did so 
de facto. In over 80% of cases, local community groups participated in the 
formulation of actions under the programme. Building local partnerships creates 
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ownership and develops management capacity at local level. But it also takes time 
and effort75. 
In line with the emphasis on partnership, many of the mid-term evaluation updates 
reported on the strong performance of programmes as regards ‘softer’ outcomes, 
especially the building of local partnerships or engaging the local community. The 
strong local partnership and presence of several agencies in the decision-making 
process was considered, for example, to have ensured the smooth operation and 
sustainability of URBAN projects in Spain and to have demonstrated that a local 
authority led project is a successful model for locally based regeneration. 
The evaluation updates for the UK provide further illustration of the potential of the 
local partnership model, with performance on soft outcomes and the engagement of 
the local community both being above expectations. Job and enterprise measures, 
however, while generally on target by end-June 2005 had started slowly initially. 
Following the results over the period 2000-2006, most of the National Strategic 
Reference Frameworks (NSRFs) for the period 2007-2013 contain references to 
sustainable urban development measures in line with the URBAN model. In most 
cases, these are to be carried out through specific priorities within particular 
operational programmes. In some cases, however (such as Denmark and Germany), 
urban development is to be a ‘cross-cutting’ objective, with the effect on cities 
included as a necessary consideration within each priority. In many cases, the sums 
involved are a considerable proportion of the total – Ile de France is allocating half 
its budget (EUR 63 million of EUR 127 million) to urban neighbourhoods in crisis. 
In line with the URBAN emphasis on partnership, most of the NSRFs envisage 
close co-operation between relevant parties in the urban areas concerned, including 
local authorities, though only a minority specify delegating the management of 
projects to local authorities. An exception is the Netherlands where the "Regio 
West" operational programme delegates management responsibility to the four big 
cities (Utrecht, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag). 
EQUAL: working against discrimination and inequality in Europe 
EQUAL is a Community Initiative which serves as a test-bed for exploring inclusive 
ways of delivering labour market policies and developing good practice (Fig. 2.7). It 
makes an important contribution to ongoing labour market reform, supporting both 
the translation of the European Employment Strategy into National Reform Plans 
and the implementation of equality legislation in Member States.  Jointly financed 
by the European Social Fund and national governments, EQUAL is structured 
around four key principles:  
• partnership: tackling complex problems by involving all relevant stakeholders  
• trans-national co-operation: learning from experiences in other Member States 
• innovation: developing and testing new approaches  
                                                 
75 "Ex-post evaluation of the urban community initiative"(GHK consulting, 2003) 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/urban/urban_expost_evaluation_9499_en.pdf 
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• mainstreaming: sharing good practice and influencing policies and practices. 
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The EU contribution to EQUAL is around EUR 3.27 billion and is supplemented by 
national co-funding of over EUR 2.2 billion. There are 27 EQUAL programmes in 
all in each of the EU-25 Member States (there are two each in Belgium and the UK) 
and round 3,000 projects. One of the clearest aspects of added value of EQUAL lies 
in the promotion of new means of cooperation - the programme requires participants 
to operate in partnership with others – which has led to integrated and coordinated 
approaches as well as cooperation across countries. . Exchange of information, 
experience and staff has contributed to the adoption of innovative approaches and to 
improvements in the quality of projects, while the local organisation of trans-
national events has helped increased the credibility of projects at local level. 
EQUAL has been effective in a number of cases in improving existing practices and 
extending them to new groups. In a few Member States, it has been used to explore 
possible action in areas where policy was not developed or practical experience was 
limited, such as in combating racism and xenophobia, supporting the social 
economy, helping to improve the work-life balance and the integration of asylum 
seekers.  
Networks have been set up in all Member States and have been the main means of 
organising exchanges between projects. These have generally worked well and have 
sometimes been transformed into "communities of practices". 
For the period 2007-2013 the main objectives of EQUAL are in line with the 
horizontal objectives set out in the new ESF regulation. In particular, with a view to 
stimulate trans-national co-operation, notably through information and good practice 
exchange, an increase by 10% of the co-financing rate can be decided by Member 
States. 
Innovative actions:  a laboratory for innovation 
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The Regional Programmes for Innovative Actions implemented in the EU15 during 
the 2000-2006 programming period are the successors of many pilot actions 
supported by the ERDF in earlier programming periods.  The programmes continued 
to support regions to build up innovation strategies and implement action plans in 
relation to technological innovation and the Information Society, so stimulating the 
development of strategic and planning competencies at regional level.  
These 2-3 year programmes were aimed at improving the quality of assistance under 
the Structural Funds. Being experimental, the finance allocated was s limited, the 
maximum amount for E each programme being EUR 3 million. Their purpose is to 
fund pilot actions developed as part of an innovation strategy in order to find new 
solutions for regional development needs that could be generally applied in the 
mainstream programmes, if successful. 
The regions were asked to concentrate on three main priorities: technological 
innovation, information society and sustainable development, reflecting the major 
Lisbon priorities. The bulk of the funding went to programmes relating to 
technological innovation and information society (51% and 34% respectively), in 
the former, the focus being on technology transfer, innovation in SMEs and 
clustering, in the latter, on developing services and applications for people as well as 
SMEs in the form of new business process (e-Commerce, networking).  
A total of 183 programmes from 151 EU-15 regions of the EU-15 were approved, 
28 regions having applied for two successive ones. The results indicate that 2 or 3 
years is often no long enough for regions to develop and implement a strategy. In 
consequence, only a few regions shifted the activities developed in their Innovative 
Actions Programme into mainstream operational programmes during the 2000-2006 
period.  With the active support of the Commission, however, many are drawing on 
their experience to develop new approaches and actions, including experimental 
ones, in their operational programmes for the period 2007-2013. 
5.5. Complementarity between Cohesion Policy and EIB assistance 
The mission of the European Investment Bank, the EU institution for providing 
long-term finance, is to help fund capital investment in support of common policies. 
To this end, it raises substantial funds on the capital markets, which are then 
directed on favourable terms to projects and programmes which are in line with EU 
objectives.  
The EIB selects investment projects to fund on three criteria: 
– consistency with EU priorities; 
– quality and soundness of projects, which involves  assessing their technical and 
environmental viability as well as their social and economic benefits; 
– financial benefits which are specific to the EIB loan in question as compared with 
alternative sources of borrowing. 
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Source: European Investment bank
 
In line with its Statutes and obligations under the EC Treaty (art 267), the EIB has 
always given priority to lending for "projects for developing less-developed 
regions". Regional development is a key objective that has been re-enforced since 
enlargement, "economic and social cohesion in the enlarged EU" being a core aspect 
of EIB business. However, the EIB remit is wider than this and, in addition to giving 
support to trans-European Networks and environmental protection, it also includes 
pursuit of the Lisbon targets, particularly in respect of education and training, R&D 
and innovation, including support for innovative SMEs. In this regard, the EIB has 
developed, with the Commission, new financial risk taking initiatives. 
During the 2000-2006 programming period, an average of 71% of total EU lending 
went to regional development, a sum amounting to nearly EUR 184 billion, 74% of 
this taking the form of direct loans. Of these, half went to Objective 1 regions (Table 
2.9). 
Table 2.9 
Objective 1 Objective 2
(incl. phasing-out) (incl. phasing-out)
2000 8 525 5 247 1 585 15 357
2001 10 127 4 116 2 270 16 513
2002 8 963 4 485 1 685 15 133
2003 10 346 7 128 2 185 19 660
2004 10 114 7 742 3 692 21 548
2005 12 435 11 634 4 020 28 088
2006 11 515 6 272 2 434 20 220
Tot 2000-2006 72025 46624 17871 136 520
Mutli-regional 
(other)
Total
Detail of Direct Loans in EU25
 
EIB loans are an important complement to the Structural Funds not only in their 
own right but because they provide a bridge between assistance from the Funds and 
loans from commercial banks, as well as giving access to financial expertise. Such 
loans, moreover, can be used for national co-financing of projects supported by the 
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Funds. Because of the EIB’s reputation in financial markets, these loans can act as a 
catalyst, attracting finance from other sources.  
EIB loans have also provided support to Objective 2 regions, complementing 
assistance from the Cohesion policy by focussing on efficiency-enhancing 
and revenue-generating investment with the Funds concentrating more on basic 
infrastructure projects, especially in the less prosperous regions. The EIB, in 
addition, provides expertise to assist in the appraisal of major projects. Between 
2000 and 2006, over 200 projects were appraised by the EIB at Commission request. 
5.6. Delivery of cohesion policy, its method and governance 
A sound institutional framework and effective administration in Member States and 
regions are preconditions for the success of Cohesion policy. The financial support 
provided under the policy also has broader spill-over effects important for economic 
growth more generally... 
Management is improving … 
The updates to the mid-term evaluations concluded that the new Member States 
have successfully put in place a suitable framework for managing cohesion 
programmes. Moreover, there was already evidence of improvements in the way 
programmes were managed. In Estonia and the Czech Republic, for example, 
evaluators noted how much had been learned in terms of collecting and monitoring 
data and defining indicators, baselines and targets. 
For the EU15, the evaluators also noted improvements in the management of 
programmes in the period 2000-2006. Italy is a prominent example with better 
project appraisal, auditing and monitoring, while in Austria, there have been 
experiments with an original approach to evaluation, involving the continuous 
exchange of detailed information on inputs and outputs considered critical by 
stakeholders. This "process evaluation" enables early action to be taken as events 
unfold, as well as giving a better understanding of less tangible developments such 
as in respect of innovation.  
In addition, improvements seem in a number of cases to have had positive effects in 
other areas of government policy – for example, in Ireland, the evaluators noted an 
improvement in strategic planning, monitoring and project evaluation in relation to 
national programmes. 
On the other hand, it was noted that administrative capacity was often lacking in 
relation to transport, where projects tend to be large and long-term with a need for a 
high degree of co-ordination. Evaluations pointed in many cases to a lack of a 
shared strategy between participants and problems of project selection as well as of 
management, especially delays, which usually stem from prolonged negotiations on 
contracts, planning difficulties, the scale of projects and difficulties in securing 
adequate finance.  
Governance is also crucial for mobilising expenditure on R&D. Mid-term evaluation 
updates in both Italy and Spain noted the importance of coordinating the activities of 
the main players and ensuring their commitment. The evaluation of the Västra 
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Objective 2 programme found that while the setting of clear priorities for cohesion 
programmes improved programme implementation perceptibly, the authorities 
responsible also need to demonstrate strong and sustained support for the effects to 
be maximised. 
… And public-private partnership (PPP) are developing… 
Public-private partnerships (PPP) are seen as an important potential source of 
finance for investment in many areas. For example, European Commission 
estimates76 suggest that more than 60% of the Trans-European Networks will be 
financed by Member States directly or via other sources, including private sectors 
ones.  
An ex-post evaluation by the EIB77 of their experience with PPPs indicates that 
projects are generally completed on-time, on-budget and to specification, which is 
important since delays and budget problems are often a feature of regular publicly-
financed projects under Cohesion policy78. 
PPP projects, however, involve some difficulties. Governments need to have 
sufficient knowledge and capacity to deal with the complexity involved, while a lack 
of a legal framework or economic incentives is sometimes cited as a reason why 
PPP has until recently been limited to a few large projects. 
… But partnership, coordination and long-term commitment could improve … 
Updates to the mid-term evaluations concluded that more and better partnerships are 
needed to strengthen the participation and institutional capacity of local and regional 
authorities, the social partners and NGOs. In Hungary, for example, evaluators noted 
that stakeholders needed to be involved both in the setting and implementation of 
objectives. Clear and regular communication is essential for this. Following the 
evaluation for the Czech Republic, the authorities are working to make public-
private partnership easier. 
The need for better and longer lasting partnership is particularly important in the 
case of longer-term projects. As regards innovation, for example, a number of the 
reports indicated the need for a stronger, longer-term institutional commitment as 
well as better coordination of the various authorities involved as well as the main 
private sector organisations. Businesses should, therefore, be involved in designing 
regional development strategies. 
                                                 
76  See EC (2005) Trans-European Transport Network, TEN-T priority axes and projects 2005 
77  See EIB (2005) Evaluation of PPP projects financed by the EIB. 
78  See for example ECORYS (2005) Ex-post evaluation Cohesion Fund 
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… more investment in human resources is necessary … 
More investment is needed in human capital, particularly in the new Member States. 
The evaluators noted that Cyprus and Malta, because of their small size, face a 
particular challenge in this regard, though the issue is a more general one. Training 
is needed to reduce staff turnover and achieve the standards required to manage 
substantially increased amounts of funding in the 2007-2013 period. This applies to 
all aspects of programme management as well as to those preparing projects for 
funding and those involved in, monitoring programmes. 
Expertise is particularly needed in the management and administration of transport 
projects. The mid-term evaluations emphasised the importance of such aspects as: 
establishing a long-term coherent plan, coordinating the activities of the various 
levels of government and relevant public agencies and the creation of agencies with 
sufficient expertise, staffing and other resources and continuity. 
… and procedures can be streamlined and simplified 
The strategic evaluation of innovation noted the need to reduce red-tape and 
formalities and to introduce more flexible and risk-tolerant practices. The updates to 
the mid-term evaluations noted that simplification is needed in respect of public 
procurement, the development of public-private partnerships, clarification of the 
roles of the different bodies implementing cohesion programmes, monitoring and 
evaluation, and data collection and transmission. In Poland, for example, action has 
already been taken on evaluation recommendations to make application and 
procurement procedures simpler and more transparent. 
... But partnership, coordination and along-term commitment should improve 
In general the evaluators concluded that development at the local level is a key focus 
of the ESF. There is a high degree of collaboration and partnership working at the 
local level. Local authorities, the voluntary sector and more generally the not-for-
profit sector are often major partners in the delivery of ESF services.  Indeed the 
support for partnerships and mobilisation of public, private and local actors is 
regularly mentioned as a source of added value. 
6. THE REFORM AND NEW CHALLENGES FOR 2007-13 
The agreement on the financial perspectives in May 2006 and the entry into force of 
the new regulatory framework in August prepared the way for the next generation of 
programmes to be supported under Cohesion policy over the period 2007-2013  
The first formal step was taken with the adoption by the Council in October 2006 of 
the "Community Strategic Guidelines on cohesion" (CSGs) which confirm the role 
the new programmes will play in delivering investment for growth and jobs. The 
second step consisted of the submission, based on the CSGs, of national strategies 
("National Strategic Reference Frameworks" or NSRFs) by the Member States in 
which certain elements were subject to Commission decision. In a third step, the 
Member States submitted the individual programmes for Commission decision, 
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detailing how national strategies would be implemented through regional or sectoral 
programmes or a combination of both.   
In anticipation of the final decisions on the regulations, the authorities in the 
Member States and the Commission worked together throughout 2006 on draft 
national strategies and, in some cases also on draft operational programmes. This 
was necessary to save time so as to ensure that most of the 444 new programmes 
could be decided by mid-2007.  
Whereas the delivery system for cohesion policy has demonstrated its capacity to 
implement quality programmes and projects of European interest on the ground, a 
number of problems have been detected in the management of the programmes in 
the period 2000-2006. 
The reform adopted by the Council while maintaining the key principles of cohesion 
policy – programming, partnership, co-financing and evaluation – introduces a 
number of reforms to enhance the efficiency of the policy. These are designed, first, 
to encourage a more strategic approach to programming, secondly, to introduce 
further decentralisation of responsibilities to partnerships on the ground in the 
Member States, regions and local areas, thirdly, to reinforce the performance and 
quality of programmes co-financed through a reinforced, more transparent 
partnership and clear and more rigorous monitoring mechanisms, and fourthly, to 
simplify the management system by introducing more transparency, differentiation 
and proportionality while ensuring sound financial management. 
This section outlines the main elements of the reform, set in the above context. 
6.1. The strategic approach – linking cohesion policy to the Lisbon process 
The conclusions of the European Spring Council in 2005 stated that: 
" it is essential to relaunch the Lisbon Strategy without delay and re-focus priorities 
on growth and employment. Europe must renew the basis of its competitiveness, 
increase its growth potential and its productivity and strengthen social cohesion, 
placing the main emphasis on knowledge, innovation and the optimisation of human 
capital.  
To achieve these objectives, the Union must mobilise to a greater degree all 
appropriate national and Community resources – including the cohesion policy – in 
the Strategy's three dimensions (economic, social and environmental) so as better to 
tap into their synergies in a general context of sustainable development. Alongside 
the governments, all the other players concerned – parliaments, regional and local 
bodies, social partners and civil society – should be stakeholders in the Strategy and 
take an active part in attaining its objectives." 
In addition a simplified governance arrangement was introduced, aiming to facilitate 
the identification of priorities while maintaining the overall balance of the strategy 
and the synergy between its various components; to improve the implementation of 
those priorities on the ground by increasing the Member States' involvement; and to 
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streamline the monitoring procedure so as to give a clearer picture of national 
implementation of the strategy. 
Cohesion policy makes an important contribution to realising the aims of the Lisbon 
strategy. In effect, growth and cohesion are mutually supportive. By reducing 
economic and social disparities, the Union helps to ensure that all regions and social 
groups can contribute to, and benefit from, the overall economic development of the 
EU. Articles 3 and 158 of the Treaty reflect this vision. 
For this reason, Cohesion policy in all its dimensions must be seen as an integral 
part of the Lisbon strategy. In other words, Cohesion policy needs to incorporate the 
Lisbon and Gothenburg objectives and to become a key vehicle for their realisation 
via the national and regional development programmes. Strengthening the linkage 
between Cohesion policy and the Lisbon strategy has been the heart of the Cohesion 
policy reform agreed upon in 2006. 
A strategic approach has been agreed upon to bring greater efficiency, transparency 
and political accountability. In order to achieve this, Cohesion policy should 
concentrate better on the use of the Funds towards making progress on the global 
priorities of the European Union. 
The investment funded by Cohesion policy will further the Lisbon strategy for 
growth and employment, in line with the conclusions of the Spring Council in 2005. 
The negotiations leading up to agreement on the programmes confirmed the 
commitment of Member States and regional authorities to the renewed Lisbon 
agenda, which seems to have fundamentally affected priorities and mindsets. The 
NSRFs and the programmes so far agreed demonstrate this in a number of ways. 
First, in relation to administrative organisation, it is evident that there has been a 
high degree of cooperation between those responsible for coordinating the 
implementation of the National Reform Programmes (NRP) and those responsible 
for the preparation of the NSRFs. Nearly all the NSRFs indicate how this 
cooperation is organised, which is both new and important, since only in a few 
countries, such as in the Netherlands, are the same Ministries responsible for both. 
In some countries, the authorities seem to have decided that effective coordination 
required administrative change: in Hungary, for example, where the new National 
Development Agency oversees both the NSRF and the NRP processes, or in Poland, 
where part of the remit of the newly created NSRF coordinating committee is to 
establish links with the NRP. 
Secondly, in relation to transparency, the NSRFs clarify which parts of the NRPs the 
new programmes will be aimed at achieving. In the case of Estonia, for example, 
financial tables have been provided to show the contribution the programmes will 
make to the Estonian NRP financing plan. Similarly, in the case of the Czech 
Republic, the 24 priorities of the NRP (out of a total of 46) that will be implemented 
via the new programmes are listed. As well as improving transparency, such details 
help to see the contribution of the programmes to the Lisbon strategy.   
Thirdly, as regards substance, Member States increased the emphasis on innovation, 
RTD and the knowledge economy. Innovation is a prominent feature of the 
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programmes which will be undertaken in the present period, often combined with 
efforts to encourage entrepreneurship and business growth.   
6.2. Concentration and simplification 
While a large parts of the funds made available under Cohesion policy are typically 
spent by public authorities on infrastructure projects, an important and growing 
share goes to business development and in this regard the rules imposed at 
Community level tend to have a knock-on effect on government relations with 
companies where support of enterprises is involved.  
Important steps have already been taken to simplify cohesion policy by streamlining 
legislation and simplifying rules for managing the Structural Funds and the 
Cohesion Fund. In particular, by implementing: 
• one set of management rules: there is now a single Commission implementing 
regulation for the 2007-13 programming period, which replaces 10 existing 
regulations for the 2000-06 programming period. The rules for management of 
programmes financed by the Cohesion Fund have been aligned with those of the 
Structural Funds. The effect should be to make management of the Funds easier 
and less costly for Member States. 
• One set of eligibility rules for expenditure: Member States will be able to use 
national eligibility rules for co-financed projects rather than having two sets of 
rules (one for Community co-financed projects and one for nationally-funded 
projects) as in the past, so simplifying project management for Member States.  
• electronic government in practice: for the first time, document exchange between 
the Member States and the Commission will take place only electronically in the 
2007-2013 programming period, marking the beginning of a new era in e-
Governance. The system concerned, SFC2007 will be used for both the  
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, as well as the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development and the European Fisheries Fund. With this system 
in place, 40% of the EU budget will be electronically managed, saving time in 
running programmes, as well as paper, and reducing instances of disagreement 
between the Commission and Member States on the amount and type of 
information to be provided. 
• simplification of financial management: the financial plans, the setting of the 
intervention rate and EU reimbursements will now be made at a higher level – at   
programme or priority axis level, instead of at measure level as before, so  This 
will simplify management of the programmes by Member States and the 
Commission and limiting the cases where financial plans need to be modified, so 
giving a wider autonomy to the national authorities in charge of the management 
of operational programmes. 
• simplification of management and control systems: the new systems have been 
built on the existing systems so as to avoid the need for Member States to change 
substantially what is already in place. Clarifications and improvements have been 
introduced, however, where experience has shown that there is a need, for 
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example, as regards the work to be carried out for first level management 
verifications and for the method of sampling of operations to be audited.  
• increased proportionality and simplification for control systems: for smaller 
programmes (total eligible public expenditure under EUR 750 million and 
Community co-financing under 40% of total public expenditure), certain 
requirements on control arrangements can be carried out by national bodies 
established according to national rules, so reducing the need to adapt national 
arrangements to comply with particular Community requirements.  
• simplifying the procedure for closing programmes: the new possibility of “partial 
closure”, whereby closure can take place in respect of completed operations in 
certain cases, will alleviate the burden of the process on Member States (and the 
Commission) at the end of the programming period. Earlier closure in respect of 
these operations will also reduce the costs of retaining documents for audit 
purposes, as the time period for conservation of documents will start at the time 
of the partial closure for the operations concerned, rather than the (probably much 
later) date when closure of the whole programme takes place. 
• Clearer rules on information and communication: people generally and potential 
recipients of the Funds in particular will in all Member States automatically have 
the same access to information on funding opportunities and awards from the 
Community budget for Cohesion Policy, so reducing the time and effort they 
have to spend in finding such information. 
6.3. Earmarking  
The integrated guidelines for jobs and growth79 argue that certain categories of 
investment are particularly conducive to growth “such as research and development 
(R&D), physical infrastructure, environmentally friendly technologies, human 
capital and knowledge”. This general recommendation is valid for the Union as a 
whole and, arguably, more so for those countries and regions for which rapid 
convergence towards the Community average and increased competitiveness are 
vital. 
The decision of the European Council to endorse the Commission’s proposal to 
“earmark” resources under Cohesion policy to support certain Lisbon-related 
priorities calls on Member States to ensure efficient allocation of cohesion resources 
to make a full contribution towards growth and employment. In particular, it invites 
Member States and regions which are in the process of preparing cohesion 
programmes for the period 2007-2013 to pay particular attention to those priorities 
and make an additional effort toward them.  
The list of domains falling under earmarking does not pretend to replace either the 
broader set of priorities identified and regularly updated under the Lisbon agenda, or 
to prevent Member States from using Cohesion funding in support of other national 
priorities. Rather, it draws the attention of Member States and regions to a subset of 
                                                 
79  Reference 
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areas where a particular effort is necessary and which are particularly relevant in the 
context of Cohesion policy. These can be re-grouped under five, broad headings: 
– promotion pf research and development, innovation, and an inclusive information 
society 
– a strengthening of  industrial competitiveness and the promotion entrepreneurship 
– encouragement of the sustainable use of resources and the strengthening of 
synergies between environmental protection and growth 
– expansion, improvement and linking up transport infrastructure of European 
importance 
– investment in people 
Notwithstanding the decision of the European Council to exempt "the Member 
States that acceded to the Union in or after 2004" from needing to apply the 
earmarking, most of the Member States have de facto engaged in the exercise as 
analysis of the National Strategic Reference Frameworks and Operational 
programmes demonstrates. 
On the basis of the intentions of Member States and regions as reflected in the 
programming documents available at the time this report is being prepared 
(corresponding to around 90% of the amounts agreed under the financial 
perspectives), the earmarking targets of 60% for the Convergence objective and of 
75% for the Regional competitiveness and employment objective have been 
reached. 
For the EU as a whole, 61.2% of the Funds under the Convergence objective and 
76.7% under the Regional competitiveness and employment objective will be 
allocated to earmarked investments80 (Fig. 2.9 and Fig. 2.10). These percentages 
mean support of these investments amounting to around EUR 200 billion, an 
increase of over EUR 55 billion compared with the programming period 2000-2006. 
In the EU15 – for which the earmarking of cohesion spending is obligatory – the 
corresponding figures are 72.1% and 83.0%. 
                                                 
80  This figure includes the categories of investment which certain Member States have added to the 
earmarking to "ensure that specific national circumstances, including the priorities identified in the 
national reform programme […] are taken into account" (Article 9.3 of Council regulation 1083/2006). 
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2.9 Earmarking: expenditure on Convergence objective, 2007-2013
Source: European Commission, data available at the end of April 2007
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The position of each Member State and its contribution to the overall targets vary 
greatly, reflecting – among other things – diverse investment needs and the different 
situation in the period 2000-2006. The figures per Member State need to be 
interpreted with some caution, however, since in certain cases relatively few 
programmes have been so far officially submitted. 
In terms of the policy mix, it is worth noting that earmarking has helped focus the 
attention of Member States on R&D and innovation, one of the key dimensions of 
the Lisbon strategy. Investment in this area shows in general the biggest increase in 
relation to 2000-2006, its share of the total more than doubling under the 
Convergence objective and more than tripling under the Regional competitive and 
employment objective. This represents overall investment in R&D and innovation 
over the period 2007-2013 of around EUR 50 billion. 
6.4. New instruments in the toolkit of cohesion policy 
JASPERS 
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The Commission has been keen to harness all sources of expertise at the European 
level to ensure that the new generation of programmes are as successful as possible. 
With this in mind, the Commission has entered into partnership with the EIB and the 
EBRD to create a special technical assistance facility, known as JASPERS, to help 
Member States to prepare major projects which will be assisted by EU funds. 
To be successful, JASPERS has to be accessible and to have the majority of its 
experts based close to the beneficiaries. Regional offices in Warsaw, Vienna and 
Bucharest became operational in late 2006 and early 2007 and are close to being 
fully staffed.  
The JASPERS team works on the basis of action plans agreed with each Member 
State. The 2007 action plans will add 94 projects to the JASPERS portfolio of 
projects. JASPERS expects to complete about 45-50 projects by end-2007 from its 
portfolio of 2006 and 2007 projects.  In view of their size, Romania and Poland are 
the by far the main areas of activity for JASPERS.  
JEREMIE  
JEREMIE is a new partnership between the Commission and the EIB Group, 
specifically the EIF, designed to move away from the traditional form of support 
through grants alone, towards repayable and recyclable forms of assistance to 
businesses, such as venture capital, loans, guarantees, equity, seed capital, etc. 
JEREMIE allows the authorities managing the European programmes in the 
Member States and regions to use the EIF or another financial institution, as a 
holding fund. The holding fund in turn will draw in experienced financial 
intermediaries to on-lend to businesses with EU-funded programmes providing 
capital. After that, the complex task of organising business assistance through 
venture capital, loans, guarantees, equity, seed capital, etc would be handled by the 
manager of the holding fund on behalf of the managing authority. It creates a win-
win solution for the authorities by helping to modernise their business finance 
systems especially at regional level without having to learn complex skills in this 
field.  
There is considerable interest in participating in the scheme. The EIF has signed so 
far Memoranda of Understanding with three Member States (Slovakia, Greece and 
Romania) and four regions (Guadaloupe, Auvergne, Galicia, Lombardy) which plan 
to use the EIF as the JEREMIE holding fund. 
JESSICA  
JESSICA is a joint initiative to support sustainable and recyclable urban investment 
and development in urban areas by the Structural Funds. The Commission presented 
the new JESSICA initiative to the Council, for the first time in February 2006, in 
cooperation with the EIB 
Under JESSICA, Managing Authorities in the Member States will be allowed to use 
some of their Structural Fund allocations to invest in Urban Development Funds and 
recycle their resources, to enhance and accelerate investment in urban areas. Other 
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International Financial Institutions, as well as the European banking and private 
sector, are expected to follow suit.  
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Commission, the EIB 
and the Bank of the Council of Europe in May 2006, on a coordinated approach to 
the financing of urban renewal and development for the programming period 2007-
2013. The Commission and the EIB, with a contribution from the CEB, will co-
finance in 2007 JESSICA evaluations, to be offered free of charge to all interested 
Member States or regions to help them better organise urban investments by the 
Structural Funds and the private and banking sectors, under the JESSICA initiative. 
These three new initiatives are part of the Commission's continuing effort to make 
cohesion policy more effective, in particular by greatly increasing cooperation with 
European financial institutions, especially the European Investment Bank, and 
making financial engineering an integral part of the delivery of cohesion policy.  
There are major advantages in increasing the use of financial engineering 
instruments: 
– involvement of new sources of expertise and technical, financial and managerial 
capacity; 
– transformation of grants from the European budget into recyclable forms of 
finance making them more sustainable over the longer term; 
– leverage effect brought about by using grants to attract and combine with private 
capital;  
– creation of stronger incentives towards better performance on the part of the 
beneficiaries who must repay at least some of the assistance received; 
– development and modernisation of the financial sector in the regions. 
  
Table 2.10 
EUR Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 3
Community 
initiatives
Total
Agriculture 97.331.457 0,1% 18.665.125 0,1% 21.484.124 0,1% 15.665.613 0,3% 153.146.318 0,1%
Rural development 569.277.824 0,6% 401.101.948 2,4% 258.648 0,0% 254.398.063 4,7% 1.225.036.483 0,9%
Large business 2.868.621.866 3,2% 392.773.474 2,4% 1.846.967 0,0% 16.016.258 0,3% 3.279.258.566 2,5%
SMEs 10.328.960.877 11,4% 5.247.176.254 31,8% 24.365.683 0,1% 371.247.508 6,9% 15.971.750.322 12,3%
Tourism 2.852.006.014 3,1% 1.568.784.089 9,5% 22.001.419 0,1% 277.076.037 5,2% 4.719.867.559 3,6%
RTD and innovation 4.936.085.079 5,4% 1.634.437.117 9,9% 4.539.406 0,0% 154.356.632 2,9% 6.729.418.233 5,2%
Other productive environment 124.972.901 0,1% 22.483.262 0,1% 22.001.419 0,1% 37.525.259 0,7% 206.982.841 0,2%
Productive Environment 21.777.256.017 24,0% 9.285.421.269 56,2% 96.497.666 0,6% 1.126.285.370 20,9% 32.285.460.323 24,9%
Labour market policy 7.618.514.859 8,4% 283.073.869 1,7% 5.317.204.005 31,2% 374.259.073 7,0% 13.593.051.806 10,5%
Social inclusion 3.335.888.268 3,7% 325.824.692 2,0% 3.383.722.005 19,9% 468.789.889 8,7% 7.514.224.853 5,8%
Educational and vocational training 7.471.691.463 8,2% 384.662.746 2,3% 3.693.957.422 21,7% 251.660.435 4,7% 11.801.972.066 9,1%
Enterpreneurship 4.318.259.781 4,8% 539.035.698 3,3% 3.100.201.512 18,2% 525.198.463 9,8% 8.482.695.453 6,5%
Labour market actions for woman 1.292.393.177 1,4% 91.190.418 0,6% 1.099.051.190 6,4% 228.856.598 4,3% 2.711.491.383 2,1%
Other Human Resources 55.411.935 0,1% 89.926.225 0,5% 15.057.442 0,1% 128.033.435 2,4% 288.429.037 0,2%
Investment in people 24.092.159.483 26,5% 1.713.713.647 10,4% 16.609.193.575 97,4% 1.976.797.893 36,8% 44.391.864.599 34,2%
Transport 23.447.517.426 25,8% 976.802.955 5,9% 490.021.564 9,1% 24.914.341.944 19,2%
Telecommunications infrastructure 3.152.548.807 3,5% 493.434.191 3,0% 65.228.315 0,4% 326.612.311 6,1% 4.037.823.623 3,1%
Energy 776.181.915 0,9% 139.677.538 0,8% 44.364.417 0,8% 960.223.870 0,7%
Environment 6.018.749.058 6,6% 703.614.815 4,3% 142.541.224 2,7% 6.864.905.097 5,3%
Planning and rehabilitation 5.179.467.278 5,7% 2.144.922.620 13,0% 409.940.568 7,6% 7.734.330.466 6,0%
Social infrastructure and public health 4.637.322.893 5,1% 205.796.780 1,2% 3.309.597 0,0% 91.359.042 1,7% 4.937.788.314 3,8%
Other Infrastructure 93.463 0,0% 147.672.160 0,9% 478.652 0,0% 148.244.275 0,1%
Basic Infrastructure 43.211.880.840 47,6% 4.811.921.059 29,1% 68.537.912 0,4% 1.505.317.779 28,0% 49.597.657.590 38,2%
Miscelllaneous 1.733.516.025 1,9% 715.303.829 4,3% 269.835.789 1,6% 767.951.120 14,3% 3.486.606.763 2,7%
TOTAL 90.814.812.366 100% 16.526.359.804 100% 17.044.064.942 100% 5.376.352.162 100% 129.761.589.274 100%
Source: Certified expenditure for the period 2000-2006, ERDF and ESF only (cut off date: April 2007)
EU25 - Distribution of cohesion policy resources between domains of interventions (2000-2006)
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public investment, which adds to the communal capital stock, is a key element of policy 
across the EU in both contributing directly to economic growth and strengthening the 
productive potential of the economy so enabling higher rates of growth to be sustained in 
the future. As such, it is both a central focus of cohesion policy, which seeks to help put 
in place the infrastructure and other conditions needed to underpin regional development 
over the long-term, and of the Lisbon strategy, which aims at creating a more dynamic 
European economy. 
It should be emphasised that public investment in its most meaningful sense covers 
investment in human as well as physical capital and that improving the skills of the work 
force through expenditure on education and training is as important as enhancing 
infrastructure in creating the conditions for regional development81. 
The focus here, however, is confined to public investment in a relatively narrow sense to 
cover public expenditure on gross fixed capital formation. The concern is to examine the 
way that this has developed in different part of the EU over recent years and the part 
which the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund have played in this. It, therefore, 
leaves out of account other forms of investment, particularly on human resources, which 
has equally been supported to a significant extent by the Structural Funds. This is not 
because this other investment is any less important than expenditure on physical capital – 
indeed, it is an essential element in creating the conditions for sustained economic growth 
– but simply because the relevant data are much less readily available on a comparable 
basis across the EU. 
2. INVESTMENT IN THE GROWTH AND JOBS STRATEGY: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL 
POLICIES 
A new partnership 
After several years of slow progress towards the objectives set by the Lisbon summit in 
2000, the European Council in Spring 2005 agreed on a fundamental re-launch of the 
strategy for the pursuit of growth and jobs. The renewed Lisbon agenda identified three 
vital strands in the re-launch: strengthening knowledge and innovation, as the engines of 
sustainable growth, ensuring that the EU is an attractive area in which to invest and work 
and recognising that growth and employment are the best means of making for social 
cohesion. Governments have a crucial role in this as structural reforms are paramount if 
the objectives are to be achieved. 
An important element in the renewed strategy concerns the way that it is governed. The 
respective responsibilities at national and Community level are defined more clearly to 
match actions better with competencies. Mobilisation of stakeholders and consulting and 
establishing partnership with them at local, regional and national level are considered 
essential to increase the sense of ‘ownership’ of the strategy on the ground and to make 
the reforms more effective. 
                                                 
81  This, of course, is not to say that the endowment of physical and human capital is the only important 
factor for regional development. Other factors include good governance, innovative capacity, social 
facilities and so on. 
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The National Reform Programmes 
To assist Member States in identifying their needs and priorities in terms of growth and 
job-generating policies, the Commission adopted the first Integrated Guidelines for 
Growth and Jobs for the period 2005-2008. These guidelines relate to macroeconomic, 
microeconomic and employment issues, and provide the basis for the National Reform 
Programmes which contain details of the reforms which Member States intend to 
implement to deliver growth and jobs.  
In their 2005 National Reform Programmes, the Member States address issues closely in 
line with the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs. The National Reform 
Programmes indicate a shift in policy towards research and innovation, resource and 
energy efficiency, freeing up of SMEs, entrepreneurship and education, investment in 
human capital and modernisation of labour markets together with securing high levels of 
social protection for the future. 
All National Reform Programmes identify key challenges in the three strands of the 
Integrated Guidelines. As regards macro-economic policy, many Member States are 
pursuing budgetary consolidation and announced reforms to pensions and health systems. 
In relation to the areas covered by the microeconomic guidelines, nearly all the Member 
States pinpointed research and innovation as well as entrepreneurship and the business 
environment as major challenges. While innovation is the key priority for most Member 
States, investment in infrastructure was also mentioned in their national programmes and 
nine considered it a priority.  
As regards employment, attracting and retaining more people in work is the priority in the 
European Employment Strategy in most cases. Member States plan to intensify efforts to 
reach out to groups and individuals at the margins of the labour market, in a balanced 
approach combining personalised labour market support, high quality social services and 
adequate levels of minimum income. Of the three European Employment Strategy 
priorities, improving the adaptability of workers and enterprises was a policy priority for 
the least number of Member States, despite the fact that increasing labour market 
adaptability was acknowledged to be a key challenge by all countries. The role of the 
Funds in responding to this apparent weakness is therefore of fundamental importance. 
The Commission’s annual Progress Reports 
The Commission assessed the National Reform Programmes in 2006 in its first Annual 
Progress Report. The main conclusions are that:  
• there are important differences in the content of programmes between Member States 
reflecting their different starting-positions;  
• the integration between the macroeconomic, microeconomic and employment 
dimensions can be strengthened and the National Reform Programmes can be vital 
means of developing a more coherent approach;  
• more efforts are needed to ensure that cohesion policy spending is targeted towards 
supporting the Lisbon strategy in general. Indeed, it should be programmed to give 
direct backing to the national reform programmes;  
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• more needs to be done to create general awareness of and commitment to the Lisbon 
agenda, since ‘public ownership’ of the Lisbon growth and jobs strategy at present 
falls short. 
The Commission's second Annual Progress Report, based on Member States 
Implementation Reports in Autumn 2006, assessed the progress made in economic 
reform. According to the report, progress has been made towards increasing R&D and 
innovation, establishing financial sustainability, enhancing the business environment and 
creating more jobs. However, achieving sound finances in the long term remains an 
important challenge, labour market reform is occurring only slowly and weak 
competition especially in services and ‘network’ industries (telecommunications, 
broadcasting and so on) is slowing progress in other areas.  
There is special focus in the Report on the extent to which Member States are meeting 
their commitments in relation to the four priority areas and on the follow-up actions 
needed at EU and national level:  
• On research and innovation, although there appears to be a stronger commitment of 
Member States to R&D, a more strategic approach is needed on innovation. 
• On the business climate, the Report notes that reasonable progress has been made in 
setting up one-stop shops for start-ups, but it calls on the European Council to agree 
that all Member States should reduce administrative burdens on enterprises by 25% by 
2012.  
• In the employment domain, it calls on Member States to promote excellence in both 
research and education, to urgently improve the adaptability of workers and 
enterprises in order to anticipate, trigger and absorb change and restructuring, to 
ensure that every school leaver can find a job or a place on a training programme, to 
increase childcare facilities and to provide incentives for people to prolong their 
working lives and to increase their participation in training.  
• On energy, it emphasises the need to reduce carbon emissions and to promote energy 
efficiency and the use of renewable energy to tackle climate change. 
The Report also concludes that, though real efforts are being made, the pace and intensity 
of reform and commitment to it differs between Member States. It, therefore, invites the 
Council to adopt country-specific recommendations in order to accelerate the pace of 
reform.  
3. PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND COHESION POLICY 
3.1. The role of public investment in economic growth 
There has been much research on the effect on economic performance of public 
investment, defined, as emphasised at the outset, to include only general government 
expenditure on fixed capital formation. It is generally agreed by economists that 
public investment, defined in these terms ― on roads, hospitals and so on― 
contributes to the growth of the economy not only directly but indirectly by boosting 
productivity in the private sector. While the positive effect impact of public 
investment on economic growth has not always been corroborated by empirical 
  136 
evidence82, a. recent survey83 concludes that there is now a wider consensus on this 
than in the past, even if the impact reported by recent studies is not as large as some 
earlier studies suggested. 
There is little question that basic infrastructure – including transport networks, in 
particular – on which most capital spending goes, is essential if businesses are to 
operate effectively in a modern economy84. 
Accordingly, public capital expenditure tends to be assigned a prominent role in 
modern theories of economic growth85 and it is a feature of most economic models 
that public investment has a lasting effect in strengthening the supply-side of the 
economy86. At the same time, because of the very long-term effects involved – 
evaluations of large-scale infrastructure projects typically adopt a 25-year time-
horizon – it is difficult to quantify at all precisely the contribution of public capital 
expenditure to economic growth. 
Studies have, however, identified factors that tend to maximize the impact of public 
investment on economic performance. First, the composition of public capital 
expenditure seems to play an important role since some components have a more 
direct effect on economic activity than others. These include the construction of road 
and rail networks, airports, urban transport systems and energy distribution 
networks. Other components of expenditure which have more social than economic 
                                                 
82  A number of empirical studies tend to confirm that public investment has a considerable positive effect 
on growth (see for example Aschauer, D.A., ‘Is public expenditure productive?’, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 23, 177-200), while others find no significant effect(or example, Garcia-Milà T, T.J. 
McGuire and R.H. Porter, ‘The effects of public capital in state-level production functions 
reconsidered,’ Review of Economic and Statistics, 78(1), 177-180.) or even i a negative one (Evans P. 
and G. Karras (1994), ‘Are government activities productive? Evidence from a panel of US states’, 
Review of Economics and Statistics 76 (1), 1-11; and Sala-i-Martin X., G. Doppelhofer and R.I. Miller 
(2004), ‘Determinants of Long-term Growth: a Bayesian averaging of classical estimates approach’, 
American Economic Review, 94(4), 813-835). Most of the studies carried out, however, relate to the 
US.  
83  Romp, W. and De Haan, J. (2005), Public capital and economic growth: a critical survey, EIB Papers, 
Vol. 10. No. 1. pp. 40-70). 
84  Investment in human capital is, of course, equally important, as emphasised above and research has 
demonstrated its significant contribution to productivity and the growth potential of economies. OECD 
research of the causes of economic growth shows that rising labour productivity accounted for at least 
half of GDP per capita growth in most OECD countries between 1994 and 2004 (OECD, Education at 
a glance, 2006). 
85  Developers of such models include Barro (1990), Government spending in a simple model of 
endogenous growth, Journal of Political Economy 98 (5), S103-117; Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), 
Public finance in models of economic growth, Review of economic Studies, 59, 645-661; Fisher, T. and 
S Turnovsky (1998), Public investment, congestion and private capital accumulation, Economic 
Journal 108, 399-413; Futagami, K., Y.Morita and A. Shibata (1993), Dynamic analysis of an 
endogenous growth model with public capital, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 607-625, among 
many others.  
86  For example by encouraging private capital accumulation in Shioji, E. (2001), Public capital and 
economic growth: a convergence approach, Journal of Economic Growth 6, 205-227; Chatterjee, S. 
and S.J. Turnovsky (2005), Financing public investment through foreign aid: consequences for 
economic growth and welfare, Review of International Economics 13(1), 20-44. The three models used 
in Chapter 2 to estimate the effects of Structural Fund intervention in lagging parts of the EU 
incorporate this feature. 
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effects, in the short-term at least though not necessarily in the longer-term, include 
the construction of hospitals, schools and public buildings.87  
Secondly, the overall effect of public investment on growth in the short-term will 
depend on how it is financed. If by higher taxes, then the positive effect on demand 
might be offset by the disincentive effects of these. If by borrowing, then this could 
at times crowd out private borrowing for investment. Cutting government current 
expenditure to finance capital spending on new infrastructure might also have 
perverse effects, if, for example, this diverts money away from repairs and 
maintenance of existing infrastructure88.  
Thirdly, the impact of public investment on productivity depends on particular 
features which affect its effectiveness in this regard, such as institutional ‘quality’89, 
the administrative capacity of the relevant authorities and the standard of 
management of existing infrastructure.90 Although these factors have been shown to 
have a crucial effect on productivity,91 they are not taken into account in most of the 
literature.  
Fourthly, the effect of public investment on productivity and growth  depends on the 
size of the existing capital stock and on the degree of complementarity with private 
investment.  
In short, public investment in terms of fixed capital formation has an essential role 
to play in economic development92, but its impact depends on a range of other 
factors in addition to the scale of expenditure, not least the investment in human 
capital.  
3.2. Public expenditure on fixed capital formation in the EU over the period 
1990-2005 
Public investment consists not only of expenditure on gross fixed capital formation93  
but also of investment grants and other capital transfers. Such items largely involve 
the acquisition or disposal of assets and, accordingly, differ from investment in the 
construction of new buildings, roads and so on in that they simply entail a change in 
ownership without increasing or reducing the capital stock. The focus here, 
                                                 
87  See Aschauer (1989) and Mastromarco, C. and Woitek, U. (2006), Public infrastructure investment and 
efficiency in Italian regions, J Prod Anal 25, 57-65. 
88  See Hulten, C.R. (1996), Infrastructure capital and economic growth: how well you use it may be more 
important than how much you have, NBER Working Paper No. 5847. 
89  See for example Acemoglu D., S. Johnson and JA Robinson (2001), The colonial origins of 
comparative development: an empirical investigation, American economic Review 91, 1369-1401; Hall 
RE and CI Jones (1999), Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than 
others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 83-116.  
90  See Hulten, C.R. (1996), Infrastructure capital and economic growth: how well you use it may be more 
important than how much you have, NBER Working Paper No. 5847.  
91  See World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development. World Bank, 1994, 
Washington D.C. 
92  Chatterjee, S. and S.J. Turnovsky (2005), Financing public investment through foreign aid: 
Consequences for economic growth and welfare, Review of International Economics 13(1), 20-44.   
93  According to the European System of Accounts 95, gross fixed capital formation includes items such 
as dwellings, other buildings and structures, machinery and equipment, and computer software. .  
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therefore, is on expenditure on fixed capital formation, which is also the focus of 
Cohesion policy support.  
This section reviews the changes in public capital expenditure, first in the EU15 
Member States over the period 1993-2005, distinguishing the four Cohesion 
countries (COH4) from the others (EU11); and secondly, in the 10 new Member 
States (NM10) which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, over the period 
2000-2005 (no comparable data are available for the new Member States before then 
or for Bulgaria and Romania).  
Public investment activity in EU15 (1993-2005) 
Public investment in EU15 both in relation to GDP and as a share of total primary 
expenditure has fallen markedly since 1993, when it amounted to around 2.9% of 
GDP, more than in the US (2.5% of GDP). Twelve years later, in 2005, public 
investment outlays had declined to 2.4% of GDP, slightly below the level in the US 
which had risen marginally over the period (Fig. 3.1). 
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While the general trend in public investment has been downwards, there are 
considerable variations between countries. In the four EU-15 Cohesion countries, 
public investment is not only significantly higher relative to GDP than in other EU-
15 Member States (around 50% higher), but has risen slightly since 1995 rather than 
fallen (Fig. 3.2). 
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The average level of investment in the 7 years 1999-2005 was, therefore, marginally 
higher in the four Cohesion countries than in the 6 years 1993-1998, while in the 
other 11 Member States it was lower, with only three countries (Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Italy very slightly) showing an increase (Fig. 3.3). 
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After declining at more or less the same rate between 1993 and 1996, public 
investment in the four Cohesion countries started recovering some years earlier than 
in the rest of the EU-15 and, apart from a small fall in 2000, continued to increase 
up to 2003, by which time it was 0.5 of a percentage point higher than 7 years 
earlier. By contrast, in the rest of the EU-15, the level was much the same in 2003 as 
in 1996. The higher level of public investment in the Cohesion countries and the 
  140 
growth over the period 1996-2003 is almost certainly due in part to the substantial 
EU support for investment under Cohesion policy. 
In the non-Cohesion countries, public investment declined by around 0.6% of GDP 
over the period 1993-1998, which coincided with the first two phases of EMU, with 
only Finland and Luxembourg showing an increase, in the former reflecting the 
substantial fall which occurred before 1993. The largest reductions were in Austria, 
Germany, the UK and France. In the four Cohesion countries, there were reductions 
in Portugal and, more especially, in Spain, while in Greece and Ireland, public 
investment increased (Fig. 3.4). 
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In the years 1999-2005 which coincide with the introduction of the Euro, public 
investment increased relative to GDP in Spain and Ireland but declined in Greece 
and Portugal. In the other 11 EU-15 Member States, 7 showed an increase in public 
investment in relation to GDP, while in the other four (Germany, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden), it fell. 
Public investment in EU 10 (2000-2005) 
In the new Member States, public investment increased markedly in the two years, 
2000 to 2002, rising from 2.8% to 3.7% of GDP, i.e. to a similar level as in the four 
EU-15 Cohesion countries. Although, investment fell in 2003, it rose significantly 
between then and 2005 (by 0.4% of GDP). Except in Estonia and Slovakia, public 
investment increased relative to GDP in all the countries over the period 2000-2005 
(Fig. 3.5). The largest increases occurred in the Czech Republic and Malta, raising 
public investment in these two countries to over 4% of GDP. Latvia apart, public 
investment was higher than the EU-15 average over this period in all of the new 
Member States. 
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Over the period 2000-2005, public investment relative to GDP was much higher on 
average in the new Member States than in the rest of the EU – as in the four 
Cohesion countries, around 50% higher. If they are to catch up in terms of 
infrastructure endowment, then investment needs to remain relatively high, though 
at the same time, it is important for it not to jeopardise fiscal stability.  
The increase in investment which has occurred in the new Member States in recent 
years has in fact taken place alongside fiscal consolidation. In all of the countries, 
apart from Hungary, where there was a small increase, the budget deficit was, 
therefore, reduced between 2003 and 2005 – in many cases significantly (Fig. 3.6). 
Indeed, in 2005, in aggregate, it was only marginally above the limit of 3% of GDP 
set under the growth and stability pact. 
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Factors underlying the trend in public investment in the EU  
There are a number of factors which might explain the decline in public investment 
as a share of GDP which has occurred in many Member States since the early 1990s. 
They include a general tendency towards a shrinking public sector, the increased 
involvement of the private sector in public sector capital projects and the pressure to 
reduce overall public expenditure to comply with rules on the budget deficit. It is 
also the case perhaps that the need for public investment has diminished in countries 
which are already well endowed with infrastructure.  
Joint public-private sector initiatives – or public-private partnerships – in this area 
have increased in importance in many countries in recent years and now account for 
a significant proportion of the finance going into public investment. Since the 
private sector element of this is not counted as public expenditure, this in itself 
could explain all or part of the fall in investment spending. Unfortunately, the data 
are not readily available to verify this94. 
There is some evidence that public investment has been reduced during periods of 
budgetary consolidation in EU-15 Member States. This is especially the case in the 
run-up to economic and monetary union in the years 1993-1998. In this period, when 
compliance with the Maastricht criteria for adopting the single currency meant that 
budget deficits needed to be kept below 3% of GDP, public investment in most 
Member States declined relative both to GDP and to primary expenditure95. Greece 
and Ireland, however, were two of only four exceptions (the others were Finland and 
Luxembourg), perhaps because of the support for investment under Cohesion policy. 
Nevertheless, reductions in current primary expenditure and lower interest payments 
were at least as important in reducing budget deficits in most countries as cut-backs 
in investment (Tab. 3.1). 
                                                 
94  Currently, such PPP initiatives cover more than 15% of the finance provided yearly to publicly 
sponsored investment projects in the UK. In other European countries like Germany, Spain, France, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Greece, PPP projects have been recently carried out, 
mainly in transport. Almost all the other EU Member States have planned PPP projects. 
95  See also Public Finance Report 2003 which distinguished several sub-periods between 1991 and 2002: 
the first. 1991-1993, the second, 1994-1998 and the last, 1999-2002. In this section, two periods have 
been chosen for examination: 1993-1998 and 2003-2005. Both are characterised by strong fiscal 
consolidation when the cyclical adjusted primary balances (CAPB) of the EU15 and nominal 
government budgetary balances increased – ie moved towards surplus – significantly. In particular, 
during the first period CAPB increased by 2.3% of GDP and during the second period by 0.5% of 
GDP. During this latter period, the CAPB of Member States which joined the EU in 2004 increased by 
1.2% of GDP, as result of lower debt interest payments (0.2 % of GDP) and a reduction in cyclically-
adjusted primary deficit (by 1.1 % of GDP). 
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Table 3.1 Change in Government revenue and expenditure, 1993-1998 
Total 
revenue
Debt 
interest 
Other current 
expenditure
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation Other capital
General 
Government 
balance
Cyclically 
adjusted 
balance
BE 2.0 -3.4 -0.9 -0.4 0.3 6.5 2.3
DK -0.5 -2.6 -1.8 -0.1 0.2 3.9 -1.6
DE 0.6 0.1 0.9 -0.9 -0.4 0.8 1.1
IE -4.9 -3.2 -6.6 0.4 -0.5 5.0 -1.0
EL 6.6 -3.3 1.8 0.5 -1.4 9.1 5.7
ES -0.1 -1.0 -1.4 -0.4 -0.6 3.4 1.4
FR 1.6 0.0 -1.5 -0.7 0.4 3.3 2.5
IT -0.1 -4.5 -2.5 -0.2 0.1 7.0 1.6
LU 3.2 0.0 1.4 0.1 -0.2 1.9 3.6
NL -6.8 -1.5 -7.6 0.0 0.3 1.9 -1.3
AT -1.5 -0.6 -2.1 -1.4 0.8 1.7 0.6
PT 1.2 -4.1 0.7 -0.1 0.0 4.7 -0.7
FI -2.2 -0.9 -9.7 0.1 -1.7 10.0 3.9
SE 1.1 -0.4 -7.8 -0.6 -3.4 13.2 10.2
UK 2.2 0.4 -4.8 -0.7 -0.5 7.8 6.9
EU-15 0.5 -0.8 -1.3 -0.6 -0.2 3.4 2.2
Source: Eurostat
EU-15 and ES: 1995-1998
percentage point of GDP
 
In the second period of consolidation between 2003 and 2005, the picture is less 
straightforward, though more countries reduced public expenditure as part of their 
efforts in this direction than increased or maintained it (Fig. 3.2). Of the 7 Member 
States which had a deficit in 2003 which was reduced in the succeeding two years, 
both in nominal and cyclically-adjusted terms, four reduced public investment 
relative to GDP (Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Austria), 
two increased it (France and UK) while in the seventh, Spain, it was maintained at 
the 2003 level. In the latter three countries, cut-backs in investment seem to have 
been avoided by increases in revenue from taxes and other sources. In the 
Netherlands, there were also revenue increases, though these were coupled with 
reductions in  public investment as well as in current primary expenditure to achieve 
a significant transformation of the fiscal position. In Germany, however, revenue 
declined and more of the fiscal consolidation was secured by reducing current 
primary expenditure rather than public investment;. In Greece, where there was also 
a decline in tax revenue, the decline in public investment was largely a consequence 
of the substantial expenditure on the Olympic Games coming to an end.  
In general, the size of budgetary adjustment achieved by reductions in public 
investment during the second sub-period was significantly smaller than in the first 
and other components of the budget, including lower debt interest payments, 
contributed more to consolidation. 
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Table 3.2 Change in Government revenue and expenditure, 2003-2005 
Total 
revenue
Debt 
interest 
Other 
current 
expenditure
Gross Fixed 
Capital 
Formation
Other 
capital
General 
Government 
balance
Cyclically 
adjusted 
balance
BE -1.2 -1.0 0.2 0.1 1.9 -2.4 -3.3
CZ -0.3 0.0 -2.4 0.4 -1.4 3.0 2.2
DK 1.7 -0.7 -1.5 0.2 0.0 3.8 2.6
DE -0.9 -0.2 -1.3 -0.2 0.0 0.8 0.6
EE -1.8 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 -0.9 0.3 0.1
IE 1.3 -0.2 1.5 -0.6 -0.5 1.1 1.4
EL -1.4 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 1.2 -0.1
ES 1.2 -0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.0
FR 1.7 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.5
IT -0.8 -0.5 0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5
CY 2.4 0.0 -1.2 -0.2 -0.1 4.0 4.3
LV 2.7 -0.1 -2.3 0.8 3.0 1.3 0.9
LT 1.1 -0.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.5
LU -0.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 -1.3 -1.0
HU 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -1.2
MT 5.7 0.3 1.2 0.3 -3.0 6.8 7.7
NL 1.2 -0.2 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 2.8 2.8
AT -1.0 -0.2 -1.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.1
PL 1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -1.0 2.2 1.7
PT -1.1 -0.1 2.2 -0.3 0.1 -3.0 -2.7
SI 0.5 -0.4 0.1 0.3 -0.9 1.4 0.6
SK -1.7 -0.8 -2.6 -0.5 1.6 0.6 -0.5
FI 0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.1 -0.1
SE 1.1 -0.4 -1.5 -0.1 0.1 2.9 2.0
UK 1.3 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
EU-15 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.6 0.6
EU-10  0.4 -0.2 -0.7 0.2 -0.7 1.8 1.2
Source: Eurostat
percentage point of GDP
 
 
Of  four Member States which had a budget surplus in 2003 which increased further 
by 2005, three countries, Ireland, Finland and Sweden, reduced public investment as 
part of the means of achieving this, while in Denmark, it increased. 
For the new Member States, the link between fiscal consolidation and reductions in 
public investment is also ambiguous. Apart from Hungary, all the new Member 
States reduced their budget deficits or increased their surpluses between 2003 and 
2005 both in nominal and cyclically-adjusted terms. Only in Cyprus, Slovakia and 
Estonia, however, was public investment reduced relative to GDP. In the other 
countries, public investment was expanded without compromising budgetary 
consolidation.  
3.3. The contribution of Cohesion policy to public investment96 
Over the period 1994-1999, ERDF and Cohesion Fund transfers  together (termed 
‘the Funds’ in what follows) amounted to EUR 109.6 billion (or EUR 18.3 billion a 
                                                 
96  This section is confined to the EU-15 Member States since the necessary data are not yet available for 
the countries which joined the EU in 2004.  
  145 
year) 97, while over the period 2000-2006, they totalled EUR 143, 6 billion (or EUR 
20.5 billion a year) at 1999 prices98.  
Their importance to recipients is reflected in their contribution to public investment 
in the Member States, especially in the four Cohesion countries. Between 2000 and 
2006, transfers from the Funds amounted, on average, to an estimated 60% or so of 
total public capital expenditure in Portugal, 48% in Greece and 24% in Spain. Over 
the same period, transfers to Italy, Germany and Ireland are estimated at around 
9.0% of public investment. Between the two periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2006, 
transfers from the Funds declined in relation to public investment in most EU15 
Member States, particularly in Ireland and Greece but increased in Portugal, 
Germany, Finland, Sweden and Austria (Fig. 3.7). 
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These transfers almost certainly increased public investment relative to GDP across 
the EU, most especially in the Cohesion countries since the principle of additionality 
means that national expenditure should have been maintained at least at the same 
level as it otherwise would have been. 
In the absence of transfers from the Funds, public investment is likely to have fallen 
as a share of GDP in the four Cohesion countries from 2001 on, whereas in practice, 
it increased slightly up to 2003. Public investment, therefore, averaged almost 3.5% 
of GDP over the period 2000-2005, around 25% higher than without transfers (Fig. 
3.8). In consequence, without the support of the Funds, these countries would either 
have to have reduced the scale of expenditure on basic infrastructure necessary to 
improve their long-term competitiveness and growth potential or to have increased 
taxes, together with perhaps cutting back on their current spending on equally 
important education and social programmes.  
                                                 
97  ESF is not included as it mostly finances projects which do not include public capital expenditure.   
98  Figures relate to commitments rather than actual expenditure in the two periods. 
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3.4. Regional variations in investment expenditure and the regional 
contribution of the Structural Funds 
The above indicates that public investment relative to GDP tends to be higher in 
lagging Member States than in more advanced ones and that support under cohesion 
policy contributes significantly to the higher expenditure. 
The question addressed in this section is whether similar tendencies are also evident 
at regional level in non-Cohesion countries, whether regions with the lowest levels 
of GDP per head have the highest levels of public investment and whether support 
from the Structural Funds is equally largest in these regions. This is based on two 
case studies, one for Italy and one for France99. 
Italy  
Development related expenditure, defined as capital expenditure plus spending on 
training, varies markedly across Italian regions relative to GDP, with the less 
prosperous regions in the South having significantly higher levels than those in the 
North. In particular, leaving aside Valle d'Aosta, P.A Trento and P.A Bolzano, 
development-related expenditure in 2003 ranged from over 10% of GDP in 
Basilicata and Sardegna to under 4% in Lombardia.  
Over the period 2002-2004, expenditure supported by the Structural Funds in Italy 
amounted to EUR 10.5 billion (EUR 7.7 billion in Objective 1 and EUR 2.9 billion 
in Objective 2 regions)100. This represents just under 11% of development-related 
expenditure in Objective 1 regions and just under 2% of expenditure in Objective 2 
                                                 
99  Lack of harmonised and comparable data makes it difficult to carry out this exercise for all Member 
States. It should be noted that in the following figures for Italy relate to payments rather than 
commitments as in the case of France.  
100  Data provided by the regional public accounts in Italy do not distinguish between ERDF and ESF and 
other funds. 
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regions. The contribution for Objective 1 regions varied from 13% in Puglia and 
12% in Calabria to 9% in Sardegna (Fig. 3.9).  
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Accordingly, support from the Structural Funds represents a much larger share of 
GDP in the least prosperous regions in the south than in those in the north 
France 
A similar picture is evident for France. Gross fixed capital formation in the public 
sector varies from around 4% of GDP in both the DOMs and Corse to just 1% in Ile-
de France. 
In 2003, total transfers from the ERDF in France amounted to EUR 1.2 billion, two-
thirds of which went to mainland France and one third to the DOMs. These transfers 
represented some 8.4% of public investment in Corse, 6.3% in Nord-pas-de Calais, 
4.3% in Limousin and Lorraine and around 4% in most other regions with relatively 
low levels of GDP per head. In the four most prosperous regions (Ile-de France, 
Alsace, Franche-Comte and Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur) ERDF contributions 
amounted to under 2% of GDP (Fig. 3.10). 
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26.7
 
3.5. The composition of public investment expenditure in the EU 
Public investment is broken down in the national accounts into 10 categories 
according to the function involved – general public services, defence, public order 
and safety, economic affairs, environment protection, housing and community 
amenities, health, recreation-culture and religion, education and social protection.  
Of these, economic affairs, which covers investment in transport and 
communications, energy and R&D related to economic development – i.e. basic 
infrastructure – is by far the largest single category, amounting to 0.8% of GDP on 
average in the EU15 countries in 2004 and 1.5% of GDP in the four cohesion 
countries. In the latter, this represents some 45% of all public investment as 
compared with just under a third in the total EU 15 countries (Fig. 3.11).  
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A similar pattern is evident for the new Member States, public investment in 
economic affairs averaging some 1.3% of GDP or around 37% of the total, higher 
than the EU15 average but less than in the four Cohesion countries (Fig. 3.12) The 
relative scale of this item, however, varied markedly across countries, from around 
half of all public investment in the Czech Republic and over 40% in Lithuania and 
Slovakia to only 17% in Cyprus and 10% in Slovenia (equivalent to only 0.3% if 
GDP).  
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The composition of public investment in the EU15 has changed in some degree 
since 1995. The biggest increase over the period 1995-2004 was in general public 
services (by 2.5 percentage points) followed by health care and education (by 
around 1 percentage point). The share of public investment accounted for by 
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economic affairs also increased if by slightly less (by half a percentage point), so 
remaining unchanged in relation to GDP (at around 0.8%).  
In the Cohesion countries, investment in economic affairs increased significantly in 
Greece and Ireland in relation to both GDP (by almost 1 percentage point) and total 
capital spending, while it declined in Portugal (though increasing slightly after 
2000). In Spain, spending on economic affairs declined marginally as a share of total 
public investment between 2000 and 2004 but rose slightly relative to GDP (no data 
are available for earlier years). In the rest of the EU15, public investment in 
economic affairs increased relative to total investment between 1995 and 2004 in all 
countries apart from France, Luxembourg and Finland, but fell slightly in relation to 
GDP.  
In overall terms, the composition of public investment in the EU15 trended to shift 
over this 9-year period from defence, environment protection and housing and 
community amenities towards general public services, health, education, public 
order and security and economic affairs.  
3.6. Public investment and differences in systems of government in EU  
Systems of government and the extent of responsibility for public investment vested 
in regional and local authorities as opposed to central government101 differ markedly 
across the EU. The level of responsibility of such authorities tends, not surprisingly, 
to be highest in federal systems, where the share of public investment controlled by 
regional and local authorities amounts to over 90% in Belgium, around 75% in both 
Germany and Austria and just under 70% in Spain. It is also relatively high in two 
unitary states, Italy and Ireland, at around 80%, while in another five countries, it is 
between 60% and 70%. At the other extreme, the share is under 20% in Greece and 
around 40% in Luxembourg, though these are the only two Member States where 
regional and local authorities are responsible for much under half of public 
investment (Fig. 3.13). 
                                                 
101  The fact that spending is made by local authorities need not mean that is financed from taxes levied 
locally. In most multiple tier systems central government partly finances local and regional authority 
expenditure by means of grants or transfers. This is intended to help correct for imbalances in 
resources between authorities in different areas. 
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Greece and Luxembourg are among the few countries where the responsibility for 
public investment of regional and local authorities has declined in recent years (the 
others are Germany and Sweden). Indeed, in many countries, there has been a 
significant increase in the share of investment under their control – by over 10 
percentage points between 1995 and 2004 in Denmark, Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Finland and by 9 percentage points in the UK. This reflects a deliberate policy of 
devolving responsibility for expenditure to the regional and local level.  
In the new Member States, responsibility for public investment tends to be more 
centralised, partly reflecting their generally smaller size. In only three countries, 
Poland – where the figure is just over 63% – the Czech Republic and Latvia, is the 
share of regional and local authorities over half. In Slovakia, it is only 34%, in 
Lithuania, just over 30% and in Cyprus just 16%, while in Malta, it is under 5% 
(Fig. 3.14). 
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In most EU15 Member States, including in three of the four Cohesion countries (the 
exception is Greece), the responsibility for public investment on economic affairs – 
i.e. much of core infrastructure – lies more with regional and local authorities than 
with the central government (Fig. 3.15). (The exceptions in the rest of the EU-15 are 
the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden.) These also have most of the responsibility 
for investment in education, housing and community amenities and environmental 
protection.  
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In the new Member States, by contrast, responsibility for public investment in 
economic affairs is vested mostly with the central government (Fig. 3.16). The one 
exception is Poland, where almost 70% of public investment in this area was 
controlled by regional and local authorities in 2004. In the other 9 countries, central 
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government accounts for over 70% of such investment in all except the Czech 
Republic, where the share was only slightly lower (66%). 
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This division of responsibility can affect the ‘quality’ of public investment and its 
contribution to higher productivity and growth in regional economies, insofar as 
authorities at the regional and local level are likely to have a better understanding of 
local needs and are perhaps in a better position to tailor investment programmes to 
meet this. A recent study in Spain, for example, has shown that decentralisation of 
responsibility can achieve a more efficient allocation of investment at regional level, 
especially as regards road building and education102. 
In addition, devolution of responsibility for investment to the regional and local 
level appears to facilitate the absorption of Cohesion funding. Actual (certified) 
expenditure from the Funds relative to the budgeted amount for the period 2000-
2006, therefore, tended to be higher in countries where the share of investment 
controlled by regional and local authorities was comparatively large. 
Such decentralisation, however, needs to be accompanied by administrative 
efficiency at regional and local level coupled with effective management and control 
systems if it is to be of benefit and provide a better basis for supporting economic 
development.  
4. STRENGTHENING THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE ECONOMY AND ENSURING ECONOMIC 
STABILITY 
The above analysis has shown that the new Member States have succeeded in recent 
years in reducing their budget deficits while at the same time expanding public 
                                                 
102  Alejandro Esteller and Albert Sole "Does decentralisation improve the efficiency in the allocation of 
public investment? Evidence from Spain" Institut d'Economia de Barcelona, Working Document 
2005/5. 
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investment in much-needed infrastructure. The increased support they receive from the 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund in the present programming period will help them to 
continue investing in infrastructure as well as on other forms of capital to strengthen their 
capacity to sustain relatively high rates of economic growth.  
At the same time, however, this additional finance, which is substantial in many cases 
(amounting to up to 4% of GDP), will add to demand in the economy and could fuel 
inflation both directly through over-heating and inducing shortages in supply and 
indirectly by increasing imports and putting downward pressure on the exchange rate. 
This raises the question, therefore, of whether there is a conflict between the maintenance 
of financial stability and sustaining a high rate of economic growth, or, in other words, of 
pursuing both real convergence of levels of GDP per head and nominal convergence of 
inflation rates, budget deficits and public sector debt ratios.  
The latter is important not only because the achievement of convergence in these terms 
represents a condition for the adoption of the Euro (the so-called Maastricht criteria) but 
more generally because it is likely to be necessary in order to sustain long-term economic 
growth. It also raises the question of whether cohesion policy in the form of transfers 
from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund tends to exacerbate this conflict 
through its effect in pushing up demand.  
The concern of this section is to review the evidence on the recent performance of the 
new Member States in achieving relatively high rates of economic growth and, in 
particular, on the effect of this on other aspects of policy which are important both in 
themselves and in sustaining growth over the long-term. These include the budget 
balance (or the need for government borrowing), the rate of inflation, the exchange rate, 
interest rates and net export performance. A parallel aim is to consider how far the 
significant financial inflows which the countries concerned will receive under EU 
cohesion policy will add to their problems as opposed to helping overcome them.  
Growth and the budget balance 
Over the period since 2001, as indicated in Chapter 1, the new Member States, with the 
sole exception of Malta, have achieved – and sustained – significantly higher rates of 
economic growth than the rest of the EU. In all, apart from Cyprus and Malta, growth has 
averaged close to 4% a year or higher over this period. In the three Baltic States, it 
averaged 8-9% a year. Moreover, except in Hungary, growth rates were higher in the later 
years of the period than the earlier ones. 
These relatively high rates of growth, as noted above, appear not to have been fuelled by 
fiscal expansion but, on the contrary, to have occurred as budget deficits have generally 
been reduced. In three countries – Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia, if only marginally in the 
last – a budget deficit was transformed into a budget surplus by 2005, while in another 
three, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia, the budget deficit was reduced to less than 1.5% 
of GDP. In another two countries, Cyprus and Poland, the deficit amounted to around 
2.5% of GDP, leaving only four countries where the budget deficit was over the 3% limit 
set by the growth and stability pact. In two of these, however, Malta and Slovakia, the 
deficit was only marginally above this and in a third, the Czech Republic, the budget 
deficit was still only 3.6% of GDP, though it had risen between 2004 and 2005. In all 
three of these countries, the budget deficit was significantly smaller in 2005 than in 2001 
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and in the years preceding this in Malta and Slovakia (in the Czech Republic, it was 
marginally less than in 1999 and 2000). 
The remaining country, Hungary, is the only one in which the budget deficit was 
substantially above the 3% limit in 2005 (at 6.5% of GDP) and has shown little tendency 
to decline since 2003. 
Growth and inflation 
The relatively high rates of growth have been accompanied in most of the countries by 
either declining or stable rates of inflation (measured by the harmonised consumer price 
index), The only two countries in which inflation was higher in 2006 than in 2001 are 
Latvia and Lithuania, and only in the latter was there a progressive increase in inflation 
over the period (from -1% in 2003 to nearly 4% in 2006). In Latvia inflation has 
remained at 6-7% since 2003 (Fig. 3.17).  
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Fig. 3.17 Change in GDP and inflation in the new Member States, 1197-2006
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Nevertheless, inflation in most cases has remained above that in the Eurozone. Only in 
the Czech Republic and Poland, was the rate of inflation in 2006 below the average in the 
Eurozone (2.2%) – though in Cyprus, it was the same and in Malta and Slovenia, only 
slightly above (around 2.5% in both cases).  
In Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as in Lithuania, it was around 4% or just above 
and in all three cases, higher in 2006 than in 2005. In the remaining three countries, it 
was well over 6% in 2006 and in Bulgaria, over 7%. In both groups of countries, in 
particular, therefore, the continuation of inflation at a relatively high rate could pose a 
risk to the maintenance of high rates of GDP growth. Accordingly, in these countries 
perhaps more than elsewhere, there is a need to ensure that economic policy is judiciously 
managed to minimise this risk.. 
Growth and exchange rates 
Rates of inflation above the EU average can lead to financial instability and a loss of 
confidence in the currencies concerned. The growth which has occurred over the present 
decade in the new Member States, however, has done so in most cases in the context of a 
relatively stable or appreciating exchange rate. In three countries – Bulgaria, Estonia and 
Lithuania – a fixed exchange rate against the Euro has been maintained since 2001, while 
the rate has varied by only 1% or so in Cyprus and has been kept constant since 2003 in 
Malta. In two other countries, Czech Republic and Slovakia, the exchange rate has 
appreciated markedly against the Euro over this period (by 20% and 16%, respectively). 
In Poland, while the exchange rate in 2006 was slightly lower than in 2001 (by just under 
6%), it was much the same as in 2002 and has appreciated significantly since 2004, 
following recovery in economic growth. In Slovenia, though depreciating by around 10% 
between 2001 and 2004, the exchange rate was then fixed against the Euro in the two 
years prior to the country joining the Eurozone.  
In the three remaining countries, the exchange rate was lower in 2006 than in 2001, in 
three of them significantly so, but in each case it has remained relatively stable over the 
past 2-3 years. In Latvia, therefore, where growth has been higher than anywhere else in 
the Union over this period, the exchange rate depreciated by some 20% between 2001 
and 2005 but since then it has been kept constant against the Euro. In Romania, the rate 
depreciated by around 30% between 2001 and 2003 (and by almost 60% between 1999 
and 2003), but since then it has tended to appreciate slightly. Hungary is the only country 
where the exchange rate depreciated between 2005 and 2006 (by around 6%) but it was 
still only some 3% lower than in 2001. 
In general, therefore, currency depreciation has not been necessary to stimulate or to 
support economic growth and, as indicated below, significant growth of exports has 
occurred in most cases with a stable or appreciating exchange rate. The evidence, 
accordingly, suggests that in most countries, continuing high rates of economic growth 
should be compatible with exchange rate stability, so long as, of course, inflation is kept 
in check. 
Interest rates 
The maintenance of reasonably stable exchange rates has, moreover, been achieved 
without necessitating high rates of interest to attract capital inflows to support the 
currency. Long-term interest rates, in nominal terms, have in all the new Member States 
fallen since 2001, in most cases markedly. In 2006, in all but three countries – Hungary, 
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Romania and Poland – long-term interest rates were within 0.6% of average rates in the 
Eurozone. In the first two of these, rates averaged just over 7% in 2006, while in Poland, 
they were just over 5%. In Romania, since inflation was just under 7%, this meant that 
real interest rates were relatively low, which was also the case in the other new Member 
States where interest rates were around the Eurozone average – indeed, in Bulgaria and 
Latvia, real interest rates were negative so giving an incentive to investment. 
This leaves only Hungary and Poland where interest rates were relatively high in real 
terms in 2006. In the former, this reflects the relatively large budget deficit, as noted 
above, and consequently the need for relatively large government borrowing. 
Net export performance 
The appreciation of the exchange rate which has occurred in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia and the fixed exchange rate regime which has been maintained in a number of 
other countries seem not to have damaged export performance. In the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, growth of exports of goods and services in real terms averaged 11-12% a 
year over the period 2001-2006 and 14-15% a year over the last three years of the period, 
substantially higher than in the EU-15 Member States. The growth in exports was very 
similar in the countries with fixed exchange rates, averaging just below 10% a year in 
Bulgaria and 11-12% a year in Estonia and Lithuania over the period. 
In all of these countries, however, especially in the last three, growth of imports was also 
relatively high, fuelled by the growth of GDP, though also being necessary in some 
degree to support this growth. As a result the balance of payments deficit on current 
account has risen to significant levels, exceeding 10% of GDP in 2005 in Estonia and 
reaching almost 12% of GDP in Bulgaria. The deficit was also large in Slovakia (just 
under 9% of GDP), though it was much smaller in the Czech Republic (around 2% of 
GDP). Nevertheless, as indicated above, these deficits have been financed without the 
need for high interest rates. 
In the other countries, apart from Cyprus and Malta, growth of exports was also relatively 
high, ranging from just under 9% a year in Slovenia to just below 12% a year in 
Romania. This r growth, however, was outstripped by growth of imports in Latvia and, 
more especially, in Romania (amounting to 18% a year), leading to current account 
deficits of almost 13% of GDP in the former in 2005 and just under 9% of GDP in the 
latter. As in the other countries, the deficit has been financed without the need for high 
interest rates. 
In Slovenia, however, the growth of imports was much the same as the growth of exports 
and in Hungary and Poland, it was less. In consequence, the current account deficit has 
not tended to increase much in any of the three countries, though while it has been 
relatively small in Slovenia and Poland (at around 2% of GDP), in Hungary, it has 
remained at around 7% of GDP since 2001. In the latter case, moreover, the need for 
capital inflows to cover the deficit has been associated with relatively high interest rates. 
The evidence of recent years suggests, therefore, that the continued high growth of 
exports which is necessary to support growth of GDP, given the growth of imports,  does 
not seem to require depreciation of the exchange rate to sustain it, though this depends on 
avoiding high rates of inflation and their damaging effects on cost competitiveness. This 
high growth, however, has not in many cases matched the growth of imports and 
relatively large balance of payments deficits on current account have resulted. While 
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these seem to have been funded without the need, in most countries, for high interest 
rates, they have, nevertheless, led to an inevitable build-up of foreign indebtedness which 
puts a premium on the maintenance of financial confidence in the coming years if the risk 
of large-scale capital outflows, high interest rates and exchange rate depreciation is to be 
avoided.  
Growth and cohesion policy 
Transfers from the Structural Funds should help new Member States sustain high rates of 
economic growth while at the same time maintaining financial stability and minimising 
the risk of excessive inflation. Transfers will, therefore, contribute significantly to 
financing much-needed public investment in infrastructure of various kinds as well as in 
human capital, so helping to strengthen the supply side of the economy and, accordingly, 
its growth potential. At the same time, they will reduce the need for government 
borrowing, so easing the pressure on interest rates, moderating the risk of crowding out 
private investment and helping to maintain financial market confidence. In sum, support 
from the Funds should facilitate the task of managing the economy to sustain high rates 
of growth while keeping inflation in check and avoiding excessive budget deficits and the 
build-up of public sector debt.  
Given the limited endowment of basic infrastructure in a number of countries and the 
generally poor state of that which exists in almost all of them – as described in Chapter 1 
above – allied to their low level of GDP per head, there is little question either about the 
importance of public investment for sustaining long-term development or about the need 
for support. While the inflow of funds will tend to increase demand, there is little reason 
to expect this to fuel inflation given the relatively low employment rates in most of the 
countries, except perhaps temporarily if expenditure is concentrated in areas where 
demand is already relatively high. This is all the more the case in view of the low level of 
productivity which exists in most sectors in almost all regions and the significant scope 
for catching up which this implies. 
Accordingly, any conflict between the pursuit of real convergence of GDP per head with 
the rest of the EU and that of nominal convergence of inflation rates, budget deficits and 
public sector debt ratios is unlikely to be more than short-term in nature. More 
importantly, by strengthening the supply-side of the economy and its capacity to meet 
increases in demand, support for public investment from cohesion policy will tend to 
reduce the extent of any conflict over the long-term. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Community Policies and Cohesion 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The negotiation on the budget of the Union for the period 2007-2013 has demonstrated 
the need for reinforced coherence and complementarity between the different elements of 
the Union intervention whether under cohesion policy or under other Community 
policies. 
While the Treaty assigns to each policy its own objectives, there is a clear demand for 
increasing effectiveness of the Union action in different fields, which has become more 
compelling with the adoption of the Lisbon agenda and its revision in 2005. 
Attention needs to be paid to the way in which different policies interact, how and to 
what extent they are mutually reinforcing and whether more can be done to increase the 
overall impact of Community action. 
This chapter of the report is therefore concerned with recent developments in those 
Community policies which have a clear link with Cohesion policy and their 
complementarity with the objectives of the latter. A final section examines the 
redistributive effect of the Community budget. 
2. EU R&D AND INNOVATION POLICIES AND COHESION: IMPACT AND SYNERGIES 
The Lisbon agenda is above all related to the building of a knowledge society, in which 
R&D and innovation play a crucial role. In order to encourage the best use of scarce 
resources in this regard, the EU has developed a common policy and a number of 
different instruments for promoting the creation of networks and the achievement of 
economies of scale in this area..  
These policies have a clear European dimension by supporting top-level R&D projects, 
mobility of researchers throughout the Union, and the creation of trans-national research 
teams with a view to increasing the overall competitiveness of the EU in the global 
economy. To this end, they are based on a competitive approach and only the best 
projects are selected and supported. 
EU policies on R&D and innovation do not replace, but support and complement, 
national, regional and local activities in this area, since R&D and innovation have a clear 
regional – and even local – dimension. It is in clusters or other informal networks (based 
on confidence and so often on proximity) that knowledge is disseminated and it is 
transferred from research and technological centres to businesses. It is also at local level 
that SMEs seek tailor-made business services and funding adapted to their needs. In this 
context, the role played by local or regional authorities in fostering such networks or to 
helping provide suitable services is essential.  
In this respect, EU policies on R&D and innovation, on the one hand, and cohesion 
policy, on the other, play complementary roles in supporting growth and job creation in 
the Union. 
2.1.The contribution of EU R&D and innovation policies to fostering regional 
competitiveness 
The Research Framework Programmes 
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EU R&D policy has traditionally been designed and implemented through 
successive framework programmes (FP), which have received increasing financial 
support since their creation in the 1980s. By 2013, support is planned to amount to 
almost EUR 9 billion, 75% more than the last year of the previous framework 
period, 2002-2006. R&D projects, submitted by international teams of researchers, 
are selected at EU level within the thematic strands agreed at the beginning of the 
period.   
The regional dimension was not especially taken into account in the planning and 
implementation of the first few FPs. As a result, although participation of 
organisations in Objective 1 regions has increased, it accounted for only 18% of the 
total participation in the Sixth FP (2002-2006).  Participation in projects is closely 
related to regional and local strengths, with patterns of participation generally 
reflecting the location – or concentration – of R&D facilities, higher education 
institutions and, to a lesser extent, firms. This explains why, within the cohesion 
countries, the main recipients of FP support tend to be situated in capital city or 
other economically strong regions. (Map 4.1 – Participation in the FP6) 
The regional or local effects of Framework Programmes are, however, not only 
related to the pattern of participation across regions. According to studies, the 
greatest impact has often been on the scientific and technological reputation of the 
participants and on the development of networks and partnerships, which may have 
positive consequences in the long-run), but which tend to have limited spill-over 
effects on the region concerned in the short- run. 
It should also be borne in mind that the FPs have traditionally accounted for less 
than 5%  of publicly funded R&D activities in the EU. 
With each successive generation, the importance of the territorial dimension in the 
EU R&D policy has, however, been increasingly recognised. In 2001, the 
Commission drew attention to the regional dimension of the European Research 
Area (ERA)103, where it underlined the crucial role of regional and local actors and 
the need to extend the benefits of the ERA to all EU regions. As a consequence, a 
number of measures were introduced in the Sixth Framework programme, in 
particular: 
– two new initiatives, the Networks of Excellence and the Integrated Projects, 
aimed at combating the fragmentation of the European research system and at 
reinforcing links between central and peripheral scientific centres, so adding to 
overall R&D capacity in the EU and diminishing the brain drain from less 
favoured to more prosperous regions; 
– a doubling of funding for human resource development, with a potentially 
important effect on less favoured regions through technology transfer schemes 
and the setting of a spending target of at least 15% of the budget for thematic 
priorities on SMEs; 
                                                 
103  EC Communication “The regional dimension of the ERA”, COM(2001)549 of 3.10.01. 
 165 
– the introduction of a 'bonus' scheme under which successful applicants to the FP6 
situated in Objective 1 regions could claim additional financing from the 
Structural Funds.  
In addition, the Regions of Knowledge Pilot Action aimed at promoting the active 
involvement of local actors in designing regional knowledge strategies, was 
launched in 2003. It has proved effective in supporting the application of regional 
foresight and other analytical tools, strengthening clustering, promoting mentoring 
between regions and fostering public-private partnerships between universities and 
local businesses. Given its success, a second call for proposals was launched in 2005 
(KnowREG 2) with similar objectives. 
EU innovation policy 
Encouraging innovation, and the development of new products and processes 
resulting from this, is closely related to the promotion of R&D. EU enterprise, 
industrial and innovation policies are together aimed at strengthening the 
competitiveness of the European firms by encouraging entrepreneurship, 
establishing an environment conducive to innovation and ensuring access to 
markets. 
An action plan for promoting innovation in the EU was launched in 2003 in the 
context of the Lisbon agenda104, defining innovation relatively widely to encompass 
"the successful production, assimilation and exploitation of novelty in the economic 
and social spheres". It recognised the need to strengthen coordination with policy at 
national level, to reinforce synergies with other EU policies and, in particular, to 
"strengthen the regional dimension of innovation policy". It concluded with a list of 
measures to be implemented at national and EU level. The main aspects of the 
action plan were updated in 2005 in the light of the renewed Lisbon agenda105, with 
increased emphasis on an integrated approach covering R&D, innovation and other 
related policies. In this context, the Commission called for the "European Structural 
Funds to drive research and innovation". 
Up to now, EU activities to promote innovation in Europe have been funded from 
the Framework Programmes, though the scope of these goes well beyond 
conventional R&D activities. They include several instruments for monitoring 
innovation policy and performance, as well as a number of practical measures to 
improve the innovation environment of firms. The former includes the Trend Chart 
on Innovation in Europe, which compiles, updates, analyses and disseminates 
information and good practice on innovation policies at national and EU level, and 
the European Innovation Scoreboard, which compares Member State performance 
and changes in this on the basis of available quantitative data. 
A number of projects are financed in order to raise awareness among businesses – 
and SMEs in particular – of the importance of innovation, such as the PAXIS 
scheme which supports innovative start-ups and their growth by publicising best 
                                                 
104  EC Communication "Innovation policy: updating the Union's approach in the context of the Lisbon 
agenda", COM(2003)112 final of 11.3.03. 
105  EC Communication "Implementing the Community Lisbon programme: more research and innovation - 
investing for growth and employment: a common approach", COM(2005) 488 final of 12.10.05. 
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practice and encouraging networking; the Gate2growth initiative which fosters 
networks between organisations which finance innovation and entrepreneurship as 
well as between industrial liaison offices in public research centres  with a view to 
creating and strengthening public-private cooperation by means of incubators, 
technology transfer offices and the Innovating Regions in Europe (IRE) initiative 
which provides a means of sharing experience in developing innovation strategies. 
As part of the IRE initiative, the Mutual Learning Platform (MLP) was launched in 
2005 with the aim of developing interactive learning tools (benchmarking, foresight 
and regional profiles) for regions seeking to implement innovation strategies. In 
addition, the Innovation Relay Centres have been set up to help firms  to network 
with others, including in other countries, and to cooperate over the development and 
transfer of technology. 
Following the mandate of the 2006 Spring European Council, the Commission 
produced a roadmap of ten priority actions to promote innovation in the EU106, 
drawing attention to the need for complementarity between innovation and cohesion 
policies at EU level, more innovation-friendly education systems, stronger links 
between research centres and industry through the promotion of innovative clusters, 
and the fostering of regional innovation through the new Cohesion Policy 
programmes.  
2.2.Looking ahead – more synergy can still be achieved  
EU R&D and innovation policies, on the one hand, and Cohesion Policy, on the 
other, have in the past intervened in similar areas and had complementary 
approaches and methods as well as a common goal of improving European 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, there is still room for fine-tuning to achieve more 
synergy.  
For example, as noted above, the Framework Programmes have usually resulted in 
strong links at EU level but limited spill-overs at regional level beyond the 
participating organisations. Cohesion programmes, therefore, have a crucial role to 
play in facilitating intra-regional links and in connecting regional stakeholders with 
more advanced knowledge networks fostered by the FP in other parts of the EU. The 
challenge is to ensure that all regions, including the less developed, can reap the 
benefits of the European Research Area and contribute to the achievement of the 
Lisbon goals. 
To this end, several improvements have been introduced in the current programming 
period following the agreement on the Financial Perspectives for the period 2007-
2013: 
• The new 7th Research Framework Programme (2007-2013), with an overall 
financial allocation of EUR 53.2 billion, includes several instruments to reinforce 
the regional dimension. Within the last of its four strands (Cooperation, ideas, 
people and capacities), FP7 incorporates a number of specific aims with a clear 
regional impact:  
                                                 
106  EU Communication "Putting knowledge into practice: a broad-based innovation strategy for the EU", 
COM(2006)502 final of 13.9.06. 
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(a) Support the creation of new infrastructure of pan-European interest 
and optimise the use of the existing infrastructure needed by the 
scientific community to remain at the forefront of knowledge (EUR 
1.8 billion) 
(b) Assist SME in outsourcing R&D activities by extending their 
networks, better exploiting R&D results, developing common 
technical solutions for groups of SMEs with similar problems and 
acquiring technological know-how (EUR 1.3 billion). 
(c) Strengthen the R&D potential of European regions by nurturing, 
through the "Regions of Knowledge" initiative, the development of 
regional "research-driven clusters", associating universities, research 
centres, firms and regional authorities (EUR 126 million). 
(d) Unlock and develop the research potential in Convergence and 
outermost regions ( EUR 370 million) by supporting transnational 
secondment of research staff from  organisations in these regions to 
those in more advanced ones, the acquisition of R&D equipment, the 
organisation of workshops and conferences to facilitate knowledge 
transfer, and access of research centres to  independent evaluation of 
their potential. 
In addition, the Cooperation strand provides support for means of disseminating 
knowledge and transferring technology, while the People strand includes several 
initiatives to facilitate training, career development and mobility of researchers, 
including co-financing of regional, national and international programmes. 
FP7 also incorporates a "Risk-Sharing Finance Facility" aimed at fostering 
private investment in R&D by improving access to EIB loans for large European 
research projects. 
• The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP), has a budget 
for 2007-2013 of EUR 3.6 billion (over 50% more than for the period 2000-
2006), with nearly a third devoted to support of entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Concrete measures in three sub-programmes are designed to promote:  
– Start up and growth of SMEs: the Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Programme with a budget of EUR 2.2 billion, including up to EUR 430 
million for eco-innovation, will provide access to finance for SMEs, 
information and advice on single market opportunities and Community 
matters and assist in establishing a better regulatory and administrative 
environment for business and innovation. 
– Information and communication technologies: the ICT Policy Support 
Programme, with a budget of EUR 728 million, will support operational 
demonstrations of technological and organisational solutions to ICT-
based services at EU level, addressing interoperability and security issues 
in particular.  
– The achievement of a 12% share of renewables in total energy 
consumption by 2010 and a reduction of energy use: the Intelligent 
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Energy-Europe Programme, with a budget of EUR 727 million, will 
support means of increasing energy efficiency, developing new renewable 
energy sources, and devising technological solutions to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions from transport. 
Some of the initiatives under the CIP are complementary to activities carried out 
under Cohesion Policy or FP7, such as help to SMEs to access the latter and to 
innovative enterprises to secure venture capital to assist them bring their research 
results to the market. Activities under the CIP can also have, a regional 
dimension, such as fostering clusters or innovation networks or supporting 
regional programmes for business innovation. In addition, identifying and 
analysing examples of excellence which can be adapted and replicated can help 
make regional interventions more effective in meeting cohesion goals. 
As these initiatives under the CIP and FP7 develop, it will be important to evaluate 
the results and gain a better understanding of the effect in territorial as well as 
economic terms. 
3. COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN STATE AID AND COHESION POLICY  
The Commission has embarked on an ambitious reform of State aid107, aimed at 
redirecting them towards the pursuit of the Lisbon objectives, while at the same time 
modernising their management by increasing the responsibilities of Member States.  
This reform will strengthen cohesion in the Union through a revision of the 
guidelines for regional support as well as through the adoption of measures aimed at 
safeguarding public intervention to support services of general economic interest 
SGEI).  
It is also aimed at promoting the conditions for sustained growth in the Union 
through directing public intervention towards support of risk capital and research 
and innovation. 
3.1.The amount and intensity of aid 
In line with the undertakings agreed by successive European Councils, the amount 
of State aid allocated by EU-25 Member States108, has tended to decline slightly 
over recent years to a little over EUR 45 billion in 2005 as against EUR 49 billion in 
2000, a fall from 0.53% of EU GDP to 0.46% (Fig. 4.1). 
                                                 
107  State aid action plan: Less and better targeted state aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 2005–2009, 
COM(2005) 107. 
108  Total of aid, with the exception of aid to agriculture, fishery and transport. 
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Two-thirds (68% in 2005) of aid is accounted for by four Member States (Germany, 
France, Italy and the UK), which is in line with their share of EU GDP (69% in 
2005). 
In 2005, State aid amounted on average in the EU to less than EUR 100 per head of 
population (EUR 98) as compared with levels close to EUR 110 per head in 2001 
and 2003. The intensity of aid in these terms, however, varies significantly between 
countries reflecting differences in approach to public intervention in economic 
activities (Fig. 4.2). 
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Excluding Malta, where aid amounted to almost EUR 300 per head in 2005, or 2.6% 
of GDP, reflecting significant transitional and ‘phasing out’ schemes, as well as 
Cyprus, which was in a similar position, aid intensity ranged from over EUR 150 
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per head  (in Germany, Denmark and above all in Sweden, at EUR 292 per head) to 
less than EUR 50 per head (in Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Greece and the Baltic 
States – where it was only around EUR 10 per head).  
In the Cohesion countries (the new Member States, Greece, Spain and Portugal), in 
general, therefore, the level of aid is well below the EU. In particular, the new 
Member States, apart from Malta and Cyprus, have rates of aid which are almost 
two-third less than the EU average ( (EUR 36  in 2005 as against EUR 98) and 
which moreover are tending to decline markedly (halving since). 
3.2.Aid to lagging regions 
Aid to lagging regions (eligible under Article 87.3 a of the Treaty) amounted to 
slightly over EUR 11 billion in 2005 as against EUR 16 billion in 2000 and EUR 19 
billion in 2003. This reduction is mainly a result of the accession of the new 
Member States, in which transitional aid schemes came to an end. Accordingly, the 
reduction in aid to eligible regions has tended to decline more than the overall aid 
since 2000. 
In all 19 Member States have eligible regions, of which 7 (Malta, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia and the Baltic States) are entirely eligible. In these 19 countries, there are 
significant differences in the intensity of aid to eligible regions and those to the 
country as a whole. 
On average, aid received by people living in the eligible regions was EUR 73 per 
head in 2005 as against EUR 95 per head in the Member States as a whole. In 
countries only partially eligible for regional aid under Article 87.3 a, this latter 
figures rises to EUR 104 per head (Fig. 4.3).  
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This differences is evident in the UK, Austria, Italy, Spain, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, in the two last, reflecting the concentration of investment, including from 
abroad, in the capital city regions of Prague and Bratislava. 
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It seems from this, therefore, that the Member States redistribute public resources by 
this means towards the most developed, and prosperous, regions, which tends to 
counteract Cohesion policy support which is concentrated in the less developed 
regions, so potentially slowing down any tendency towards internal convergence. 
3.3.Directing aid towards the Lisbon objectives 
In recent years, there has been a significant change in the distribution of State aid. 
Over half of Member States concentrated over 90% of their aid on horizontal 
objectives109.  
In these countries, the aid directed towards the Lisbon and Gothenburg objectives 
(environment, regional aid, SMEs, employment, training and R&D) amounted to 
80% of the total in 2005 (excluding fisheries, agriculture and transport) as compared 
with only 61% four years earlier. This increase is mainly the result of aid going to 
the environment and energy saving (up by 74%), training (by 140%) and 
employment (119%), while aid to SMEs fell (by 25%) and that to R&D remained 
unchanged. In four countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Finland and Luxemburg), 
however, over a quarter of aid went to the last (Fig. 4.4). 
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Among the Member States which continue to direct a significant share of State aid 
towards sectors, in Malta, 97% goes to manufacturing, in Hungary, 48% and in 
Cyprus and Slovakia, 38%, while in Portugal, almost three-quarters goes to financial 
services. In Spain and Poland, coal mining continues to be subsidised, despite a 
significant reduction since 2001, with, respectively, 34% and 24% of total aid going 
to this sector. 
                                                 
109  Employment, regional aid, SMEs, training, the environment, energy saving, R&D, trade, cultural 
activities, historical heritage, prevention of national disasters and risk capital  
 172 
3.4.2007-2013: a strategic revision of regional aid towards increased concentration 
and more coherence with Cohesion policy 
The reform of regional aid has three objectives: 
• to continue the process of reducing the intensity of aid, 
• to concentrate 'intervention on the least favoured regions; 
• to ensure the competitiveness of all regions in the EU 
This reform ensures some continuity with the present situation in order to maintain 
coherence. To this end, there is a safeguard to make sure that the population covered 
in Member States does not decline by more than 50% in relation to the previous 
guidelines. (Map 4.2 – Regional state aid 2007-2013) 
In total, 42% of population in the Union will be covered, 31% under Article 87.3 
(a), as against 52% and 34%, respectively in 2000-2006. Accordingly, the 
population covered in assisted regions has become significantly less than the 
population in non-assisted regions. Coverage is determined as follows: 
• Eligibility to Article 87.3 (a) for regions where GDP per head in PPS terms is less 
than 75% of the EU average together with the outermost regions, with the 
possibility of providing  aid of between 30% and 50% of investment, depending 
on their level of development (increased by 10 to 20% for SMEs); 
• Eligibility of some regions110 under Article 87.3 (c), with a coverage of 
population of between 2.8% (in Portugal) and 33% (in Finland) and reaching 
50% in countries where the population is entirely covered by the safety net 
(Ireland et Cyprus). The intensity of aid, therefore, reaches 10%, or even 15% 
(where GDP per head is below the EU average and unemployment is above), 
with the same additional amounts for SMEs 
• Transitional eligibility of regions covered by the ‘statistical effect’ under Article 
87.3 (a) up to  2010; 
• The exceptional possibility of operating aid for regions eligible for assistance 
under Article 87.3 (a), outermost regions with low population density and the 
sparsely populated regions. This aid has to be temporary and to diminish over 
time except for outermost regions and the sparsely populated regions ; 
• Aid for business creation and start-up. 
This new system gives Member States more flexibility in concentrating their aid 
through an integrated regional development strategy, aimed at clearly defined 
                                                 
110  Economic development regions, sparsely populated regions, regions bordering regions eligible under 
87.3 (a) or on the external borders, regions whose GDP/head is below 100% of the EU25 average and 
whose unemployment rate is above 115% of the EU25 average, islands and sparsely populated regions 
or regions with a very high unemployment rate, and regions with more than 50,000 inhabitants 
experiencing serious structural decline. 
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objectives and closely in line with the principles of the new Cohesion policy 
programming period 
In some of the regions eligible for the ‘regional competitiveness and employment’ 
objective, particularly in those where there is the risk of economic decline due to a 
lack of competitiveness, the guidelines enable better complementarity to be achieved 
between national policies for development and action under Cohesion policy  
Coherence between the two sets of policies is reinforced by their redirection towards 
priority services under the Lisbon agenda. The adoption of a new aid framework 
geared towards research and innovation should facilitate public investment in this 
area, while new guidelines on capital investment111 should further development. 
In addition, these guidelines by allowing operating aid, together with the 
clarification of the applicability of aid for Services of General Economic Interest, 
should enable public authorities to tackle the problems in some regions, caused by a 
lack of accessibility and inadequate transport networks, through resorting to their 
public service obligations and the associated financial compensation.. 
It is up to Member States to take advantage of the flexibility provided by the new 
State aid framework by, according to the context, aiming at: 
• an appropriate concentration of intervention in less favoured regions or those 
which are a most risk of economic decline because of globalisation or economic 
restructuring; 
• suitable coordination with  the priorities identified under Cohesion policy or with 
national development priorities; 
• optimising the aid possibilities under either the regional aid guidelines or the 
horizontal framework also available. 
4. AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
4.1.Market expenditure and direct aids 
In 2005, budgetary expenditure on market policies and direct aids under the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) amounted to EUR 42.1 billion (EUR 33.7 
billion for direct aids and EUR 8.4 billion for market measures)112, or 0.4% of the 
Gross National Income (GNI) of the EU-25. This represented a reduction from 
40.4% of total EU spending in 2003 to 36.5%. 
The principal beneficiaries in absolute terms of this component of the CAP in 2005 
were France (21.6%), Spain (13.9%), Germany (13.5%) and Italy (11.4%). 
However, market expenditure and direct aids per unit of production113 is 
                                                 
111  Community guidelines on State aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises, 2006/ C 194/02 
112  35th Financial Report on the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guarantee Section, 
2005 Financial Year, COM(2006) 512 final: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/fin/index_en.htm  
113  Annual work unit (AWU). 
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significantly higher in the northern Member States than in the southern and new 
Member States. In the new Member States, direct payments are gradually being 
phased in and have not yet reached the level in the EU15 (Fig. 4.5). 
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A recent study on the territorial impact of the CAP came to the conclusion that 
market policy support tends to benefit the more developed rural areas with large 
farms and lower unemployment rates as well as higher than average population 
growth. These areas tend to be concentrated more in the core regions in northern and 
western Europe and less in the peripheral regions in the east and south. (Map 4.3 – 
Agricultural support under pillar I) 
This is not too surprising a result given that market support was not designed for 
cohesion purposes. Since 1992 however, reform of the CAP has increased its effects 
on cohesion by shifting support away from maintaining prices towards direct 
payments, which, in contrast to price support, tend to be higher in areas with a low 
GDP per capita and high unemployment rates. 
4.2.Rural development 
During the period 2000-2006, rural development programmes were financed under 
the CAP by both the EAGGF-Guidance and the EAGGF-Guarantee funds, the 
former applying in Objective 1 regions, the latter elsewhere. The EAGGF-Guarantee 
also financed the so-called rural development accompanying measures (eg for agri-
environment, pre-retirement, farmland afforestation and less favoured areas,) in all 
regions. Over this period, expenditure from rural development funds on measures 
aimed at rural development outside agriculture114 were both limited and 
concentrated in a few Member States (Germany and Spain, particular). Indeed, over 
the period 2000-2005, only around 10% of the total expenditure of the EAGGF 
Guarantee Fund for the EU15 went on this type of measure. 
                                                 
114  Those implemented under 'Article 33 of the rules governing the operation of EAGGF as regards 
'Promoting the adaptation and development of rural areas  (Regulation 1257/1999). 
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For the programming period 2007-2013, rural development will be implemented 
through one fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural development (EAFRD). 
At the same time, the policy aims have been simplified and clarified around three 
clearly defined objectives: (Axis 1) improving the competitiveness of the 
agricultural and forestry sector, (Axis 2) improving the environment and the country 
side, and (Axis 3) enhancing the quality of life in rural areas and diversification of 
the rural economy. In addition, the Leader method, a bottom up approach which has 
improved rural development through local action groups (almost 1000 across 
Europe) implementing strategies for their own areas will be mainstreamed. 
A budget of some EUR 88.3 billion115 has been allocated to the EARDF for 2007-
2013, with at least EUR 48,2 billion of this going to the Convergence regions116. 
The overall budget is EUR 20 billion less than the Commission had initially 
proposed. However, most of the new Member States have received an increase in 
their annual allocation compared to the previous programming period, while some 
EU15 countries have experienced a significant reduction. Support in the 
Convergence regions for the period 2007-2013 will average some EUR 40 per head 
and per year, substantially higher than in other regions (i.e. the Regional 
competitiveness and employment ones) where the average will be EUR 18 per head 
and per year.  
For the same period, the share of the CAP budget devoted to rural development will 
increase as a result of the modulation scheme (the reduction in direct payments to 
producers in favour of rural development). EARDF support for rural development 
outside the agricultural sector will also increase since interventions to improve the 
quality of life and diversify economic activity in rural areas (the third priority of the 
EARDF) will amount to 19% of the total budget (as against a minimum of 10% set 
by the Council). Depending on national strategies, however, it may turn out that 
some countries or regions will devote a significant share of their budget to this. In 
the Netherlands, it is intended to devote 35%, in Romania, Bulgaria and Malta, 
around 30%, in Poland, 25%, while among the regions in Saarland, the figure is 
43%. 
In most Member States of the EU27, the agricultural sector no longer constitutes the 
dominant part of the rural economy. In 2004, employment in the sector averaged 
7.4% of the total in the EU27, but with considerable variations between countries 
ranging from around 4.0% or less in most Member States to over 10% in Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Portugal and Bulgaria and over 30% in Romania. 
Between 2000 and 2005, the share of agriculture fell 7.8% to 6.2% (according to the 
EU Labour Force Survey). This fall is likely to continue with the new Member 
States experiencing the same process of decline as in the EU15 in the past. 
According to the mid-term evaluation117, the impact of measures hitherto co-
financed by the EARDF is more effective in maintaining employment rather than in 
creating jobs and has more effect in agriculture than in other parts of the economy 
(Tab. 4.1). 
                                                 
115  Including financial resources from modulation (see following paragraph). 
116  Information based on Rural Development Programme proposals by the Member States. If not yet 
available, the minimum amounts earmarked for Convergence regions have been withheld (Commission 
Decision 2006/636). 
117  Synthesis of the mid-term evaluation of the rural development programmes 2000-2006. 
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Table 4.1: Employment
118
 and GVA from agriculture (2004) 
Employment in 
primary sector as % 
of total employment 
Share of 
agriculture in GDP 
(GVA/DGP) %
Employment in 
primary sector as % 
of total employment 
Share of 
agriculture in GDP 
(GVA/DGP) %
Belgium 2.2 0.9 Czech Rep 4.4 1.4
Denmark 3.3 1.7 Estonia 5.5 2.2
Germany 2.4 0.9 Cyprus 5.1 2.5
Greece 12.6 5.2 Latvia 13.3 2.6
Spain 5.5 3.4 Lithuania 16.3 2.9
France 4.0 1.9 Hungary 5.3 3.1
Ireland 6.4 1.8 Malta 2.3 1.3
Italy 4.2 2.2 Poland 17.6 3.1
Lux 2.1 0.5 Slovenia 9.7 1.9
NL 3.2 1.7 Slovakia 5.1 2.0
Austria 5.0 1.2 NMS10 12.5 4.5
Portugal 12.1 2.4
Finland 5.0 1.0
Sweden 2.5 0.6 Bulgaria 10.7 8.2
UK 1.3 0.7 Romania 32.6 12.2
EU15 3.8 2.0 EU27 7.4 2.2
EU25 5.0 2.1
 
Source: Eurostat - Agriculture in the European Union:  Statistical & economic information 2005 
With the adoption of the new rural development policy and the Community 
Strategic Guidelines on rural development a more strategic approach has been 
introduced into the policy with a strong focus on the integration of major policy 
priorities as spelt out in the conclusions of the Lisbon and Goteborg European 
Councils. The translation of these priorities into the strategies of Member States for 
the period 2007-2013 provides a unique opportunity to refocus support from the new 
EAFRD on growth, jobs, and sustainability. 
The challenge is, therefore, to support the overall competitiveness of rural 
economies by encouraging diversification and training outside agriculture and, at the 
same time, to help bring about changes in agriculture to respond to the objectives 
identified in the Community strategy such as support for innovation, the growth of 
bio-energy, improvement in product quality and in environmental conditions 
5. POLICIES CONTRIBUTING TO MORE AND BETTER JOBS 
5.1.Employment policy: achieving social objectives and ensuring equal 
opportunities 
In addition to the measures supported by cohesion policy, there are a number of 
additional Community policies in relation to employment, social affairs and equal 
opportunities which contribute to economic and social cohesion. 
• Combating discrimination, and promoting gender equality and equal 
opportunities which is one of the main policy priorities of the EU and part of its 
wider strategic objectives.  
The Roadmap for equality between women and men (2006-2010)119 adopted in 
March 2006 was designed to drive  the gender equality agenda forward by 
                                                 
118   Includes agriculture, forestry, fisheries and hunting 
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promoting the integration of the gender perspective in policy initiatives and 
measures at European, national, regional and local level (gender mainstreaming) 
as well as specific action to reduce inequalities between women and men.  
In addition, as part of the Lisbon strategy, the European Council has adopted a 
European Pact120 for encouraging action at Member State and EU level to close 
gender gaps and combat gender stereotyping in the labour market, to bring about 
a better work-life balance for everyone and to strengthen governance through 
gender mainstreaming and better monitoring.  
Moreover, the regulations for the new European Institute for gender equality, 
which will provide technical support to Member States and the EU institutions to 
improve the implementation of Community policy, were agreed by the Council in 
December 2006.  
• Supporting people with disabilities, who represent around 16% of EU 
population of working age and of whom only 40% are in employment.  
In order to achieve the employment targets set out in the revised Lisbon agenda, it 
is evident that vulnerable groups such as these need to be better integrated into the 
labour market. To help bring this about, the Council has established a clear line121 
to be followed by Member States and the Commission, calling for increased 
mainstreaming of a disability perspective in all relevant policies when they are 
formulated and implemented as well as when they are monitored and assessed. 
In addition, the EU Disability Action Plan has been launched for the period 2004-
2010 with three objectives: the full implementation of the Employment Equality 
Directive; successful mainstreaming of disability issues in relevant Community 
policies; and improved accessibility for all.  
• Combining labour market flexibility with security for workers, which is key 
for adaptation to change while ensuring social justice.  
The Commission initiated a public debate in November 2006 by publishing a 
Green Paper on Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century, which asked Member States, employers and workers' representatives and 
people in general, how the EU and national legislation in this area could be 
adapted in response to the challenges of the global economy and the new realities 
of work organisation. A follow-up communication summarising the results and 
identifying areas for change is planned in 2007. 
• Ensuring free movement of workers, which is a fundamental aspect of the 
internal market and important for increasing convergence between Member 
States and regions, as well as being one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by Community law as set out in Article 39 of the Treaty  
                                                                                                                                                 
119  COM(2006)92 final 
120  Annex II Presidency conclusions – 23/24 March 2006 
121
  Council Resolution of 15 July 2003 on promoting the employment and social integration of people 
with disabilities 
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The right to free movement for workers is complemented by a system for 
coordinating social security arrangements and by an agreed set of rule for 
resolving practical cross-border problems in this area. In 2003, the scope of these 
provisions was extended to third-country nationals living legally in the EU (under 
Regulation 859/03) and efforts are at present being made to simplify the rules in 
place. 
In addition, in April 2006 guidance was published to help Member State 
governments, businesses and workers understand their rights and obligations 
when companies post employees to work in another EU country and to clarify EU 
legal requirements in this respect. A follow-up report is planned in 2007. 
• Maintaining effective social inclusion policies and modern social protection 
systems, which meet the needs of people and are financially sustainable in the 
long term. 
Such systems are crucial for achieving the Lisbon goals of economic growth, 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. Co-ordination at the EU level, 
combined with the setting of common objectives, helps Member States to 
develop and adapt their policies, monitor the outcomes and exchange good 
practice. The policy areas concerned include inclusive labour markets, active 
ageing, lifelong learning and equal opportunities.  
• Responding to demographic change, which in the form of ageing and migration 
is increasingly affecting the structure and spatial distribution of the labour force 
in the EU. A Green Paper122 describes the current situation and the expected 
trends as well as suggestions on the action to be taken, which given the very 
different demographic characteristics of regions, can have a significant effect on 
social and economic cohesion.  
5.2.Education and culture policy for investing in human capital 
Education policy, and the associated investment in human capital to improve skills 
and qualifications, directly affects on the possibilities for regional convergence as 
well as social cohesion. Equal access to knowledge and learning needs to be ensured 
throughout the EU to avoid differences in systems of education and training 
reinforcing economic disparities between regions. 
The objective of supporting EU cohesion objectives through education and training 
policy is pursued through the Education & Training 2010 work programme123 which 
is aimed, among other things, at adding a European dimension to education, aligning 
school education policies, furthering the mutual recognition of diplomas, 
encouraging life-long learning and promoting excellence in higher education.  
Coordination measures targeted, for example, at improving core skills and 
competencies, early school leaving and completion of upper-secondary education, 
                                                 
122  COM (2005) 94, 16.03.2005 
123   ‘Modernising education and training: a vital contribution to prosperity and social cohesion in Europe’. 
2006 joint interim report of the Council and the Commission on progress under the ‘Education & 
Training 2010’ work programme (February 2006). 
 179 
support the employment goals pursued in under Cohesion policy and can help to 
increase access to jobs and social inclusion in deprived regions. Equally, EU 
programmes for enhancing cooperation in vocational education and training and 
adult education (under the so-called Copenhagen process) should also contribute to 
strengthening regional competitiveness and increasing employment. In addition, 
student exchange schemes, which are particularly important in disadvantaged 
regions124, can increase the mobility of young people and reduce the disadvantage of 
living in regions with less well developed educational facilities.  
Moreover, programmes encouraging trans-national co-operation between 
universities can also contribute to reducing regional disparities in tertiary education 
in terms of both teaching and research capacities. As part of wider agenda on 
education reform (under the Bologna process), European universities are also 
encouraged to play a larger role in the Lisbon strategy by mobilising their potential 
for boosting economic growth and job creation. 
In a slightly different area, the designation of  cities as European capitals of Culture 
can create significant opportunities for their development both in the city itself and 
in surrounding areas. 
5.3.Health policy for a healthier population 
The overall aim of health policy at EU level is to ensure a high standard of health 
care and to encourage cooperation between Member States in this regard. Policy is 
directed towards health and safety at work and improving public health, through, for 
example, information and education (awareness-raising) and preventing illness and 
disease. 
The ultimate goal of health and safety at work is to improve working conditions in 
EU Member States and to reduce the incidence of work-related accidents and 
illnesses which both result in absenteeism and can lead to permanent occupational 
disability. The application of Community legislation in this area can have an 
important effect on the productivity of enterprises and the competitiveness of 
regions and Member States and consequently on economic growth and employment. 
In combination with regional policy, health policy can help to make for a healthy 
population and so increase participation in both employment and society generally. 
This is especially important in lagging regions which tend to be more disadvantaged 
in terms of both the health and age structure of the population. 
6. THE EU BUDGET 
Each policy financed by the Community budget has its own objectives, whether it is 
to assist the restructuring of a particular sector, promote critical mass and excellence 
in certain areas or support investment which because of its trans-national dimension 
requires a Community response. 
                                                 
124  In 2004/2005, 32% of Erasmus students came from Cohesion countries (source: national agency final 
reports).  
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While only Cohesion policy explicitly has a redistributive function, all expenditure 
implicitly has a redistributive effect. Since Article 159 of the Treaty requires that the 
formulation and implementation of Community policies and actions should take 
account of economic and social cohesion, it is important to understand the overall 
effect of the Community Budget in each Member State (Fig. 4.6). 
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Because data on actual expenditure is available only up to 2005125, the following 
does not include the new Member States which joined the Union in May 2004 and at 
the beginning of 2007 for which 2005 data are not meaningful. 
Expenditure aimed at promoting excellence and overcoming the fragmentation of 
activities in certain areas (such as R&D) is not linked to the relative prosperity of 
Member States and therefore its distribution between them is not correlated with 
GDP (Fig. 4.7).  
                                                 
125  Commission's document: "Allocation of 2005 EU expenditure by Member State, September 2006, 
available on http://ec.europa.eu/budget/documents/revenue_expenditureen.htm . 
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Similarly, policies for supporting the restructuring of agriculture also do not show 
any correlation with national wealth, since most of the expenditure is related to the 
structure of agricultural holdings and to the gap between market prices and support 
prices (Fig. 4.8). 
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Not surprisingly, the distribution of resources between Member States under 
cohesion policy is strongly related to their GDP, since this is the main criterion on 
which resources are allocated (Fig. 4.9). 
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Cohesion policy has played an essential role in supporting the construction of the 
European Union by seeking to ensure that everyone benefited from the creation of 
the Single Market irrespective of where he or she lived or worked and was in turn 
able to contribute to economic activity. Equally, through the creation of the 
Cohesion Fund in the early 1990s, it helped the weaker Member States to fulfil the 
conditions for economic convergence and sound government finances in the run-up 
to the single currency. 
In addition, cohesion policy has provided key support for structural adjustment in 
the countries entering the EU in successive phases of enlargement and it is now 
contributing to the pursuit of the Lisbon strategy. 
Cohesion policy now accounts for around a third of the total spending from the 
Community budget and will amount to some EUR 54.2 billion in 2013. Yet, despite 
the challenges posed by the two recent enlargements of the EU and the entry of 12 
countries with GDP per head well below the average of the existing Member States, 
the size of the Funds is declining in relation to EU GDP. By 2013, it will have fallen 
to 0.35% of GDP back to what it was at the beginning of the 1990s (Fig. 4.10). 
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The allocation of the Funds to Member States and regions for the period 2007-2013 
was decided by the European Council in December 2005 on the basis of objective 
statistics, using the so-called Berlin method established in 1999 during the 
preparation of Agenda 2000. Overall, the system ensures that the bulk of resources 
are concentrated on the less developed regions and countries. Whereas in 1989, 56% 
of available resources were allocated to the lowest income regions, at the end of the 
current programming period, the proportion will be 85%. The new Member States, 
which represent around 21% of the population of the EU27, are set to receive just 
over 52% of the total over the period. 
The method of distribution attempts to strike a balance between the need to relate 
the amount of financial support to the GDP per head of a region or country, so that 
those with the lowest levels receive most, and the need to ensure that available 
resources are used most effectively. Under the method adopted, each Member State 
is allocated an amount of aid per head which is larger the lower the GDP per head in 
its regions. This amount is then capped so that it cannot exceed a maximum level in 
relation to GDP (Fig. 4.11). 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
R
O
B
G LV LT EE P
L
SK H
U C
Z
M
T PT S
I
EL C
Y ES D
E IT IE FI FR SE U
K BE A
T N
L
D
K LU
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
Aid intensity 2000-06 (left scale)
Aid intensity 2007-13 (left scale)
Transfer2007-13 (right scale)EUR per head
4.11 Cohesion policy spending, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013
Source: calculations DG REGIO
% of GDP
 
Once the allocation of resources between Member States has been decided, national 
governments are responsible for determining the distribution between national and 
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regional programmes and between regions (except for the Cohesion Fund which is 
allocated nationally), taking account of the indicative allocations proposed by the 
Commission.  
According to the National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs), regional 
programmes are planned at present to absorb around 50% of Structural Funds 
support under the Convergence objective and over 75% of support under the 
Regional competitiveness objective. Accordingly, over EUR 100 billion of the 
Structural Funds is planned to go not to regional programmes but to sectoral 
programmes designed and managed at the national level. The distribution between 
regional and national programmes, however, varies significantly between countries, 
with most of the new Member States, as well as Greece and Portugal, allocating the 
largest part of resources to national programmes.  
In relation to the initial distribution of resources between regions indicated by the 
Commission, Member States, on average, have re-allocated around 6% of ERDF 
resources in respect of Convergence regions and 7% in respect of RCE regions away 
from the intended recipients to, in most cases, the most developed regions.  
In addition, Member States and regions are responsible for determining the 
distribution of the Structural Funds between the ERDF and the ESF. For the period 
2007-2013, on the basis of available data, Member States have chosen to assign, on 
average, approximately 75% of the Structural Funds allocation to the ERDF under 
the Convergence objective (the minimum being 63% in the UK), and around 54% 
under the Regional competitiveness objective (the minimum being 38% in 
Belgium). 
 
